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ABSTRACT 
A reading of the first volume of Sigmund Freud's Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 
(1916-17 [1915-17]), concentrating on the account of the technique for the interpretation 
of dreams. In these lectures Freud attempts to elaborate an empirical model for the 
investigation and explanation of the dream. Closer examination of this argument, 
however, quickly brings to light certain diffIculties that allow us to question whether the 
validity of psychoanalytic procedures could ever be sustained in these terms. It is 
suggested that this account requires the introduction of conditions and assumptions of 
another order. 
This argument amounts to a critique of the attempt to provide empirical foundations for 
certain key psychoanalytic concepts, in favour of a deduction of the validity of those 
concepts at the level of formal conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. It 
suggests that the legitimacy of that technique of interpretation depends upon a particular 
mode of deduction that can be considered characteristic of psychoanalytic procedure in 
general. The validity of the central concepts of psychoanalysis is then to be considered in 
terms of the procedure of argument from which their status is derived. 
Two models of psychoanalytic investigation are considered - an empirical model for the 
explanation of the dream and a more formal account of the fundamental principles of 
interpretation. The thesis concludes that these two models are not in fact exclusive but are 
rather complementary, and that a comprehensive statement of the conditions of validity of 
the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation can only be achieved through their 
interaction and articulation. At the same time it attempts to demonstrate that these issues 
have a fundamental influence upon our conception of the orientation and goals of that 
technique of interpretation. 
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This thesis is based on a reading of the first volume of Sigmund Freud's Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-17 [1915-17], Volume XV in the Standard Edition), 
concentrating on the account of the technique for the interpretation of dreams. Even then, 
it makes no claim to being an exhaustive or comprehensive analysis of that account, but 
merely pursues one line of argument through this text. It hopes to demonstrate that closer 
attention to some of the details of this account might provide us with a better 
understanding of Freud's procedure of argument in other areas of his work. 
The technique for the interpretation of dreams, the "royal road" to the discovery of the 
unconscious, plays a central role in the development of Freud's work and is indispensible 
for any understanding of the theory of psychoanalysis in general. The Interpretation of 
Dreams (1900a) remains the defming statement of this technique and of the foundations of 
the psychoanalytic method elaborated around it. The only other exposition of comparable 
scope is to be found in the lectures which Freud delivered at the University of Vienna in 
the winter term of 1915-16. It is the contrast between these two accounts that served as 
the point of departure for work on this thesis. 
The later argument does not rely to the same extent on the psycho-physiological model of 
the psychic apparatus carried over into The Interpretation of Dreams from Freud's earliest 
work in neurology. Instead it offers an account of the principles and premisses of the 
technique of interpretation within a broader consideration of the scientific status of 
psychoanalytic theory in general. It thus provides the basis for a more formal account of 
the conditions of validity of that technique, freed from any immediate dependence upon 
the metapsychological model of the psychic apparatus. 
At the same time this account forms part of a more general argument for the legitimacy of 
the central concepts of psychoanalysis. These lectures provide a consistent and 
cumulative argument which allows us to suggest that the validity of those concepts is in 
fact derived from, and depends upon, some of the most basic issues at stake in the account 
of the technique of interpretation itself. It can thus be demonstrated that a proper 
appreciation of the nature and status of those concepts within the body of psychoanalytic 
theory depends upon an understanding of the underlying argument for the validity of that 
technique. 
In the Introductory Lectures Freud puts forward what appears to be a straightforward 
"common sense" argument for the validity of psychoanalysis as a form of scientific 
knowledge. This account elaborates a basic empirical model for the investigation and 
explanation of the dream. Closer examination of this argument, however, quickly brings 
to light certain difficulties that allow us to question whether the validity of psychoanalytic 
procedures could ever be sustained in these terms. It is suggested that this account 
requires the introduction of conditions and assumptions of another order. 
This argument amounts to a critique of the attempt to provide empirical foundations for 
certain key psychoanalytic concepts, in favour of a deduction of the validity of those 
concepts at the level of formal conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. It 
suggests that the legitimacy of that technique of interpretation depends upon a particular 
mode of deduction that can be considered characteristic of psychoanalytic procedure in 
general. The validity of the central concepts of psychoanalysis is then to be considered in 
terms of the procedure of argument from which their status is derived. 
This thesis therefore considers two models of psychoanalytic investigation - an empirical 
model for the explanation of the dream and a more formal account of the fundamental 
principles of interpretation. It concludes that these two models are not in fact exclusive 
but are rather complementary, and that a comprehensive statement of the conditions of 
validity of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation can only be achieved through 
their interaction and articulation. At the same time it attempts to demonstrate that these 
issues have a fundamental influence upon our conception of the nature and orientation of 
that technique. 
II. 
The Introduction sets out some of the basic questions concerning the status of 
psychoanalysis as science which will have to be considered by these lectures as a whole. 
These questions turn upon the problematic status of the object of psychoanalysis and the 
difficulties which this creates for any empirical model of psychoanalytic investigation. The 
broad aim of these lectures may then be understood as an attempt to elaborate an 
alternative foundation upon which the validity of psychoanalytic knowledge is to rest. 
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The lectures on the parapraxes consider these issues in more detail in relation to one of the 
more familiar objects of psychoanalytic investigation. This account serves as a concrete 
illustration of some of the difficulties confronting psychoanalysis and provides a first 
indication of the approach that will allow Freud to come to terms with the difficulties 
posed by the status of the psychoanalytic object in general. This section thus contains a 
preliminary outline of the argument that will serve as the framework for these lectures as a 
whole. 
The account of the technique for the interpretation of dreams may then be understood as 
an attempt to elaborate a more comprehensive response to these difficulties. The first 
approach to the problem of dreams demonstrates how these questions are raised in their 
most extreme form by the nature of the dream as possible object of scientific investigation. 
We must therefore consider the characteristics of the dream that allow it to serve both as 
the privileged example of the difficulties facing psychoanalytic investigation and the site of 
their resolution. For it is in overcoming these obstacles that the psychoanalytic method 
will take on its mature form. 
The lecture on the premisses and principles of the technique of interpretation establishes 
the foundations for a novel technique of investigation that will allow psychoanalysis to 
come to terms with its object. This technique is grounded in the method of free 
association, which is peculiar to psychoanalysis and forms the basis for its discoveries. 
Particular attention will be paid to the two fundamental premisses of the technique of 
interpretation, as it is the discussion of the respective status of these two premisses that 
establishes the procedure of derivation which proves central to understanding the nature of 
Freud's argument in general. 
The distinction in registers established by the relation between these two premisses is then 
situated at the root of a distinction between two different models of the technique of 
psychoanalytic investigation itself. At one level Freud attempts to elaborate an empirical 
model for the explanation of the dream, structured around a direct relation between its 
manifest and latent poles. The difficulties encountered in the implementation of this model 
of investigation, however, lead to the postulation of a further register of conditions that 
will prove indispensable to the account of the conditions of validity of the technique of 
interpretation as a whole. 
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The principles of the empirical model of investigation are considered in the lecture on the 
dreams of children. Freud makes use of the more transparent examples of children's 
dreams to establish a model for the explanation of the dream as a direct reaction to a 
stimulus disturbing sleep. The absence of distortion in these dreams allows him to 
demonstrate the nature of the latent stimulus as a wish arising out of the events of the 
previous day, giving rise to the claim that the function of the dream is one of wish-
fulfilment. These examples thus allow Freud to introduce the central thesis of the 
technique for the interpretation of dreams and to provide immediate evidence for its 
validity. 
Closer examination of Freud's argument, however, raises doubts about the nature of the 
evidence upon which the thesis of wish-fulfilment depends. For the problem of distortion 
remains an immediate restriction upon the applicability of this thesis to the wider class of 
dreams as a whole. The difficulties associated with the empirical status of the principle of 
wish-fulfilment lead to the elaboration of an alternative argument for the validity of this 
principle as a necessary condition of the technique of interpretation itself. This argument 
becomes the basis for an alternative conception of the orientation and conditions of 
validity of the psychoanalytic method in general. 
This account of the technique of interpretation finds its grounding in the theory of the 
dream-work. The empirical model for the explanation of the dream relies upon the 
suppression of the register of distortion in order to establish a direct and verifiable relation 
between the manifest and latent elements of the dream. The theory of the dream-work, on 
the other hand, offers a systematic account of the modalities of distortion that arise in the 
relation between those manifest and latent elements. The register of the dream-work thus 
provides the basis for a revised account not only of the goals and orientation of the 
technique of investigation, but also of the nature and position of the wish upon which that 
technique devolves. 
The fmal section of this thesis attempts to situate these two different lines of argument in 
relation to one another and to reconcile the concepts and principles associated with each. 
This account centres on Freud's defence of the validity of the principle of wish-fulfilment 
as the fundamental postulate of the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation. It is the 
discussion of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in the dream that provides the context for 
the attempt to bring the two different models of investigation into alignment and to 
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consider the nature of the articulation between them. The defence of the principle of 
wish-fulfilment thus amounts to a comprehensive statement of the conditions of validity of 
the psychoanalytic method as a whole. 
III. 
All page references are to the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Freud, 1916-17 
[1915-17]). As an aid to continuity it has been thought best to retain these references in 
the text itself, while keeping them to a minimum. References are given to the relevant 
volume of both the Standard Edition of Freud's works and the Penguin Freud Library, 
with the Standard Edition always cited fIrst - e.g. "(P)sychoanalysis is a procedure for the 
medical treatment of neurotic patients. "(15/39) This indicates that this reference is to be 






Psychoanalysis is introduced in its most general form as "a procedure for the medical 
treatment of neurotic patients" .(15/39) It will be defined, however, both as a method 
of therapy and as a form of scientific knowledge, in distinction from the medical model. 
"(I)n this field a number of things take place in a different way - often indeed in an 
opposite way - from what they do elsewhere in medical practice" .(15/39) The 
distinction between the procedures of psychoanalytic investigation and those of 
medical science will be pursued via a discussion of the differences in instruction and 
training in the two disciplines. These differences reflect the nature of each discipline as 
a body of scientific knowledge, and extend by implication to the structure of 
demonstration and evidence which each assumes. 
The primary characteristic of medical trammg is that "you are accustomed to see 
things".(l6/40) Medical knowledge is organised around, and assumes, the primacy of 
an immediate perceptual relationship to its object, the body. The register of anatomical 
and physiological processes provides the field of evidence, accessible to objective 
verification and demonstration, upon which medicine's status as science depends. "In 
psychoanalysis, alas, everything is different. Nothing takes place in a psychoanalytic 
treatment but an interchange of words between the patient and the analyst. "(17/41) 
The entire field of psychoanalytic experience is thus limited to, and remains suspended 
from, this exchange of words. It is this restriction of the scope of psychoanalytic 
investigation to the register of language that constitutes the defming condition of 
psychoanalysis in contrast to medicine, whether as a form of clinical treatment or as a 
body of scientific knowledge. 
The restriction of the field of clinical experience to an exchange of words between 
patient and analyst raises the question of the nature and foundation of psychoanalysis 
as a technique of therapeutic intervention. In contrast to any form of direct medical 
intervention at the level of the body, it is the register of speech or language that 
effectively becomes the site of psychoanalytic intervention. This would suggest that 
the means and conditions of that intervention are themselves to be pursued at the level 
of the register of language. Freud's remarks on the role of words as a means of 
therapeutic intervention serve merely to situate in the most general terms the problem 
of the relation between language and the body in the therapeutic process. This leads us 
to question the nature of the neurotic symptom, its structure and genesis, and hence 
the possibility of its resolution, as in some way associated with the conditions of 
language itself. 
The restriction of the field of psychoanalytic investigation to the register of language 
raises more immediate difficulties for the foundations of psychoanalysis as a body of 
scientific knowledge. For the conditions governing access to its clinical material would 
appear from the start to deny to psychoanalytic investigation the sort of relation to its 
object which its status as science would require. The only material to which 
psychoanalysis does have direct access is that of the patient's speech. The natural 
expectation, then, is that it is the patient's speech, the register of clinical discourse, that 
is to provide the proper object, and thus the appropriate field of verification, for a 
science of psychoanalysis. Freud, however, immediately rules out the possibility of 
independent access to the patient, rejecting any attempt to situate the discourse of the 
patient within the accepted structure of empirical verification. "The talk of which 
psychoanalysis consists brooks no listener; it cannot be demonstrated .... you cannot be 
present as an audience at a psychoanalytic treatment."(17/42) 
This stipulation would appear to remove the possibility of objective verification of the 
findings of psychoanalytic investigation, and hence any prospect of psychoanalysis 
being accepted as a legitimate form of scientific knowledge. Far from attempting to 
gloss over these difficulties, Freud is quite explicit here in his attempt to distance the 
conditions of psychoanalytic investigation from the standard epistemology of medical 
science. He thus emphasises that even though the patient can, on analogy with the 
model of medical demonstration, be presented at a psychiatric lecture, and can be 
induced to give an account of his symptoms, the patient's willingness to provide this 
material still depends solely on the condition of his special relation of "emotional 
attachment" to the doctor. 
The restriction on independent access to the material of psychoanalysis, apparently 
ruling out the prospect of objective verification of its findings, is the decisive condition 
differentiating the structure of psychoanalytic investigation from that of medical 
science. The closure of the field of psychoanalytic experience at the same time 
establishes the dyadic relation between doctor and patient, the relation of transference, 
as the condition of access to its object. It is therefore the very condition precluding the 
possibility of empirical verification of the fmdings of psychoanalysis, the exclusive 
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nature of the clinical relation between patient and analyst. that is set up as the defining 
condition of the field of psychoanalytic investigation. 
Freud's attempt to establish psychoanalysis as a valid form of scientific knowledge, to 
outline an alternative epistemological foundation for psychoanalytic investigation, must 
therefore be in some way bound up with this process where the traditional framework 
of medical investigation is disrupted by the conditions restricting the field of 
psychoanalytic experience to an exchange of words between patient and analyst. At 
the same time this process juxtaposes the question of language, the role of words as a 
means of therapeutic intervention, and the problem of transference, the relation 
between patient and analyst as the condition of access to the material of 
psychoanalysis. 
This account thus involves a striking inversion of the concepts of language and 
transference within the distinction of registers between psychoanalysis as a form of 
scientific knowledge and psychoanalysis as a form of therapeutic intervention. For the 
problem of transference is introduced, prior to any questions of clinical technique, as 
the central condition defining the epistemological structure of psychoanalysis as a 
method of scientific investigation, just as the question of language has been introduced 
in a discussion of the conditions of therapeutic intervention. 
Freud will develop the possibilities of this dialectic between the epistemological 
register of psychoanalysis as science and the clinical register of therapeutic technique 
throughout his argument. This strategy is only really apparent by proxy in the first half 
of these lectures, where we find a deliberate exclusion of any clinical material in favour 
of an introduction to the principles of psychoanalytic interpretation within the 
framework of general questions of scientific validity. The subsequent account of 
pathological processes, which concludes with a discussion of clinical technique, then 
comes to focus on the problem of the transference as the condition upon which the 
possibility of therapeutic intervention rests. 
A certain symmetry of argument elaborated around this distinction will, however, 
allow Freud to explore themes in one register via themes in the other. Thus we will 
fmd that questions concerning the conditions of epistemological access to its object 
come to reflect across questions of the nature of psychoanalysis as a technique of 
therapeutic intervention, and vice versa. These initial remarks on the notion of 
transference as the condition defining the epistemological structure of psychoanalytic 
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investigation. will thus be mirrored by the concluding remarks on the role of 
knowledge or understanding as a condition of therapeutic resolution. 
A constant and fundamental theme in this dialectic between the two wmgs of 
psychoanalysis, as science and as therapy, will be the attempt to situate some further 
register common to both, or at least delimited by their relation, in terms of which their 
intersection, and ultimately their mutual conditions of validity, can be understood. 
Thus it is that the question of the transference comes to emerge more and more clearly, 
both as the register within which the conditions of therapeutic intervention may be 
defmed, and, more problematically, as the underlying epistemological register from 
which psychoanalytic knowledge derives its validity. 
It is this theme that provides the key to Freud's discussion of the conditions structuring 
the field of psychoanalytic investigation, and accounts for his otherwise rather puzzling 
approach to the question of the status of psychoanalysis as science. At the same time 
this strategy allows us to appreciate the use Freud makes here of the analogy of the 
lecture situation to provide the framework for his argument. 
He has begun by using the procedures of teaching or training in the two disciplines to 
distinguish the form of psychoanalytic investigation from that of medical science, 
around the question of independent perceptual access to the object in question. This 
account has involved a deliberate rejection of any attempt to situate psychoanalysis 
within the standard structure of empirical verification, in order to focus the conditions 
of access to its material onto the closed relation between patient and analyst. 
As a result of the restrictions on access to the material of psychoanalysis, Freud's 
audience are placed in a position where they are forced to rely solely on what they hear 
from him, rather than on any independent assessment of that material. The audience's 
judgement as to the validity or accuracy of what they are told thus comes to rest upon 
quite specific conditions. "As a result of receiving your instruction at second hand, as 
it were, you find yourselves under quite unusual conditions for forming a judgement. 
That will obviously depend for the most part on how much credence you can give to 
your informant." ( 18142) 
It is clear that these "unusual conditions of judgement" can be used to characterise the 
particular epistemological conditions structuring the field of psychoanalytic 
investigation as a whole. Yet by the same token it is difficult to see how this situation 
is to provide the basis for a legitimate form of scientific knowledge. For the conditions 
restricting access to the object of psychoanalysis place the audience in a position of 
exaggerated subjectivity, where their judgement comes to depend on the reliability of 
their informant rather than on any objective evaluation of the relevant material. 
It is in order to elaborate on this issue that Freud here refers to analogous difficulties in 
the epistemology of historical investigation, where one's object is by definition not 
available to direct examination, placing one in a similar position of dependence on 
alternative sources of information. Once again it is the framework of the lecture 
situation that allows him to formulate the question, not in terms of the status of the 
object of investigation, but in terms of the possible grounds for confirming the claims 
of one's informant. "What grounds would you have for believing in the truth of what 
he reported?"( 18/42) 
The two major sources of historical evidence. the monument and the document, are 
considered here primarily in their status as possible sources of verification for the 
claims of the historian. And yet it is clear that the aim of Freud's remarks is not in fact 
to establish the document as an alternative foundation for the validity of historical 
knowledge. On the contrary, he is concerned precisely to problematise the objective 
status of the document itself, by questioning the possibility of any concrete verification 
of its relation to the event in question. "Strictly speaking, however. all these 
documents only prove that earlier generations already believed in ... the reality of 
[these] deeds, and your criticisms might start afresh at that point. "( 18/43) 
The question of the status of the document as a form of objective evidence is in this 
way itself absorbed into the question of the possible grounds for the verification of 
one's sources. The criteria for the verification of historical knowledge are thus 
effectively displaced away from the traditional site of evaluation, that of the relation 
between the document and the event, onto the axis of our relation to the informant. 
Again, then, the value of the material reported comes to depend on a decision based on 
the credibility of our sources, rather than on any independent verification of the 
material itself. 
It is difficult to see how this line of argument, this strategy of excluding any external 
source of verification, in favour of absolute dependence on the report of one's 
informant, is to provide a reliable basis for psychoanalytic knowledge. Freud does 
suggest that our evaluation of the material reported would then come to rest on two 
primary considerations - the conformity between the reports of witnesses, and our 
knowledge of possible motives for deceit and fabrication on the part of the informant. 
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Yet at the same time he himself goes on, with some irony, to refer to the doubts we 
might entertain as to the credibility of our informant in psychoanalysis. 
Ignoring the contradictions involved in this approach, Freud will merely take his 
argument to an even more problematic conclusion. "If there is no objective verification 
of psychoanalysis, and no possibility of demonstrating it, how can one learn 
psychoanalysis at all, and convince oneself of the truth of its assertions?"( 19/43) The 
answer to this question is provided in equally enigmatic form. "One learns 
psychoanalysis on oneself."(l9/43) Only in that way can one acquire "the desired 
sense of conviction of the reality of the processes described by analysis and of the 
correctness of its views".(19/44) 
The reduction of the epistemological structure of psychoanalysis to a point of extreme 
subjectivity constitutes the apex of Freud's strategy of argument here. This amounts to 
a systematic attempt to maximise the "unusual conditions" of psychoanalytic 
knowledge, rejecting any attempt to situate the claims of psychoanalysis within the 
accepted framework of objective verification, in order to place his audience in a 
position of exaggerated dependence, where their judgement of psychoanalysis comes 
to rest upon the highly problematic notions of credence and conviction. 
Making no attempt to enter into the difficulties entailed by this argument, Freud 
returns to the distinction between psychoanalysis and medicine. It was this distinction 
that allowed him to bring to light the linguistic framework of psychoanalytic 
experience in contrast to the perceptual basis of medical investigation. The status 
attributed to the register of anatomy in medical knowledge corresponds directly to the 
primacy of the visual modality in the structure of its demonstrations. The register of 
physiological processes then provides the common foundation for both the aetiological 
explanations and the clinical interventions of medical science. 
Freud's account of the anatomical foundations of medical and psychiatric knowledge is 
of particular interest here, because he will explicitly dissociate the conditions of 
psychoanalytic explanation from any reliance on the register of physiological processes. 
He thus emphasises the limitations of psychiatric nosology, as a purely descriptive 
classification of mental disorders that can account for neither the origin, the 
mechanism, nor the interrelation of symptoms, except in terms of their relation to 
disturbances of physiological functioning. "These mental disorders are only accessible 
to therapeutic influence when they can be recognised as subsidiary effects of what is 
otherwise an organic illness."(21145) 
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The nature of psychoanalytic explanation is agam characterised by contrast to the 
medical model, this time in the rejection of any foundation in the anatomical unity of 
physiological functioning. The orientation of psychoanalytic thought is now defined by 
the goal of providing for psychiatry the psychological foundation that would allow it to 
account for mental disorders that have no observable organic basis. At the same time 
the particular nature of psychoanalytic knowledge and the conditions of its validity will 
come to be associated with the attempt to define this "missing psychological 
foundation" . (21145) 
The goal of Freud's argument in these lectures as a whole may be understood as an 
attempt to elaborate the conditions upon which the validity of psychoanalytic 
knowledge is to rest. The only indication that we are given here as to the possible 
nature of this foundation must be inferred from the two hypotheses that Freud now 
puts forward as characteristic of psychoanalytic science. He has already rejected as 
alien to psychoanalytic thought any hypothesis "of an anatomical, chemical or 
physiological kind" .(21145) Instead he introduces two hypotheses that are particular to 
psychoanalysis and characteristic of its mode of explanation. 
The orientation of Freud's argument in this lecture leads us to suspect that the 
foundation for psychoanalytic knowledge, defined in the move away from any basis in 
the objective realm of organic processes, is to be sought in the opposite pole of 
subjective psychological experience. Yet the first hypothesis cited by Freud, the 
postulate of the existence of unconscious mental processes, itself puts an end to any 
suggestion that he is hoping to situate the register of subjective experience at the 
foundation of psychoanalytic thought. For the assertion that mental processes are not 
necessarily conscious can only serve to frustrate any form of investigation that aims to 
base itself in the register of psychological experience. 
Despite Freud's use of the term "psychological" to provisionally characterise the nature 
of psychoanalytic knowledge in contrast to the physiological foundations of medical 
science, then, it is clear that he is equally concerned to distance himself from the 
concepts and assumptions of classical psychology, which equates the register of the 
psychical with the field of conscious experience. It is the use of this postulate, the 
hypothesis of unconscious mental processes, to drive a wedge between the definition 
of the psychological and the register of subjective experience, that then "paves the way 
to a decisive new orientation in the world and in science".(22/47) 
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This first psychoanalytic hypothesis thus serves to problematise the entire orientation 
of Freud's argument up to now, with its apparent tendency to reduce the tield of 
psychoanalytic knowledge to the pole of subjective experience. Yet in the context of 
that same argument the second hypothesis can only be put forward with equally 
provocative implications in mind. For in the light of Freud's rejection of any 
foundation in the register of physiological processes, what are we to make of the 
proposition that the psychoanalytic explanation of neurotic symptoms centres on the 
role of "instinctual impulses which can only be described as sexual, both in the 
narrower and wider sense of the word"?(22/47) 
Within the context of Freud's attempt to define an alternative foundation for the 
validity of psychoanalytic science, the juxtapositioning of these two hypotheses can 
therefore only have the paradoxical effect of problematising the nature of that 
foundation itself. Far from allowing us to defme the conditions of psychoanalytic 
explanation, these two hypotheses serve merely to preclude any attempt to situate this 
foundation in the register of either psychology or physiology, in the subjective or the 
objective pole. Instead we are left with the question of the nature of the conditions 
determining the form of psychoanalytic explanation, characterised only as "the 
common ground on the basis of which the convergence of physical and mental disorder 
will become intelligible" .(21145) 
Our only indication as to the possible status of this alternative register of 
psychoanalytic intelligibility, founded neither in the register of objective empirical 
verification nor in the subjective register of psychological experience, remains that 
initial process by which the field of psychoanalytic investigation has been restricted to a 
relation of speech between patient and analyst. For it is this process of delimitation, 
according to which the grounds of psychoanalytic intervention become identified with 
the conditions of the register of language itself, that suggests that the conditions 
defining the field of clinical experience, and thus of psychoanalytic intelligibility as a 
whole, are to be sought in terms of a possible convergence between the registers of 
language and the transference. 
I. 
The account of the psychoanalytic method begins not with postulates or principles, but 
with "an investigation".(25/50) The question then arises as to what it is about the 
topic, or object, of this enquiry that will allow us to characterise the method of 
psychoanalytic investigation. We find a first indication in the suggestion that "the 
material for its observations is usually provided by the inconsiderable events which 
have been put aside by the other sciences as being too unimportant - the dregs, one 
might say, of the world of phenomena." (27/52) 
The characteristics of the parapraxis, the initial topic of discussion, certainly conform 
to this description. These apparently random and trivial disturbances, to which 
everyone is liable, manifest themselves as inexplicable and fleeting disruptions of 
normal activities. As they possess no identifiable foundation in illness or organic 
pathology, and are without any real practical significance, they are easily disregarded 
by medicine as not worthy of scientific investigation. 
The status of these occurrences in the scale of scientific interest is reflected in the fact 
that before Freud they were not even considered a unified class or category, but 
perceived merely as a confused range of random disturbances. Indeed, their only 
corrunon attribute, the negative prefix by which the various species are designated, 
indicates that they were simply conceived as a lapse, a failure, in relation to the positive 
organic unity of normal functioning. 
The marginal or residual status of these phenomena in the world of scientific objects is 
not, then, a simple question of their lack of practical importance. In lacking the 
recognised criteria of physiological or functional unity that would render them liable to 
medical explanation these phenomena in fact fall below the threshold of scientific 
visibility. It is then legitimate to enquire into the criteria or procedures by which this 
array of random and inexplicable phenomena now come to be constituted as positive 
objects of psychoanalytic investigation. 
Freud begins by establishing the principle of determinism as a fundamental condition of 
the scientific "Weltanschauung". The suggestion that there might be any occurrence, 
no matter how trivial, that is not liable to explanation, that drops out of "the universal 
concatenation of events", would amount to "a break in the determinism of natural 
events", which is itself the most general premiss of scientific explanation.(28/53) 
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Hence it must in principle be possible to account for these phenomena, like any others, 
or at least assign to them certain determinants. 
He goes on to consider the "psycho-physiological" determinants involved in 
disruptions of normal functioning, factors that might "result in insufficient attention 
being directed to the function in question" .(29/54) Parapraxes could then be 
accounted for as "the effects of a disturbance of attention, whether from organic or 
psychical causes".(29/54) There are, however, certain features of parapraxes, the 
positive or productive aspects of these phenomena, which are not explained by a 
withdrawal of attention. Here Freud cites the most common and most striking 
examples of slips of the tongue, where one says precisely the opposite of what one 
intended to say. 
The psycho-physiological theory of the parapraxis cannot account for the product of 
the parapraxis, except as the arbitrary or accidental consequence of a disruption of 
normal functioning. It has therefore failed to examine "what it is that emerges in the 
slip itself', or to ask "why it is that the slip occurred in that particular way and no 
other".(32/57) In the place of any functional explanation of how a parapraxis might 
occur, psychoanalysis will take the product of the parapraxis as the object of its 
investigations, and seek to explain why it took that particular form. "Is there 
something that compels me in the particular case to make the slip in this particular 
way, or does it remain a matter of chance, of arbitrary choice"?(32/58) 
The constitution of the parapraxis as a positive object of psychoanalytic investigation, 
this shift from "how" to "why", entails a move away from the general physiological 
conditions of this process to the question of the individual determinants, the possible 
psychological significance, of any particular slip. This distinction is clearly marked by 
Freud's claim that until we can account for the particular nature of the product of any 
parapraxis, "the phenomenon remains a chance event from the psychological point of 
view, even though it may have been given a physiological explanation".(32/57) 
The form of psychoanalytic explanation is thus characterised by the move away from 
the register of physiological processes to a consideration of the significance of the 
parapraxis "from the psychological point of view". It is this shift in registers that 
underlies the constitution of the parapraxis as an object of scientific investigation, and 
makes possible the recognition that the parapraxis "has a sense of its own".(35/61) 
The form of explanation that makes this recognition possible, the psychological 
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foundation of psychoanalytic investigation, will similarly come to be characterised In 
terms of the notions of "significance" or "sense". 
It is here that Freud's choice of slips of the tongue as the most suitable examples of 
parapraxes becomes pertinent. For it is this category that most easily allows the 
introduction of the thesis that the parapraxis is to be considered as "a statement with a 
content and a significance" .(35/61) The topic of parapraxes in general has similar 
advantages for an introduction to the method and principles of psychoanalytic 
interpretation. For the parapraxis, even more clearly than the dream, allows Freud to 
bridge the gap from a physiological model of psychic functioning to a register of 
"psychological" explanation based on the concepts of sense and significance. 
Freud goes on to claim that if these parapraxes can be shown to have a sense then it 
becomes feasible "to leave all physiological or psycho-physiological factors on one side 
and devote ourselves to purely psychological investigations into the sense - that is, the 
meaning or purpose - of parapraxes".(36/62) This is the clearest indication yet as to 
Freud's conception of the nature of these investigations and of the alternative 
foundation for psychoanalytic explanation. His use of the term "psychological", as a 
provisional designation for this register in distinction from that of physiology, is here 
seen to entail a far broader conception than that traditionally associated with the sphere 
of empirical psychology. 
Thus where the term "psychology" has been used until now to distinguish this register 
from that of physiology, so too the term "sense" must now be taken as an index 
distinguishing this register from the traditional conception of psychology itself. We 
must therefore examine Freud's use of this term in the context of his attempt to define 
an alternative foundation for psychoanalytic explanation. An awareness of the position 
of the concept of sense within Freud's argument will help us to negotiate more 
successfully some of the confusions or ambiguities that might arise not only around the 
definition of this term, but also in relation to the status of the parapraxis in general. 
The constitution of the parapraxis as an object of psychoanalytic explanation entails a 
conception of the parapraxis "as a completely valid psychical act pursuing an aim of its 
own, as a statement with a content and significance".(35/61) Already in this defmition 
we may distinguish two aspects. On the one hand we have a notion of the parapraxis 
"as a completely valid psychical act pursuing an aim of its own", and thus as "a normal 
act which merely took the place of the other act which was the one expected or 
intended". On the other hand the parapraxis is to be considered as "a statement with a 
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content and a significance", and thus as an utterance which has "a sense of it:-
own".(35/61) 
This distinction between the two different conceptions of the parapraxis corresponds 
directly to the two aspects which Freud associates with the concept of sense itself - i.e. 
as "purpose" and as "meaning".(36/62) Hence we find both in the conception of the 
parapraxis and in the concept of sense a common nexus of ambiguity or divergence 
that can be traced to, or aligned in terms of, the tension within Freud's argument 
between a register of physiological explanation and a register of psychological 
significance. 
The use of slips of the tongue as the privileged example of parapraxes thus not only 
facilitates the introduction of the notion of sense, but also serves the attempt to 
maintain the primacy of a conception of the parapraxis as "statement", over the more 
obvious conception of the parapraxis as a "psychical act" or "function". For this latter 
notion remains in danger of returning us to a conception of the parapraxis modelled on 
the physiological conditions of normal functioning which, like any attempt to explain a 
psychic function on the structure of normal action, relies on a reference to the 
problematic psychological notions of "intention" and "purpose". 
That Freud hopes to use the notion of sense to bypass these more problematic 
subjective assumptions of psychological explanation, in favour of a form of 
interpretation based in an objective register of signification, is suggested not only by 
his privileging of the conception of the parapraxis as statement, but also by his choice 
of examples from literature to support his argument. How else are we to account for 
Freud's strategy here of presenting examples taken from fiction as evidence for his 
basic claim that parapraxes can be shown to have a sense? 
At an obvious level these examples provide a clear illustration of the role of intention 
in parapraxes. Hence Freud will claim that they prove that the author must regard the 
parapraxis as having a sense, "since he has produced it deliberately". This suggests 
that "he intends to bring something to our notice by means of the slip of the 
tongue".(36/62) Yet at the same time does not this claim fundamentally invalidate the 
basic conception of the parapraxis itself? For "what has happened is not that the 
author has made an accidental slip". Rather, "he has produced it deliberately".(36/62) 
This assertion, which might appear to contradict Freud's whole account of the 
parapraxis, serves instead to problematise the conception of a meaning or purpose 
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internal to the slip itself. ralsmg the question of the conditions under which the 
existence of such an intention could legitimately be demonstrated or veritied. Freud 
will go on to argue that even if the slip cannot after all be shown to possess a meaning 
of its own, "the author would still retain his right to intellectualise it by furnishing it 
with a sense so as to employ it for his own purposes".(36/62) 
In this way the gap opened up between the author and his character has the 
simultaneous effect of creating a displacement between the notion of sense and the 
notion of intention. This frees the assertion of sense from any reliance on evidence for 
a meaning inherent in the parapraxis, allowing us to dissociate the question of sense 
from the psychological axis of subjective intention. This manoeuvre in turn serves to 
establish objective conditions for the sense of the parapraxis that might be derived from 
its position within an external register of narrative development rather than its relation 
to the intentions of a subject. 
II. 
We have examined Freud's attempt to characterise the nature of psychoanalytic 
investigation by contrast to that of medical science. This argument turns on the 
distinction between a form of explanation grounded in the register of physiological 
functioning and an alternative psychological foundation which has come to be 
associated with the notions of sense and significance. We may therefore use the 
framework of this distinction to position the concepts that Freud introduces to define 
the conditions of psychoanalytic explanation. 
It becomes apparent that the concept of sense, which has been used to characterise the 
specific register of psychoanalytic investigation, is itself possessed of a certain degree 
of ambiguity or divergence that can be understood in terms of this underlying 
distinction. Freud's initial definition of the term as "meaning or purpose" (36/62) thus 
allows us to separate out these two aspects of the concept of sense in terms of a 
distinction between a concept of "meaning" in a linguistic register of semantics or 
significance, and a concept of "purpose" in a physiological register of function or 
intention. 
Freud's return to the concept of sense at the start of the third lecture merely serves to 
confirm the structure of this distinction. Here we find the assertion that "what is to be 
understood by the 'sense' of a psychical process" is nothing other than "the intention it 
serves and its position in a psychical continuity" .(40/66) The two aspects of this 
definition again correspond to the two possible approaches to the explanation of the 
parapraxis - either in terms of the intention or purpose that lies behind it, or in terms of 
the meaning or sense that can be attributed to it on the basis of "its position in a 
psychical continuity". 
An awareness of the underlying dynamics of the argument should thus prevent us 
leaping to any premature conclusions when Freud announces the aim of pursuing here 
only one aspect of that defmition, that of intention or purpose. "In most of our 
researches we can replace 'sense' by 'intention' or 'purpose'. "( 40/66) This assertion 
should not blind us to the possibility that Freud is here using the strategy of eliding the 
distinction between the concept of "sense" and that of "intention" precisely in order to 
bring to light the difficulties inherent in any attempt to explain the parapraxis by 
reference to the notion of intention. 
The particular interest of this discussion is not therefore Freud's apparent efforts to 
defend an explanation of the parapraxis predicated upon the psychological concept of 
intention, but rather the attempt to bring into focus the difficulties that the subjective 
and internal aspects of this notion pose for the requirements of empirical verification. 
For if the sense of the parapraxis is to be reduced to its relation to an intention, then 
the validity of that explanation comes to depend on the possibility of demonstrating the 
existence of a second, disturbing intention, which interferes with the function initially 
intended. 
We start with the simplest case in which both the sense of the parapraxis and the 
intention behind it are "plainly visible".( 40/66) It is the examples where "what was 
intended is replaced by its contrary" that provide the clearest instance of the role of a 
second intention in the outcome of the parapraxis. For here not only is the sense of the 
parapraxis unmistakable, but the existence of the conflicting intention is clearly 
demonstrated in the product of the slip itself. 
This schema, where the sense of the parapraxis is explained by reference to a relation 
of interference between two conflicting intentions, is then extended to the more 
obscure instances where neither the sense nor the nature of the disturbing intention are 
so easily discernible. Freud will claim that even the most obscure or meaningless 
examples can be explained in terms of a process of interference between two 
conflicting intentions. In these cases the absence of sense is itself to be attributed to 
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the effects of distortion ansmg from the mutual interference bet\veen those 
intentions.(42/68 ) 
The entire range of parapraxes, from those where the sense is displayed most clearly to 
the most distorted instances where neither the sense nor the intention is apparent, can 
thus be accounted for in terms of the variety of possible relations between two 
conflicting intentions. "The differences between these cases of slips arise merely from 
the fact that on some occasions one intention takes the place of the other completely 
(becomes a substitute for it), as in slips of the tongue that express the contrary, 
whereas on other occasions the one intention has to be satisfied with distorting or 
modifying the other, so that composite structures are produced".( 42/69) 
The explanation of any given parapraxis thus comes to rest upon the possibility of 
identifying the two conflicting intentions involved in each case and determining the 
nature of the relation between them. One of these intentions, that associated with the 
conscious function, is by definition easily established as manifest in the function itself. 
The question then becomes that of the procedure by which the nature and role of the 
other "disturbing" intention is to be discovered. 
In the most favourable case, where the one intention completely replaces the other, this 
second intention is apparent in the outcome of the slip itself. In all the other cases, 
however, the relation of interference between intentions gives rise to a degree of 
distortion that prevents us from easily determining the nature of the second intention. 
A fundamental problem for this method of investigation then arises. "(H)ow do we 
arrive at the disturbing purpose from the distortion?"(47174) 
Again Freud will make use of the simplest-case scenario to define the essence of the 
problem. We simply ask the speaker to explain his own parapraxis. In the most 
favourable case he is able to tell us both what he intended to say and what it was that 
disturbed him. "Here then the disturbing purpose is as securely established as the 
disturbed one".(47174) This procedure, in which the speaker is himself asked to 
account for the parapraxis and provides the explanation "with the first thing that 
occurs to him", is now presented as the fundamental model "for every psychoanalytic 
investigation".( 48175) 
This formulation of the psychoanalytic method in its most basic profile has the effect of 
situating the speaking subject at the centre of its investigations, thus bringing into 
focus the most obvious objection to the validity of this procedure - the question of the 
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reliability of the information supplied by the speaker. "But there is no proof that the 
slip did in fact take place in that way".(48175) This issue becomes even more 
unavoidable when we turn to the more problematic case where the speaker not only 
fails to contirm the role of the second intention, but goes on to deny or repudiate any 
suggestion that it exists at all. Is psychoanalysis not then forced to abandon its 
"unproveable interpretation"?( 49176) 
It is clear, then, that this formulation of the psychoanalytic method is not designed to 
defend the validity of psychoanalytic interpretation with simplistic examples, but on the 
contrary to bring into focus the problematic position of psychoanalysis in relation to 
objective verification. So too, the structuring of the argument between the most 
favourable and most problematic instance is not, despite appearances, an attempt to 
show that the latter can be reduced to, or at least approximated to, the model of the 
former. It serves rather to problematise the very possibility of verification from this 
source, by demonstrating the difficulties inherent in even the most favourable case. 
By bringing the model of investigation to bear on the position of the speaking subject, 
Freud thus demonstrates the basic contradiction faced by psychoanalysis. On the one 
hand the speaker is himself established as the sole source of information concerning the 
intentions or purposes involved in the slip. At the same time it is clear that the material 
provided by that speaker can not serve as an objective foundation for psychoanalytic 
explanation. This problematic situation gives rise to the admission that in the absence 
of reliable information from the speaker "we cannot arrive at a direct proof of the 
suspected sense". Instead, "we are obliged to turn to circumstantial evidence" .(50-
51178) 
Here Freud invokes the analogy with the conditions of legal procedure as justification 
for turning to alternative sources of verification for psychoanalytic interpretation. The 
sense of the parapraxis is thus to be sought not in the hidden intentions of the subject, 
but rather in an examination of "the psychical situation in which the parapraxis 
occurs".(51178) At the same time we encounter a slightly more elaborate account of 
that procedure of interpretation itself, which starts from general principles of 
interpretation, and then looks for confirmation or clarification either in the details of 
this psychical situation or in the course of subsequent events. 
"What happens as a rule is that the interpretation is carried out according to general 
principles: to begin with there is only a suspicion, a suggestion for an interpretation, 
and we then find a confirmation by examining the psychical situation. Sometimes we 
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have to wait for subsequent events as well (which have, as it were, announced 
themselves by the parapraxis) before our suspicion is confirmed."(S 1/78-79) 
Freud goes on to provide a range of examples intended to demonstrate not just that 
parapraxes have a sense, but more pertinently, "how that sense is discovered or 
confirmed by the attendant circurnstances".(SS/83) He refers to two groups of 
observations in particular - accumulated or combined parapraxes and cases in which 
our interpretations are confirmed by the course of subsequent events. It may be hoped 
that the relation between these two groups of examples might provide us with some 
clarification as to the status of the concept of sense and the orientation of 
psychoanalytic interpretation itself. 
The examples of accumulated and combined parapraxes are described as "without 
doubt the finest flower of their kind".(56/83) What is it about these forms that 
presents us with the essence of the psychoanalytic conception of parapraxes? On the 
one hand it is the accumulation of these phenomena which betrays an obstinacy that 
makes their sense unmistakable and indicates "something intentional". On the other, it 
is precisely their "mutual interchangeability", the variety and diversity of the forms they 
take, that demonstrates most clearly "what it is in parapraxes that is important and 
characteristic" .(56/83) 
Despite Freud's use of the terms "intention" and "purpose", then, it is clear that the 
sense constituted by the series of parapraxes as a whole is not to be identified with the 
intention associated with any particular function. Instead we are pointed towards a 
definition of the sense of parapraxes that goes beyond any limited intention or purpose 
of the psychological subject, and is constituted rather by the accumulated sequence of 
events. 
This suggestion IS supported by the second group of examples in which an 
interpretation of the sense of the parapraxis can only be conftrmed by the course of 
subsequent events. Here again the attribution of a sense to the parapraxis depends not 
on any primary reference to the intentions of the subject, which remain obscure, but 
rather on what the sequence of objective events allows us to infer about the nature of 
those intentions. 
The "governing condition" of these instances is that "the present psychical situation is 
unknown to us or inaccessible to our enquiries".(57/85) But has not the thrust of 
Freud's entire argument been to demonstrate the difficulties arising from the fact that 
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the object of psychoanalytic investigation is by nature inaccessible to the standard 
procedures of observation and veritication? Hence the need to elaborate alternative 
principles of explanation that do not depend on the possibility of any immediate access 
to the subjective sphere of intention, which is by definition "unknown to us" and 
equalJy "inaccessible to our enquiries". 
Hence when Freud suggests that there is a similarity in the status of parapraxes and 
"the omens and auguries of the ancients" he is hardly implying that psychoanalytic 
interpretation operates at the level of divination or superstition. This reference serves 
rather to establish a point of articulation between "objective happenings" and 
"subjective acts". For it is at this point that we might be able to deploy a form of 
interpretation that would allow us to interpret the external course of events as 
"indications of intentions that were still concealed".(58/86) 
III. 
The register of psychoanalytic investigation has been defined in terms of the 
proposition that its object, in this case the parapraxis, has a sense. This concept of 
sense has made possible an "extension to the world of psychical phenomena", and 
rendered liable to explanation "phenomena which were not reckoned earlier as 
belonging to it".(60/87) And yet we still have no account ofthe grounds for this claim, 
nor any clarification of the status of that concept of sense itself. This question is hardly 
resolved by Freud's suggestion that the notion of sense constitutes both the "product" 
of the psychoanalytic method and the "basis" for its further enquiries.(60/87) 
Freud points out that the validity of this conception of the parapraxis does not in fact 
depend on the possibility of demonstrating "that every single parapraxis that occurs has 
a sense", even though that may be considered likely. He thus allows for the possibility 
of parapraxes that may either occur on a purely physiological basis or be regarded as 
unintended. These two provisos, which seem to contradict the very tenets of his 
argument, are situated as qualifications or "limitations" to the hypothesis that serves as 
the starting point of these investigations - "that parapraxes are psychical acts and arise 
from mutual interference between two intentions".(60/87) 
We have seen that the explanation of the parapraxis is made possible by stmcturing it 
as a valid psychical act according to the model of normal psychical functioning. The 
sense of that parapraxis is then to be determined by tracing it to the underlying 
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structure of interference between two conflicting intentions. Freud will noW' elaborate 
on this model of the parapraxis and his conception of psychical phenomena in general, 
by questioning the concept of psychical act itself. "Let us pause for a moment longer 
over the assertion that parapraxes are 'psychical acts'. Does this imply more than what 
we have said already - that they have a sense? I think not. "(60/87) 
Here Freud provides the most unmistakable indication yet that the constitution of the 
novel register of psychoanalytic objects is to be associated with the concept of sense, 
by positing a direct relationship between the conception of "psychical act" and that of 
"sense", and arguing for a reduction of the former to the latter. He will now consider 
the respective value of these two terms in the description of psychical processes via a 
discussion of the notion of "mental phenomenon" itself. The relevant question is then 
whether this phenomenon has either "arisen immediately from somatic, organic and 
material intluences" or is rather "derived in the first instance from other mental 
processes" .(60-61188) 
Freud will once again reject any form of investigation oriented towards immediate 
physiological influences as falling outside the realm of psychology. He argues instead 
that the description of a phenomenon as psychical implies that it is situated primarily in 
relation to other mental processes. The term "sense" is introduced to distinguish this 
conception of psychical phenomena, the proper object of psychology, from any 
reduction to the form of physiological functioning. Hence even though the parapraxis 
may have a physiological basis, or even a purely physiological mechanism, it is quite 
clear that these influences do not constitute its sense, which is here established as the 
specific register of psychoanalytic investigation.(61188) 
The advantage of a form of interpretation pivoting upon the concept of sense, rather 
than on the concept of psychical function more traditional to psychology, is then 
illustrated by reference to a group of phenomena - chance and symptomatic actions -
which are "distinguished from parapraxes by their lack of another intention with which 
they are in collision and which is disturbed by them".(61188) As these phenomena 
have no conscious function there can be no question of accounting for them in terms of 
any conflict of intentions. Yet it is precisely the notion of sense that allows these 
phenomena to be interpreted "in the same way as parapraxes", even though they lack 
what would otherwise be considered the requisite structure of intentions.( 61/88) 
Rather than immediately pursuing the implications of these comments, however, Freud 
will return instead to the initial model of the parapraxis as the product of an 
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interference between intentions. "in connection with which problems important for 
psychoanalysis can be worked out with far greater clarity".(61188) We have seen that 
the validity of any attempt to account for the parapraxis as the product of an 
interference between intentions depends on its ability to determine the nature of the 
intentions involved, in order to explain how they came into a relation of mutual 
interference. Here Freud will make use of the inverse procedure, approaching the 
question of the nature of those intentions in terms of a discussion of the various 
relations possible between them. 
Again he sets up a relation between two possible cases. In the obvious case where the 
two intentions are incompatible or opposed, the parapraxis "represents a conflict 
between two incompatible intentions" .(62/89) The relation of interference between 
them may then be accounted for in terms of the content of the two intentions 
themselves. This approach is not, however, adequate for the more problematic case 
where there is no apparent relation of content between the intentions involved, and any 
relation appears to be artificially imposed along external or arbitrary paths of 
association. 
It is this second instance that suggests that the disturbance resulting in the parapraxis 
need not in fact arise from any intrinsic relation between the two intentions at all, but 
must be accounted for on other grounds. "If the disturbing intention has nothing to do 
with the disturbed one, where can it have come from and why is it that it makes itself 
noticeable as a disturbance at this particular point?" (63/90) 
This is the framework which Freud establishes as the context for his approach to "the 
main question ... of what sort of intentions these are, which find expression in this 
unusual fashion as disturbers of other intentions".(64/91) He will go on to catalogue 
the different possible types of disturbing intentions into three groups, "among which 
we must look for the common factor". These examples are grouped not according to 
the nature of the intentions themselves, but rather in terms of the manner in which we 
may come to know them. 
We may thus distinguish cases in which either "the disturbing purpose is known to the 
speaker and ... noticed by him"; or "the disturbing purpose is equally recognised as his 
by the speaker", but of whose role at that moment he was unaware; and fmally, "the 
interpretation of the disturbing intention is vigorously rejected by the speaker" as being 
"entirely foreign to him" .(64/91) The common element uniting these three groups is 
provided by the observation that, in the first two cases at least, "the disturbing purpose 
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is recognised by the speaker" but had been "forced back" or denied expression. It is 
this purpose which is then "put into words against the speaker's will".(65/92) 
This conception of the mechanism conunon to all cases of slips of the tongue gives rise 
to the observation that "what distinguishes these three groups from one another is the 
differing extent to which the intention is forced back".(65/93) This formulation in its 
turn provides the basis for the thesis that "the suppression of the speaker's intention to 
say something is the indispensable condition for the occurrence of a slip of the 
tongue" .(66/93) 
It is the third group of examples, however, that remains an obstacle for this account of 
the mechanism of the parapraxis. For if the only information about the intentions 
involved comes directly from the speaker himself, then this third instance where the 
speaker denies all knowledge of that intention would seem to constitute a serious 
restriction to the general validity of this thesis. The coherence of this account then 
requires the introduction of a further assumption - "the hypothesis that intentions can 
find expression in a speaker of which he himself knows nothing" but which can be 
inferred "from circumstantial evidence" .(64-65/92) 
It becomes apparent that it is in fact the legitimacy of this hypothesis, the assumption 
that "intentions can fmd expression in a speaker of which he himself knows nothing", 
that constitutes the horizon of this whole argument. For it is this hypothesis that 
introduces the question fundamental to the validity of psychoanalytic explanation in 
general - that of the grounds for the postulation of unconscious mental processes 
whose existence is unknown to the subject and can not be immediately demonstrated 
or verified. 
This account, which appears to tie the validity of psychoanalytic interpretation to the 
confirmation of the speaker, must therefore be assessed in relation to the more 
problematic instance where the speaker knows nothing of those processes and can not 
be expected to acknowledge their existence. Far from wishing to base his argument on 
the speaker's own evidence, Freud has been concerned to demonstrate the degree to 
which that material is fundamentally compromised as a source of objective verification. 
Hence the need for alternative principles of interpretation that not only do not rely on 
any direct knowledge of the intentions of the speaker, but will ultimately have to stand 
against the denials or protests of the speaker himself. 
21 
These issues have a direct correlate in the model of the parapraxis as the outcome of a 
relation of interference between intentions. For not only can there be no direct access 
to these intentions. nor any independent verification of their existence. but so too there 
will be instances where the role of those intentions can only be presumed or inferred. 
Hence the significance of the examples in which there is no discernible relation of 
content between the intentions, and the relation of interference has to be explained on 
other grounds. It is precisely the condition of the prior suppression of one of those 
intentions that then accounts for the relation of interference between them, and thus for 
the occurrence of the parapraxis itself. 
This hypothesis therefore implies a fundamental inversion In the procedure of 
explanation. The parapraxis was initially to be explained as the outcome of a relation 
of interference between two conflicting intentions. Attention was then focused on the 
nature of the disturbing intention in order to explain how that process of interference 
came about. This question will now, however, be answered not in terms of the content 
of that intention, nor even in terms of its relation to the intention that it disrupts, but 
solely in terms of the fact of its prior suppression. "One of these intentions must have 
been in some way forced back from being put into effect before it can manifest itself as 
a disturbance of another intention".( 66/93) 
The suppression of an intention is thus established as the "indispensable condition" for 
the occurrence of a parapraxis. This hypothesis, however, poses as many questions as 
it resolves. For it appears to rest upon the possibility of identifying that process of 
suppression as the common factor in all instances of parapraxis. We have just seen, 
however, that this conception itself demands the apparently arbitrary introduction of 
the subsidiary hypothesis concerning the role of intentions unknown to the speaker. 
And this hypothesis in turn is not only entirely devoid of adequate grounding, but 
appears to contradict the very grounds for the method of psychoanalytic investigation 
itself. 
These, then, are the questions that will have to be resolved in the course of Freud's 
argument. For this preliminary account has served merely to introduce the terms of the 
problem and to set these issues in place. Making no attempt to approach these 
difficulties or to elaborate on the status of the two hypotheses, Freud is content to 
abandon the analysis of parapraxes at this point, concerned only to emphasise "the 
manner in which we have treated these phenomena" as the model for the procedures 
and assumptions of psychoanalytic explanation in general. This approach he designates 
as "a dynamic view of mental phenomena" .(67/95) 
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This dynamic view, which will come to characterises the specificity of psychoanalytic 
explanation in contrast to the procedures of medical science. involves two interrelated 
aspects. On the one hand, psychical phenomena are to be understood and explained 
"as signs of an interplay of forces in the mind, as a manifestation of purposeful 
intentions working concurrently or in mutual opposition".(67/94) At the same time 
Freud suggests that the principle of this dynamic view of mental life implies that "the 




2.1 Dreams - Difficulties and First Approaches 
I. 
Freud's introduction to the psychoanalytic method has focused upon the constitution of 
the parapraxis as an object of scientific investigation. We have seen that this account 
revolves around the proposition that the parapraxis has a sense. We were led to 
question the grounds for this claim and the status of the notion of sense itself. For it is 
already clear that this notion of sense and its role in the procedure of interpretation will 
be fundamental to the validity of the psychoanalytic method in general. 
When we turn to the account of the dream we find the notion of sense situated once 
more at the centre of Freud's argument. The discovery of sense is presented as the 
inaugural moment of the psychoanalytic method and placed at the root of a brief sketch 
of the development of that method that is condensed to the point of being misleading. 
"It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients 
have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. 
It happened in the course of this treatment that patients, instead of bringing forward 
their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too 
had a sense."(831l11) 
The difficulties associated with this account of the process by which the dream 
becomes the object of psychoanalytic investigation have nothing to do with the 
question of its historical accuracy. It is rather the notion of the "discovery" of the 
sense of the symptom, upon which this method is supposedly founded, that appears to 
take as given the very question that is at issue. For this would imply that the concept 
of sense itself stands at the foundation of the method of investigation which makes that 
discovery possible. And yet it is precisely the problem of the status of this central 
concept that remains the most contentious and unresolved aspect of Freud's argument 
for the validity of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it. 
Similarly, the strategy of using the demonstration of the sense of the dream as an 
introduction to the study of pathological symptoms rests upon a proposed equivalence 
between dreams and symptoms. There is, however, every reason to suspect that this 
equivalence is itself only made possible by that very notion of sense that the argument 
sets out to demonstrate. For it is surely only on the basis of such a conception that 
Freud can claim that "dreams are themselves a neurotic symptom", or that the entire 
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scope of psychoanalytic knowledge could be elaborated around an interpretation of the 
dreams of healthy people.(83/ Ill) 
On the basis of Freud's earlier remarks we might suggest that it is more precisely a 
concept of sense associated with the conditions of psychoanalytic interpretation rather 
than the specific object involved that allows psychoanalysis to propose a novel level of 
equivalence between the symptom and the dream and to explore features common to 
both. It would then be precisely the rejection of the physiological criteria of medical 
explanation in favour of a problematic of sense that allows psychoanalysis to overcome 
the rigid functional distinction between normal and pathological processes and to 
consider both dream and symptom alike in terms of their role in the therapeutic 
process. 
It is clear that Freud's whole procedure here, his very approach to the study of dreams 
as an introduction to the general principles of psychoanalytic interpretation, revolves 
around the question of the status to be attributed to this problematic concept of sense. 
His discussion of the nature of the dream and the process by which the dream becomes 
the privileged object of psychoanalytic investigation should therefore allow us to 
situate this fundamental concept as that defining the parameters of this argument as a 
whole. 
II. 
"Dreams then have become a subject of psychoanalytic research. "(831112) The 
position of dreams and parapraxes as common objects of psychoanalytic investigation 
entails certain obvious similarities. The problematic status of the dream as an object of 
scientific research, however, is distinguished from that of the parapraxis by an 
additional obstacle - "the odium of being unscientific". Again this issue provides us 
with an index to more fundamental questions concerning the constitution of the object 
of science itself. For the characteristics of the dream, its very nature as object, 
challenge the most basic criteria of scientific and medical investigation. "In 
investigating dreams one is not even certain about the object of one's 
research."(841112) 
The characteristic attributes of the dream, its fragmentation, incoherence, and general 
instability, would seem from the start to preclude its definition as a coherent object. 
Compounding the intrinsic difficulty of its status as object is the fact that we can have 
25 
no direct access to the content of any particular dream apart from the dreamer's own 
description of it. We are thus faced with two interrelated aspects of the same 
fundamental problem, On the one hand the object itself, the dream as content or 
experience, is by definition beyond access to direct investigation or objective 
examination. At the same time our only source of information about that dream 
remains highly suspect as a possible basis for scientific assessment. 
The status of the dreamer's report as a reliable or accurate description of the dream 
becomes the central question - "has he any guarantee that his account has been 
correct?"(841l12) Here the difticulties of objective verification appear even more 
insurmountable than in the case of the parapraxis. For the possibility of determining 
the veracity of the dreamer's account would seem to require the availability of the 
dream itself as the basis for comparison. The particular nature of the dream, however, 
definitively rules out any form of verification predicated upon the relation between the 
dreamer's description and its object. For not only do we lack any means of 
independent access to the content of that dream, but the objective profile of the dream 
itself remains characteristically unstable or elusive. 
It is the indistinct and fragmentary position of the dream in the dreamer's recollection, 
the problems of forgetting and uncertainty, that would appear to finally preclude any 
objective verification of the dreamer's account of it. Freud's response to these 
difficulties, simply doing away with the object itself, is as startling for the nonchalant 
manner with which he proposes it as it is for the implications that it carries for the 
foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge. "We can help to overcome the defect of 
uncertainty in remembering dreams if we decide that whatever the dreamer tells us 
must count as his dream, without regard to what he may have forgotten or have altered 
in recalling it. "(851113) 
Let us take a step back. These lectures constitute an attempt to characterise the 
method of psychoanalytic investigation in distinction from the methods of medical 
investigation and the criteria and procedures of empirical science upon which it relies. 
Freud has chosen to approach this matter not in terms of the general principles of 
psychoanalytic investigation, but rather by way of the particular conditions determining 
the means of access to its objects. The question then arises as to what it is about the 
nature of these objects, and the conditions under which they become available to 
psychoanalytic investigation, that will allow us to characterise the conditions of that 
form of investigation itself. 
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The example of the parapraxIs has provided the preliminary framework for this 
argument. It is the topic of dreams, however, that will serve as the central platform 
around which Freud will formulate the basic principles of psychoanalytic investigation. 
We must therefore ask what it is about the status of the dream that makes it suitable to 
illustrate the specific conditions under which the method of psychoanalytic 
investigation comes to be elaborated and systematised. If the dream constitutes the 
privileged site for the development of that method, we can expect that the difficulties 
encountered in the attempt to situate the dream as an object of scientific research must 
be representative of the conditions of the field of psychoanalytic investigation in 
general. 
The study of the dream is faced with the immediate difficulty of its very detinition as 
object. Where the symptom, for example, at least offers us a positive object of 
investigation, the characteristics of the dream render it beyond access to empirical 
examination. Instead we are forced to rely on the dreamer's report as our only source 
of information about the content of that dream. Yet the validity of this report, and 
hence its suitability to serve as the basis for objective findings, is rendered doubtful by 
the distortions of memory that arise between the experience of the dream and its 
waking recollection. With no independent source of information about the content of 
that dream, and no means of access to the dream itself, we are left without any 
measure by which the veracity of that report might be assessed. 
As Freud has pointed out in his introduction, these difficulties are not in fact unique to 
the class of psychoanalytic objects, nor therefore necessarily characteristic of 
psychoanalytic investigation. The discipline of history is confronted with analogous 
conditions in that its object is by defmition irretrievable, and thus inaccessible to direct 
examination. Although immediate access to its object may be denied, some form of 
valid knowledge of historical events is still considered feasible on the basis of 
correlation between alternative sources of information about those events. The 
absolutely insular experience of the dream, however, precludes any attempt to 
approximate to the structure of objective verification by means of alternative form'> of 
corroborating evidence, apparently ruling out any form of reliable knowledge about 
that dream. 
At the same time that the tenuous objective status of the dream places us in a position 
of absolute dependence on the subjective report of the dreamer, we are confronted 
with the additional difficulty of the extreme instability of the subjective pole itself. It is 
this aspect, the inherent uncertainty and indistinctness of the dreamer's own 
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recollection of his dream, that ultimately precludes any attempt to use that report as a 
source of approximate information upon which access to the dream might still be 
founded. Apart from any difficulties with the insular or inaccessible nature of the 
dream as object, therefore, it is in fact the corollary instability of the subjective pole. 
the uncertainty of the dreamer's recollection, that turns out to be the decisive factor for 
the attempt to configure the dream as the object of scientific investigation. 
We are thus forced to abandon any attempt to use the dreamer's report as a means of 
gaining access to the dream itself. Instead psychoanalysis will take as its sole point of 
reference the dreamer's recollection of the material of his dream, as it is preserved in 
his memory and configured in his recounting. The rejection of any criteria of validity 
external to the dreamer's account would at the same time, however, appear to exclude 
the possibility of an objective knowledge of that dream. By cutting the dream free 
from any reference to the object, in order to consider the fragments of representation 
preserved in the recollection of the dreamer, Freud seems to be removing the empirical 
foundation for its investigation. And yet it is quite clear that the precarious nature of 
the dreamer's own recollection is in no way suited to serve as an alternative foundation 
for psychoanalytic science. 
III. 
It is only then reasonable to expect Freud to provide some other criteria by which the 
veracity of the dreamer's recollections might be evaluated, and which would then serve 
as the guiding principles of psychoanalytic investigation. We are presented instead 
with an apparently anecdotal history of attitudes to dreams, which contrasts the 
contemporary status of the dream in medical and scientific circles with the significance 
attached to dreams in ancient times as objects of practical interpretation. 
Freud suggests that it is the criteria associated with the rise of the exact sciences, and 
the quantitative and physiological foundations of medical science in particular, that 
have led to dreams being considered solely as the peripheral expression of somatic 
processes, and thus as "non-psychical acts". The presuppositions determining the 
orientation of medical investigation have tended to rule out any positive conception of 
dreaming as a psychical process in its own right. Instead the attributes of dreams have 
been considered in relation to the conditions of normal mental functioning in inevitably 
deprecatory terms, as mere "signs of diminished functioning".(871115) 
It is here that Freud raises the possibility of alternative criteria of investigation that 
would allow psychoanalysis to approach the dream as a form of coherent mental 
activity with a sense of its own, one that might have escaped the procedures of 
empirical investigation. Freud sets out to situate this task by means of "a general 
survey of the field of dreams". Avoiding the problematic issue of providing a defmition 
of the dream as the object of this enquiry, he proposes instead to isolate "the essential 
feature" of dreams. It is suggested that this defining feature of the dream might be 
sought in something that can be shown to be "common to all dreams".(87-881116) 
The most obvious common attribute of dreams is the fact that they occur while we are 
asleep. Dreaming is a form of mental activity which is distinguished from waking 
thought by certain characteristics that can be traced to the conditions of the state of 
sleep itself. Here Freud approaches the state of sleep not in terms of its biological or 
physiological function, which would merely return us to the medical model of the 
dream, but rather in terms of its "psychological characteristics". The state of sleep is 
thus characterised by a withdrawal of psychic interest from the external world. "The 
biological purpose of sleep seems therefore to be rehabilitation, and its psychological 
characteristic suspense of interest in the world." (881117) 
In that case dreams cannot be attributed directly to the condition of sleep, for they 
contradict the demand for complete absence of stimuli. Dreams would appear rather 
to involve the residues of mental activity which persist in sleep. The primary common 
feature of dreams, their relationship to the state of sleep, thus allows Freud to 
elaborate a "psycho-physiological" model of the dream as a form of defensive reaction 
to the stimuli which disturb sleep. "A dream, then, is the manner in which the mind 
reacts to stimuli that impinge upon it in the state of sleep. "(891118) This model serves 
to re-establish an empirical framework within which the occurrence of the dream might 
be explained by reference to the stimuli out of which it arises. 
Freud will devote the remainder of the lecture to an evaluation of this model and its 
ability to account for the most characteristic features of the dream. It is important, 
therefore, not to ignore the proviso that Freud situates at this stage of the discussion -
that the explanation of the dream as a simple reaction to a disturbing stimulus leaves no 
room for the factor of sense. For it is this qualification that structures Freud's 
approach to the psycho-physiological model and allows him to use the shortcomings of 
this model to situate the dimension of sense. It is thus precisely those aspects of the 
dream that can not be accounted for in term~ of any direct relation between stimulus 
and response that will point us towards the register of sense. 
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This question also explains Freud's somewhat enigmatic reference here to the other 
common attribute of dreams. For the only other feature common to all dreams, the 
difference between mental processes in dreams and in waking life, cannot be dismissed 
as the sign of a reduction or impairment of mental functioning in sleep. Rather it 
points to some form of qualitative transformation, a change in modality inherent to the 
process of dream formation, that would account for the predominance of visual images 
in dreams despite the various types of stimulus involved. It is this qualitative 
transformation that underlies the impression of strangeness in the dream, and suggests 
that "the scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational 
life" .(901119) 
The conception of the dream as a response to the stimuli that impinge on sleep thus has 
two obvious limitations. On the one hand there would be no need for the dream to 
have a sense, nor in fact to possess any positive function beyond simple reaction to 
residual stimuli in sleep. On the other hand it should then be possible to explain the 
dream by tracing it to the particular disturbing stimulus to which it constitutes the 
response. Yet the variety of dreams, the range of differences between individual 
dreams, can hardly be explained either in terms of a correspondence to the different 
states or stages of sleep, nor in terms of the various kinds of stimulus involved. "This 
variety is not in fact what we might expect to find in a mere defensive reaction to a 
stimulus" .(901119) 
After making note of these reservations, which themselves serve to cast doubt on the 
viability of the psycho-physiological model of the dream, Freud will propose leaving to 
one side the question of the sense of the dream in order to press ahead with the 
conception of the dream as "the reaction to a stimulus which disturbs sleep" .(921120) 
Again we start with the simplest example, where the stimulus appears in the content of 
the dream, providing the most direct evidence for the role of that stimulus in the 
formation of the dream. We continue with a series of "arousal dreams" where the 
dreamer is in fact woken from the dream by the persistent disturbance of the stimulus. 
These instances again provide a simple demonstration of the role of some external 
stimulus in the instigation of the dream. 
In these examples, however, the stimulus does not actually appear in the content of the 
dream. Instead the dream "interprets" the stimulus, and replaces it with another. It is 
here that a problem arises for any attempt to explain the dream by reference to the 
stimulus around which it forms, for "it interprets it differently each time" .(93/122) 
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Thus in each of these examples the same disturbing stimulus is represented by a 
different image. An adequate explanation of the dream would have to be able to 
explain why this particular image and no other was chosen for the representation of the 
stimulus in the dream. As that aspect of the dream is clearly not determined by the 
nature of the stimulus, the question of the choice of image would appear to be "a 
matter of caprice" .(931122) 
Freud goes on to suggest that the examples of arousal dreams "offer the best chance of 
establishing the influence of external sleep-disturbing stimuli", in that the stimulus itself 
remains available to consciousness on waking. In all other instances we are faced with 
the problem of the means by which we are to determine the nature of the stimulus 
which gave rise to the dream when we have no information about that stimulus. "If the 
stimulus can no longer be pointed to we cannot be convinced of its existence."(941123) 
Yet Freud will also point out that, whatever the status of this external stimulus, it can 
in any case explain only those aspects of the dream which correspond directly to the 
influence of that stimulus, but not the most familiar and characteristic aspects of dream 
formation in general. 
When Freud turns to the role of internal stimuli in the formation of the dream he will 
make us of the same framework of argument. Thus although we find ourselves 
returned here to the register of physiological processes, Freud is concerned above all 
to emphasise that the role of somatic stimuli in the formation of the dream is open to 
the same objections as that of external stimuli. On the one hand there is the problem 
that the influence of a somatic stimulus is "uncertain or unproveable", in that this 
stimulus "is no longer manifest after waking and can therefore not be proved to have 
occurred".(951124) On the other hand, and more decisively, Freud wishes to point out 
that "internal somatic stimuli are as little able as external sensory stimuli to explain 
more of a dream than what corresponds in it to a direct reaction to the 
stimulus" .(961125) 
In this case too there are examples where the relation of the content of the dream to 
the source of a somatic stimulus "is too plain to be mistaken".(951l24) Here it is 
precisely the pressure of a need, an over-full bladder or a state of excitation of the 
genital organs, that provides the clearest example of the role of an internal stimulus in 
the formation of a dream. In all other cases there can be at best "a justifiable 
suspicion" that a somatic stimulus is involved. For although the content of the dream 
might provide some indication of the influence of a somatic stimulus, that stimulus is 
inevitably subjected to a process of "interpretation" or "working over". "Dreams do 
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not simply reproduce the stimulus: they work it over. they make allusions to it. they 
include it in some context, they replace it by something else."(961l25) 
It is this active or productive aspect of the process of dream formation, the "working 
over" of the stimulus, that can not be explained in terms of any simple relation of 
reaction to that stimulus. For that process does not appear to be determined by the 
nature of the stimulus itself. The difficulties involved in establishing the origin of the 
stimulus that disturbs sleep are thus rendered irrelevant by the subordinate role 
attributed to that stimulus as mere "instigator" of dream formation. Whatever the 
status of that stimulus, and whatever its role in the instigation of the dream, it can still 
not account for the aspects of dream formation that might be considered most 
characteristic of the dream itself. 
This point is illustrated by reference to the simplest or most reasonable dreams, which 
might be expected to display most clearly the influence of the stimuli from which they 
arise. Even in these most transparent instances, where there appears to be a minimum 
of working over and the dream is made up of nothing more than a direct representation 
of material from everyday life, we still need to know "why and for what purpose this 
familiar material, only recently experienced, has been repeated in the dream" .(971127) 
IV. 
The attempt to characterise the dream in terms of the conditions of sleep, and thus in 
terms of its relation to possible sources of disturbance to sleep. appears to have met 
with limited success. An alternative approach to the problem seems called for. Freud 
suggests that the topic of day-dreams might provide an indication of some further 
attribute of dreams apart from those already considered. 
It is immediately apparent that any claim of day-dreams to be considered a form of 
dreaming can have nothing to do with the state of sleep, for "there is no trace in them 
of the two things that are common to dreams".(981127) Any similarity between night-
dreams and day-dreams would rather have to do with their nature as "products of the 
imagination". Their common designation would thus be attributable to their "having 
the same relation to reality".(991128) 
This would suggest in turn that the two common features already identified might not 
in fact be the ultimate determinants of dreaming, but might merely account for the 
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characteristic form in which it is experienced. The conditions of the state of sleep 
would in that case account for the irrational or incoherent aspects of mental activity in 
the dream, as weU as the predominance of visual imagery. So-called "day-dreams" 
would, in contrast, provide us with an example of the mental activity of dreaming, but 
without those aspects derived from the conditions of sleep that make dream, 
themselves so difficult to understand. 
The more accessible content of the day-dream would then provide us with insight into 
the nature of these forms of imaginative production, expressed in the rational modality 
of waking thought. Here the function of this form of mental activity as the imaginary 
fulfilment of wishes of either an egoistic or erotic nature becomes quite apparent. "The 
content of these phantasies is dominated by a very transparent motive. They are scenes 
and events in which the subject's egoistic needs of ambition and power or his erotic 
wishes find satisfaction. "(98/ 128) 
The analogy between night-dreams and day-dreams, founded on apparently speculative 
linguistic grounds, thus allows Freud in one move to dispose of the two "common 
features" of dreams, which have served their purpose to establish the terms of the 
argument, and to bring to light the more essential question of the status of dreams as 
"products of the imagination". This in turn allows him to introduce the central 
psychoanalytic thesis that the dream is a form of wish-fulfilment in its most concrete 
and plausible context. The grounds for that principle. however, will have to be sought 
elsewhere. 
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2.2 The Premisses of Interpretation 
I. 
Freud's introduction to the method of psychoanalytic investigation has until now 
revolved around an examination of the characteristics of the object involved. This 
procedure is made quite explicit at the beginning of the second lecture, where Freud 
proposes starting with a particular object of investigation, the parapraxis, rather than 
with general princip~es or postulates. The aim of this procedure may be understood as 
an attempt to situate the field of psychoanalytic investigation in terms of the particular 
conditions of access to its object. The initial approach to the topic of the dream has 
been shaped by a similar attempt to bring into focus those aspects of the 
psychoanalytic object that prove resistant to standard procedures of empirical 
investigation. It is in response to the limitations of the physiological account of dream 
formation that Freud now proposes an alternative approach. "What we need, then, is a 
new path, a method which will enable us to make a start in the investigation of 
dreams. "( 1 DOl 129) 
Freud turns to elaborating the principles of a procedure of investigation that will allow 
psychoanalysis to come to terms with the particular nature of its object. This new 
approach is marked by a shift in register away from an examination of the object to a 
general discussion of the principles or premisses of the technique of interpretation. 
This step marks a decisive shift in the orientation of the argument. The previous 
discussion has focused on the characteristics of the psychoanalytic object, in an attempt 
to demonstrate that it is the problematic status of its object that denies to 
psychoanalysis the sort of empirical foundation that grounds other forms of scientific 
investigation and ensures their validity. Instead psychoanalysis will be forced to seek 
an alternative foundation at the level of the principles underlying its procedure of 
investigation. It is these principles, the premisses of the technique of interpretation, 
that are to provide the basis for a novel approach to its object. 
The fust premiss of the psychoanalytic technique for the interpretation of dreams is the 
assumption that "dreams are not somatic but psychical phenomena".( 100/129) A large 
part of the previous lecture has been devoted to a discussion of the inadequacies of the 
physiological model of dream formation, in order to demonstrate that the attempt to 
explain the dream in terms of the somatic processes that underlie it is unable to account 
for the most characteristic features of the dream. This discussion was aimed precisely 
at bringing to light those aspects of the process of dream formation that can only be 
accounted for in terms of the dream's nature as a form of mental activity or 
"imaginative production". Yet here Freud will make no reference to this preceding 
argument, which itself amounts to a decisive rejection of the somatic model of dream 
formation. Instead he will choose to present this premiss in what seems to be an 
unnecessarily belligerent or dogmatic manner. "(W)hat justifies our making the 
assumption? Nothing: but there is nothing either to prevent our making it."(l001129) 
Let us not forget that we are here dealing with what is to be the first premiss of the 
technique of psychoanalytic interpretation. The validity of that technique of 
interpretation, and thus of the psychoanalytic method as a whole, can therefore only be 
presumed to rest upon, or at least be closely tied to, the legitimacy of this initial 
premiss. It is not then unreasonable to expect closer attention to be paid to the 
question of the status of this premiss and the grounds of its validity. Freud's approach 
to this issue becomes even more puzzling when one realises that he has at his disposal 
perfectly plausible grounds for arguing that the dream is in fact a form of mental 
activity, and could even claim to have demonstrated this likelihood in the previous 
lecture. Yet he will ignore the available empirical support for this premiss, in favour of 
the far more tenuous argument that dreams "can only interest us on the assumption 
that they are mental phenomena".(1 001129) Are we truly to believe that the nature of 
the dream is to be considered dependent upon the reasons for our interest in it? 
We can only make sense of Freud's procedure here as an attempt to separate off the 
question of the validity of this premiss, and thus of the technique of interpretation 
itself, from any foundation in the empirical register. The manner in which the issue is 
formulated then serves to bring this strategy to our attention and to highlight this 
distinction. For the first premiss of the technique of interpretation is formulated as an 
assumption concerning the nature of the object under investigation. It also happens 
that there are quite legitimate grounds for this assumption in the demonstrated 
characteristics of the dream itself. The validity of this premiss could thus be far more 
effectively argued on those grounds, in terms of the positive attributes of the object of 
this assertion. Yet Freud will disregard any possible empirical support for this 
assumption, in order to tie the validity of the premiss to the aims of the work of 
investigation. "The outcome of our work will decide whether we are to hold to this 
assumption and whether we may then go on to treat it in turn as a proved 
finding."( 1001129) 
The legitimacy of this first premiss is not, therefore, considered in terms of any 
foundation that it might have in the characteristics of the object involved, nor in terms 
of any possibility of establishing its validity at the level of an empirical examination of 
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that object. The validity of this assertion as a premiss of interpretation is rather to be 
considered solely in terms of its status as a principle of explanation, and thus in relation 
to the aims or goals of the work of investigation. And what are these aims. the 
"outcome" of the work of investigation, to which the validity of this premiss will be 
tied? "(S)omething sought for in all scientific work - to understand the phenomena, to 
establish a correlation between them".( 1001129) 
Freud's procedure of argument here, his conception of the status and grounds of 
validity of this initial premiss, becomes even more signiticant in the light of the 
inference he immediately wishes to draw from it. "We proceed with our work, 
accordingly, on the supposition that dreams are psychical phenomena. In that case 
they are products and utterances of the dreamer's, but utterances which tell us nothing, 
which we do not understand. "( 100/129) A great deal will hinge upon this inference, 
for Freud will go on to characterise the method for the interpretation of the dream as 
the attempt to discover the meaning of this "utterance". We can only then presume 
that the validity of that method of interpretation will depend to a large degree on the 
legitimacy of this assumption and the concept of meaning that it implies. And yet, after 
taking a somewhat oblique approach to the relatively innocuous question of whether 
the dream is to be considered a psychical process or not, Freud is quite happy, without 
any further qualification, to now draw this crucial and contentious conclusion from that 
premiss. We must then take a closer look at this first premiss of the technique of 
interpretation, in order to determine in what sense it can be considered to imply, or 
provide the basis for, the assumption that the dream has a meaning. 
Freud's account of the method of psychoanalytic investigation began with the 
distinction between the physiological register of medical investigation and the 
"psychological" register of psychoanalytic explanation. It is not, then, entirely 
unexpected to fmd this same distinction situated at the root of the first premiss of the 
technique of interpretation. For the question whether the dream is to be considered a 
somatic or a psychical phenomenon merely maps, in the form of a hypothesis about the 
nature of the object, that initial distinction between registers of explanation that Freud 
has already established as fundamental to the method of psychoanalytic investigation. 
Nor should it surprise us to fmd that the next step takes us once more to the heart of 
the problematic of sense. We have already examined the use Freud makes of that 
initial distinction to situate the parapraxis, the first object of psychoanalytic 
investigation, as a "statement" with a sense or a meaning. That whole argument now 
serves as the framework for the attempt to situate the dream as an "utterance", on the 
grounds of its position in the register of mental activity. 
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That initial argument thus allows Freud to treat this ftrst premiss of psychoanalytic 
interpretation, formulated as a claim about the dream's status as psychic phenomenon. 
as amounting to the premiss that the dream has a sense. For has he not already gone to 
some pains to set up an equivalence between the notion of "mental phenomenon" and 
the notion of "sense"? It is this conception of the sense of mental phenomena in 
general that now forms the basis for the assertion that the dream has a sense, and may 
thus be considered a meaningful utterance. Once we appreciate that this premiss in 
effect amounts to the postulate of sense then we have for the first time some indication 
as to the status of that enigmatic concept itself. For we may then treat the procedure 
by which this ftrst premiss has been argued as establishing the general framework for 
the premiss of sense as well. In that case the sense of the dream, and of the 
psychoanalytic object in general, is to be postulated in the form of a provisional 
hypothesis on the basis of which the work of interpretation proceeds. The validity of 
this assumption is then to be justifted on the basis of the outcome of that work of 
interpretation, in terms of its success in rendering that dream intelligible. 
The suggestion of circularity or tautology about this process, that a concept of sense is 
postulated as the basis for a technique of interpretation that then allows us to 
"discover" that sense, only arises if we ignore the procedure according to which this 
premiss is argued. For just as the claim that the dream can only interest us on the 
assumption that it is a mental phenomenon remains inexplicable if treated as a 
dogmatic assertion about the nature of the object, so too the postulate that the dream 
has a sense is not to be considered as an empirical or substantive claim, but rather as a 
provisional assumption justified in its status as a necessary premiss of interpretation. 
The premiss of sense is thus postulated in a provisional or "hypothetical" mode as the 
premiss of the intelligibility of the dream. This principle of intelligibility rests on no 
other grounds than its status as a necessary assumption required if interpretation of the 
dream is to be at all possible. The legitimacy of this principle will then be considered in 
terms of its success in rendering the interpretation of the dream possible, rather than on 
the basis of any empirical demonstration of characteristics intrinsic to the dream itself. 
"We proceed with our work, accordingly, on the supposition that dreams are psychical 
phenomena".(lOO/129) This allows us to consider the dream as a product of the 
dreamer's mental activity that is in principle intelligible or meaningful, even though that 
meaning may not be at all apparent. The question then becomes merely one of the 
procedure by which that meaning is to be discovered or established. The most obvious 
approach would be to ask the dreamer what his dream means. This "common-sense" 
37 
model of investigation, already elaborated around the parapraxis as the basic model for 
every psychoanalytic investigation, however, runs into immediate difficulties in the 
case of the dream. With the parapraxis the basic procedure of interpretation was 
modelled on the simplest case where the speaker was himself able to tell us what he 
had intended to say. In all other cases that model of investigation turned Ollt to be a 
little more problematic, and ultimately required the introduction of supplementary 
hypotheses of questionable legitimacy. The nature of the dream forces these 
difficulties to the forefront, in that from the start the dreamer has no information to 
give regarding the meaning of his dream. "With dreams cases of the frrst sort are 
entirely lacking; the dreamer always says he knows nothing".(1 0 1/130) 
Again, then, it is the dream that raises the most serious doubts about the viability of 
this method of investigation. "Since he knows nothing, and we know nothing, and a 
third person could know even less, there seems to be no prospect of finding 
out".(101l130) It is in response to this characteristic situation that Freud introduces 
the second premiss of psychoanalytic investigation. "(1)t is quite possible, and highly 
probable indeed, that the dreamer does know what his dream means: only he does not 
know that he knows it and for that reason thinks he does not know it".( 1011130) 
The manner in which Freud formulates this second premiss, upon which the procedure 
of psychoanalytic interpretation is to rest, gives rise to such a welter of paradoxical 
implications as to defy any credence to that premiss itself. For not only does Freud's 
use of the term "know" appear to go beyond any accepted conception of knowledge, in 
suggesting the possibility of the dreamer knowing something that he does not know, 
but tied as it is to our enquiry into the meaning of the dream, this claim further implies 
a conception of the dreamer meaning something that he does not mean. This situation 
is not, in fact, any further clarified by Freud's indication that this second premiss 
amounts to the postulation of the existence of unconscious mental processes. Why 
then the formulation of this key issue, one of the more problematic psychoanalytic 
hypotheses, in a manner apparently designed to guarantee its dismissal? And yet he 
will go on to argue that this second premiss actually refers to an established empirical 
fact, one that "has already been proved in another field".(l02/131) 
At this stage it becomes difficult to keep track of Freud's intentions here. He has 
begun by arguing what should be a relatively straightforward frrst premiss, concerning 
the nature of the dream as psychical process, in what seems an unnecessarily obscure 
or tautological manner. He has now arrived at what would appear to be one of the 
most contentious of all psychoanalytic hypotheses, that of the possibility of 
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unconscious knowledge, which we might well expect to see argued in provisional 
form. And yet he will proceed to argue that this second premiss refers to a concrete 
and demonstrable empirical fact. If we are not to go astray here, it will be necessary to 
make some effort to sort out the precise status of these two premisses, and the nature 
of their relationship to one another. 
We have seen how the first premiss, which situates the dream within the register of 
mental processes, can be considered to introduce the postulate of sense, in the form of 
the assumption of the intelligibility of the dream, necessary if interpretation is to be at 
all possible. Given that the very possibility of interpreting the dream must depend to 
some extent on the question of whether the dream does in fact has a sense, it should 
not surprise us to find this postulate tied up with the premisses upon which the 
technique of interpretation is to rest. The manner in which this tirst premiss is 
approached, however, suggests that Freud wishes to derive the postulate of sense from 
the assertion that the dream is to be considered a psychical rather than a somatic 
process. This first premiss thus seems to entail the postulate that the dream is to be 
considered intelligible, in principle, solely on the basis of its situation within the register 
of psychical processes. It is, therefore, the possibility of situating the dream within the 
context of mental activity that in itself constitutes the basis for the claim that the dream 
has a meaning or a "sense". 
We thus have a conception of the sense of the dream, postulated in the form of the 
premiss of its intelligibility, that derives from the situation of that dream within the 
register of mental activity. This concept of sense need imply no more than the 
possibility of assigning to the dream a certain significance solely on the basis of its 
occurrence within an economy of psychological processes. It is surely only on the 
basis of such a conception that Freud can argue for any direct equivalence between the 
notion of mental phenomenon and the notion of sense. The possibility of interpretation 
would depend, then, neither on the configuration of the dream as a "meaningful 
utterance", nor on the demonstration of any meaning that might be apparent in the 
manifest dream itself. Instead we would have the basis for a formal conception of the 
intelligibility of the dream that would be derived from its position within the closed 
economy of psychical processes as a whole, rather than from any relation to the 
intentions of the dreamer. 
Are we not then required to distinguish between this conception of the sense of the 
dream and any conception of meaning that would be derived from the conscious 
knowledge or intentions of the dreamer? It is only on the basis of such a distinction 
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that we can hope to make any sense of the ambiguities of the second premiss. This 
distinction would at the same time allow us to clarify the question of the relationship 
between the two premisses, which Freud rather enigmatically characterises as laid 
down "one within the other".(1 021131) If we understand the tirst premiss as 
establishing the postulate of the sense of the dream, in the form of a general principle 
of intelligibility associated with its situation in the register of mental events as a whole, 
then it becomes clear how the second premiss can be considered to be established 
"within" the first. For the second premiss merely formulates the implications of that 
initial postulate of intelligibility, but within a structure of meaningful communication 
predicated upon the position of the conscious subject as the site of knowledge and 
source of meaning. 
It is only on the basis of such a conception of the relationship between the two 
premisses, and the sense in which the second is to be considered as postulated "within" 
the first, that we can account for, or hope to resolve, the paradoxes of the second 
premiss. At the same time the distinction in registers detined by the relation between 
the two premisses would provide a comprehensive framework for an understanding of 
the use of the terms within them. The transition from a general conception of the 
"sense" of the dream, postulated in the first premiss as a principle of intelligibility, to a 
positive assumption of the "meaning" of the dream considered as an utterance of the 
dreamer, would then account for the paradoxical formulations of the second premiss. 
For it is the transition from the first premiss to the second that contains the 
questionable inference from the postulate of the intelligibility of the dream to its 
structure as meaningful utterance. "In that case they are products and utterances of 
the dreamer's, but utterances which tell us nothing, which we do not 
understand".( 1 00/129) 
It is around this second conception of the dream as utterance that Freud will then 
deploy the basic model of investigation already elaborated in relation to the parapraxis 
as statement. The major difference between the dream and the parapraxis, however, is 
that the parapraxis is already situated in the context of meaningful speech or functional 
activity. The examples of slips of the tongue, in particular, can thus quite plausibly be 
structured in terms of the model of meaningful communication. Hence when we 
question the speaker as to what he "meant to say", he will tell us what he had "intended 
to say".(1011130) The question of the meaning of the parapraxis may thus be 
answered in terms of the intention that lies behind it. The practical difficulties 
encountered by this model of investigation in the case of the dream, on the other hand, 
bring to light more fundamental difficulties with the model of meaning which it 
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assumes. The fact that the dreamer cannot tell us what his dream means is merely an 
indication that the dream is not in fact structured as a meaningful utterance, and can 
not therefore be explained in terms of any simple relation to the dreamer's intentions. 
The manner in which Freud approaches this discussion, and the contradictions into 
which he leads it, suggests, however, that the underlying aim of this strategy is 
precisely to allow him to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in such a conception of 
the meaning of the dream and the inadequacy of any model of investigation based upon 
it. This procedure thus serves to bring into focus the impasse into which such a 
concept of meaning leads us, demonstrating the need for some further conception of 
the sense of the dream and an alternative procedure for its investigation. To tie both 
the meaning of the dream and the possibility of its interpretation to the conscious 
knowledge of the dreamer, as Freud appears to do here, can only give rise to 
immediate difficulties. Within any model of meaningful communication structured on 
the intentions of the speaking subject, the dream would by definition remain 
meaningless, and thus beyond interpretation. In the light of such a conception of 
meaning the insistence that the dream does have a meaning, and that the dreamer does 
know what that meaning is, even though there is manifestly no trace of either that 
knowledge or that meaning, can only amount to a deliberate paradox. 
The only possible grounds for such an assertion would be the assumption of a meaning 
that does not in fact rest upon the conscious knowledge or intentions of the dreamer. 
The first premiss, the postulate of the intelligibility of the dream in relation to the 
economy of psychical processes as a whole, itself sets up the conditions for such a 
concept of sense. For this initial postulate already entails a conception of the sense of 
the dream associated with, or constituted by, conditions external to it, and thus distinct 
from the intentions of the dreamer. The second premiss then amounts to no more than 
a reformulation of this first premiss of the intelligibility of the dream within the 
traditional structure of meaning and knowledge as devolving upon the position of the 
conscious subject. The appearance of paradox that arises from the insistence that the 
dreamer must know what his dream means, even though he does not know, only 
follows if we are unaware of the foundation of this claim in the initial postulate that the 
dream has a sense that, given the availability of the necessary material, can in principle 
be deciphered without the knowledge of the dreamer. This second formulation, by 
bringing the issue to bear on the site of the conscious subject in its position as sole 
arbiter of knowledge and meaning, serves, however, to manufacture a paradox that will 
require the dissolution of that sovereign position for its resolution. 
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It is thus the distinction in registers detined by the relationship between the two 
premisses, to the extent that the second may be considered to be laid down within the 
first, that provides the framework within which this procedure becomes intelligibk. 
For it is only in terms of the distinction between the registers of the two premisses that 
we may appreciate the questionable nature of the inference that links them, and which 
gives rise to the paradoxical implications of the second premiss. And it is only if we 
can understand how the paradox of the second premiss is constructed that we can 
understand how it is to be resolved, by tracing the illegitimate use of terms in their 
positive formulation back to the context from which they derive their appropriate 
conditions of use. The paradoxical implications of the second premiss turn upon a 
double use of the terms "knowledge" and "meaning" - once as postulated in 
hypothetical form in the initial premiss of intelligibility, and then again within the 
positive model of the meaning of the dream, devolving on the position of the conscious 
subject as source and support of that meaning. The difficulties associated with the 
second premiss could then be shown to arise from the illicit use in substantive mode of 
terms which derive their coherence from within a different register. 
This procedure for the resolution of the paradoxes of the second premiss provides us 
with the outline of an approach to symptoms in general. If we consider the paradox as 
a simple formal model of the symptom, then the procedure for the resolution of the 
symptom would entail a similar "therapeutic deduction", tracing the illegitimate 
conjunction of terms in the conscious register, which has given rise to the difficulties of 
the symptom, back to the context from which they arise. This procedure of derivation 
would also provide a first indication as to the appropriate status for the concept of the 
unconscious itself, as the register of intelligibility within which the occurrence of the 
symptom can be accounted for. This concept would then imply no substantive 
assertion concerning the positive nature of unconscious mental processes, nor depend 
upon any empirical evidence for their existence, but rests solely on its status as a 
necessary postulate required if explanation of certain paradoxical effects in the register 
of conscious experience is to become possible. In each case the appropriate procedure 
of derivation would entail the demonstration that the difficulties experienced at the 
level of positive formulation demand the postulation of an alternative register of 
intelligibility, in the context of which alone the coherence of phenomena in the 
empirical register can be explained. 
This procedure of deduction, by which the postulate of the unconSClOUS is to be 
justified, also throws some light on the analogous status of the concept of sense. For it 
would account to some extent for the rather puzzling manner in which the postulate of 
sense has been proposed, under cover of the first premiss, as a hypothetical principle of 
intelligibility justified on no positive grounds apart from its success in rendering the 
phenomena in question intelligible. The legitimacy of that tirst premiss of intelligibility, 
whether configured as the premiss of sense or as the postulate of the unconsciolls, 
would then derive, in the first instance, solely from the procedure of deduction itself. 
This argument also takes us some way towards a more comprehensive account of the 
relative status of the two premisses themselves. For a simple inversion in the direction 
of derivation, from the positive formulation of the second premiss to the necessary 
postulation of the first, required in order to render that second premiss intelligible, 
immediately renders their relationship more transparent. This reversal of the procedure 
of argument would allow us to account not only for the puzzling hypothetical status of 
the first premiss, with its lack of any apparent empirical foundation, but also for the 
problematic inference linking the two premisses and giving rise to the paradoxes of the 
second. For the difficulties at each of these stages of Freud's argument could then be 
traced to the attempt to present in a positive or substantive mode postulates whose 
status is derived from an inverse procedure of deduction. 
It is therefore the reversal of this legitimate procedure of derivation, in the attempt to 
provide a substantive statement of the foundations of the technique of interpretation, 
that accounts for the problematic provisional status of the premiss of sense. At the 
same time it is the illegitimate inference bridging the gap between the two premisses 
and giving rise, in the progressive direction, to the paradoxes of the second premiss, 
that remains the most obvious index of this inversion of the procedure of argument. It 
is no accident, therefore, that it is precisely the questionable inference connecting the 
two premisses that has provided our initial point of access in the attempt to situate the 
concept of sense in terms of the relationship between the two premisses. Freud's 
procedure of argument here remains, however, all the more important, because it is 
around this inference that we may see how, in effect, the paradox of the second 
premiss is constructed. The ensuing argument will now go on to demonstrate the 
conditions under which that paradox may be resolved, precisely by means of the 
introduction of an alternative conception of knowledge and sense already prepared by 
the first premiss. 
In a way then, it is only at this stage that we are provided with a clear picture of the 
position and status of the concept of sense entailed by the premiss of intelligibility. 
From now on that concept of sense, and the register of intelligibility detinecl by the first 
premiss as a whole, will in effect disappear from view under the register of the second 
premiss. It is around the formulation of this second premiss that Freud will elaborate a 
method of investigation directed towards the conscious knowledge of the dreamer. 
This will allow him to elaborate a simple common-sense model of psychoanalytic 
investigation anchored resolutely at the level of concrete empirical procedures. His 
strategy of argument, however, will remain consistent in the attempt to bring into foclis 
the difficulties facing this method of investigation, precisely in order to demonstrate the 
need to introduce further conditions of intelligibility, in the context of which alone 
these difficulties might be resolved. The concept of sense, this alternative register of 
intelligibility, will thus be left in suspense in order to pursue a conception of meaning 
oriented upon the conscious knowledge of the dreamer. It is the demonstration of the 
limitations of the model of investigation elaborated around this notion of meaning, 
however, that will then serve to establish the possibility of a more comprehensive 
frame of reference for the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation as a whole. 
If we are not, then, to fall into a simplistic or reductive reading of Freud's argument 
here, it will be necessary to orient that reading in terms of the distinction of registers 
established by the relationship between the two premisses of the technique of 
interpretation. For that same distinction between a register of meaning and a register 
of sense will give rise to a radical divergence between two fundamentally different 
conceptions of the nature, conditions, and orientation of the technique of 
psychoanalytic investigation itself. The relationship between these two premisses, the 
distinction in registers that it entails, and the appropriate procedure of derivation from 
one to the other, will therefore continue to provide the framework for the argument 
that follows. 
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2.3 The Method of Free Association 
1. 
This thesis concerning the relationship between the two premisses of interpretation 
allows us to reconsider Freud's attempt to argue the second premiss in the form of an 
empirical postulate. Our conception of the status of this premiss will have a 
determining influence on our understanding of the orientation and grounds of validity 
of the technique of interpretation as a whole. For the elaboration of a scientific model 
of psychoanalytic investigation around this second premiss depends in the first instance 
on the assertion that this premiss, the postulate that the dreamer does in fact know the 
meaning of his dream even though he does not realise it, can be maintained as an 
established fact. The proof for this assertion will be provided by evidence taken from 
the field of hypnotic phenomena. The procedures of hypnotic investigation will at the 
same time serve as the initial model for the investigation of the dream. 
Yet in following the development of this account we should not entirely neglect the 
register of conditions defined by the first premiss of sense. For it is clear that the 
argument for the validity of the second premiss, and of the technique of interpretation 
in general, does not rest solely on the evidence of hypnotic phenomena. The 
plausibility of this argument turns equally on the legitimacy of the grounds that allow 
us to transfer these findings from the field of hypnotic investigation in the tlrst place. 
This procedure depends in turn upon the postulation of an analogy in the conditions 
supporting the possibility of dreams and hypnosis - the state of sleep and the state of 
hypnotic somnambulism respectively. The viability of the attempt to defend the second 
premiss on the basis of the evidence of hypnotic phenomena thus comes to rest upon 
the claim that "(t)he psychical situations m the two cases are really 
analogous".( 1 041 133) 
The psychical situation underlying these two phenomena will now be characterised in 
terms of the withdrawal of interest from the external world. This description of the 
psychical situation underlying the two instances recalls Freud's earlier attempt to detine 
the state of sleep underlying the dream in terms of its psychological rather than 
physiological characteristics. In the case of the day-dream, too, the psychical situation 
was characterised by a withdrawal of interest from the external world, a suspension of 
the relation to reality which creates the conditions for a closed field of imaginative 
production. In each case the attempt to characterise the dream in terms of a 
descriptive analogy at a positive level, whether to day-dreams or to hypnosis. 
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ultimately depends on our ability to detine the underlying psychical situation that may 
be considered the necessary condition of each. 
The attempt to argue the second prentiss at an empirical level, on the basis of evidence 
brought over from the field of hypnotic investigation, thus rests upon the assumption 
of a closed economy of mental activity underlying both the dream and the phenomena 
of hypnosis. Yet the position of this underlying psychical situation, a closed field of 
imaginative production defmed by the withdrawal of interest from the external world, 
bears certain striking similarities to that of the register of sense delimited by the first 
premiss. For not only has that register of sense been detined in term" of a closed 
economy of mental activity, within which the dream may be considered meaningful, but 
so too its status has been established in the form of a necessary condition, required if 
effects in the empirical sphere are to be rendered intelligible. Once again, then, it is the 
relationship between the two premisses of interpretation that provides our guide to an 
argument apparently elaborated solely at the positive level of the secondpremiss. 
A comprehensive account of the grounds and orientation of the technique for the 
interpretation of dreams can therefore only be sketched out in the space opened out by 
the relation between these two premisses. The first premiss of sense establishes the 
initial conditions for a form of interpretation that does not depend on the dreamer's 
limited knowledge about the meaning of his dream. For that first premiss postulates 
the intelligibility of the dream in terms of its position within the economy of mental 
processes as a whole. The question that then arises is how that register of sense, the 
underlying psychical situation, is to be determined in any particular case. It is the 
second premiss, which orients the general premiss of intelligibility onto the knowledge 
of the dreamer, that provides the basis for the attempt to establish the context of 
signification in relation to which the meaning of any specific dream might be 
determined. 
The defence of the second premiss by reference to the evidence of hypnotic 
phenomena thus serves to provide provisional support for the assertion that the 
dreamer may indeed have access to material of which he previously knew nothing. At 
the same time the procedure of hypnotic investigation provides a concrete and 
plausible demonstration of a technique by which that material may be brought to light. 
Once the second premiss has been established in positive term';, in a way that the first 
could not, then it is around this premiss, the assumption that the dreamer does know 
more about his dream than is immediately accessible to him, that the basic model of 
psychoanalytic investigation will be deployed. "It is very probable, then. that the 
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dreamer knows about his dream; the only question is how to make it possible for him 
to discover his knowledge and communicate it to us."( 104/134) 
It is clear, however, that such a conception of the goals and orientation of the 
technique of psychoanalytic interpretation, modelled directly on the procedures of 
hypnotic investigation, would merely lead us once more into all the difficulties of the 
positive model of knowledge and meaning. For this would imply that our knowledge 
of the meaning of the dream, and hence the possibility of its interpretation, rests 
directly upon the dreamer's own knowledge of that meaning, and the possibility of his 
communicating it to us. Apart from the practical obstacles already outlined, it is 
difficult to see how this procedure might be expected to provide the basis for a reliable 
form of objective knowledge about the dream. 
Despite the initial claim that the goal of investigation is for the dreamer himself to 
discover the meaning of his dream, in order to communicate it to us, it is clear that the 
technique of interpretation cannot ultimately rely upon that knowledge for its validity. 
For the dreamer cannot be expected to have any direct knowledge of the dream's 
meaning, but merely to guide us towards "the circle of thoughts and interests from 
which it sprang".( 104-05/134) It is this circle of thoughts and interests, the context of 
signification within which the meaning of that dream is determined, that will then form 
the basis for a technique of interpretation that does not ultimately depend on the 
conscious knowledge of the dreamer. 
While the second premiss serves to orient the question of the intelligibility of the dream 
upon the knowledge of the individual dreamer, therefore, its formulation as paradox at 
the same time serves to problematise that concept of knowledge and its foundation in 
the conscious subject. The immediate outcome of this strategy will be a displacement 
of the traditional position of the conscious subject as sovereign arbiter of knowledge 
and meaning, in order to establish a more comprehensive context for the interpretation 
of the dream. "Thus we disregard the distinction between his thinking or not thinking 
that he knows something, and we treat both cases as one and the same." (l 05/ 134) 
We can only consider this step, the dissolution of a distinction central to the detinition 
of knowledge itself, to be the direct result of the manner in which the second premiss 
has been formulated. The paradoxical implications of the second premiss here give rise 
to a fundamental displacement of the position of the conscious subject, in order to 
introduce a conception of meaning that neither coincides with nor depends on the 
knowledge of the dreamer. It is this step, the dissolution of the distinction supporting 
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the position of the knowing subject, that now provides the basis for the method of free 
association, upon which the technique of psychoanalytic interpretation is to be 
founded. 
At the same time it becomes apparent that, despite immediate appearances, a positive 
model of investigation, elaborated at the level of the second premiss and oriented upon 
the knowledge of the dreamer, can no longer be sustained. For although this second 
premiss appears to establish the knowledge of the dreamer as the foundation for an 
understanding of the dream, it is clear that the technique of interpretation does not in 
fact depend upon the dreamer's own knowledge about that meaning. but merely uses 
his associations to establish the context of thoughts and interests in relation to which 
the dream might be rendered intelligible. 
It is easy, therefore, to fall into a simplistic reading of Freud's argument here if we 
ignore the framework provided by the relationship of the two premisses, and in 
particular the procedure of derivation according to which Freud makes use of the 
paradoxical implications of the second premiss in order to arrive at the alternative 
register of intelligibility postulated by the flrst. This would leave us with a simplistic 
conception of the conditions of the technique of interpretation, argued solely at the 
positive level of the second premiss, based on the dubious empirical foundations of the 
model of hypnotic investigation, and devolving upon the conscious knowledge of the 
dreamer. 
The strategy of argument outlined in relation to the paradoxes of the second premiss 
may now, however, be extended to the assumptions of the model of investigation 
elaborated around it. Freud will make use of the dialectical possibilities of the lecture 
format to raise hypothetical objections to an argument formulated in empirical terms, 
precisely in order to develop principles of explanation that could not be directly 
established at a positive level. Hence it is in fact the shortcomings of this model of 
investigation, and the limitations of the concepts of knowledge and meaning which it 
assumes, that will allow Freud to situate the further register of conditions which the 
coherence of that procedure of investigation ultimately demands. 
II. 
The legitimacy of such a reading of Freud's argument in these lectures remains to be 
demonstrated. This approach, however, immediately allows us to reconsider the status 
of the initial model for the explanation of the parapraxis, which was proposeJ by Freud 
as the basic procedure for all psychoanalytic investigation. For we may suspect that it 
is precisely the criticisms of the empirical validity of this model of investigation that 
will allow Freud to introduce further principles of explanation which might resolve the 
difficulties implicit in that earlier account. It is this more comprehensive account of the 
technique of interpretation, elaborated in the first instance around the principle of the 
determinism of associations, that will then provide the foundation upon which the 
psychoanalytic theory of the dream is to rest. 
In the original model for the investigation of the parapraxis the speaker was asked to 
account for his slip, "and the first thing that occurred to him gave LIS the 
explanation".( 1051134) His reply provides us with an explanation only to the extent 
that he is aware of the intentions involved, and can thus explain the meaning of his 
parapraxis by informing us of the intention that lay behind it. The conscious 
knowledge of the speaker is here quite clearly situated as the site of the relation 
between meaning and intention, and hence as the primary condition for the explanation 
of the parapraxis. 
It is clear, however, that the sense in which the dreamer's response constitutes an 
explanation of his dream merely approximates, at best, to the case of the parapraxis. 
For the dreamer has no conscious knowledge of the meaning of his dream, and can 
thus not be expected to provide any direct explanation of it. It is here that Freud 
suggests that we disregard the distinction between the dreamer having or not having 
any knowledge of that meaning, and enquire merely as to what occurs to him "in 
connection with the dream".(1 051134) The dreamer's remarks, the first ideas that 
occur to him, are then to be considered an explanation to the extent that they provide 
access to the circle of thoughts and interests from which the dream arose. 
The validity of this technique thus comes to depend upon the nature of the relation 
between the ideas that arise and the dream which they are supposed to explain. These 
ideas provide the basis for an explanation of the dream only if it can be shown that they 
bear some sort of determinable relation to the meaning of which we are in search. The 
term "free association" itself points us towards the crux of this issue. For the question 
at stake is precisely whether what occurs to the dreamer in response to his dream does 
arise at random, or whether it can be shown to bear a necessary relation to that dream, 
hence providing the basis for an explanation of its meaning. 
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This difficulty is already implicit in the original model for the investigation and 
explanation of the parapraxis. In the initial account Freud points out that even if lhe 
speaker does have some knowledge of the meaning or intention underlying his 
parapraxis, and even if he is prepared to communicate this knowledge to us. there can 
still be no proof that his explanation is reliable.(4817S) Hence even in this most 
concrete case, where the relation between the meaning of the parapraxis and the 
intention underlying it is clearly established in the consciousness of the speaker, we still 
lack the conditions for the objective verification of that relation, and thus for any 
demonstration of the validity of the explanation. 
At that stage Freud was content to dismiss this objection with a reference to the notion 
of a "psychical fact", although the relation of this term to the general prim:iple of 
psychic determinism was neither elaborated nor pursued. Here he will defend the 
validity of the method of free association by reference to a "determinism whose rule 
extends over mental life", and will go on to argue that this determinism is a 
demonstrable fact. "It can be proved that the idea produced by the man was not 
arbitrary, nor indeterminable, nor unconnected with what we were looking 
for. "( 106/136) Once again we might expect that the attempt to defend the principle of 
determinism at an empirical level will at the same time allow us to situate a further 
register of conditions underlying that principle. 
The basic model of association to the dream entails association around a specific topic, 
"while keeping an idea in mind as a starting-point".(1061l36) The question then 
concerns the nature of the connection between this initial idea and the associations that 
arise in response to it. Rather than attempting to demonstrate the determinism of any 
particular association, however, Freud will approach this issue by situating that relation 
in the context of the determinism of associations as a whole. This will allow him to 
arrive at the conclusion that if "things that occur to one quite freely are determined in 
this way and form parts of a connected whole, we shall no doubt be justified in 
concluding that things that occur to one with a single link - namely their link with the 
idea which serves as their starting point - cannot be any less determined".( 1081138) 
We thus begin with examples where the initial condition of a fixed starting-point IS 
dropped, and associations are merely called for within a particular context, according 
to a general rule or principle of association which specifies only the sort or kind of 
association called for. ( 1 07/136) The example of numbers chosen at random provides 
the most instructive example of the type of association implied here. For the class of 
numbers offers the classic illustration of a closed economy of elements elaborated 
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around specific rules of procedure. We thus have a purely formal organisation of 
elements, meaningless in themselves, whose value or significance is determined hy their 
position in relation to the other elements within the system as a whole. 
Precisely for that reason association within the system of numbers provides the most 
telling demonstration of the influence of mental processes whose existence is not 
otherwise apparent. For, in contrast to the system of language, there can be no 
question of any "meaning" inherent to the elements themselves, and thus no additional 
factor to mask the influence of these hidden interests. These examples therefore 
provide the clearest evidence for the assertion that associations are "always strictly 
determined by important internal attitudes of mind which are not known to LIS at the 
moment at which they operate - which are as little known to us as the disturhing 
purposes of parapraxes and the provoking ones of chance actions".( 107/136) 
The example of association within the class of proper names then provides the link to 
the determinism of associations within the system of ordinary language. For just as 
association to numbers displays the unmistakable evidence of subjective innuences, so 
too "it is impossible to think of a name at random which does not turn out to be closely 
determined by the immediate circumstances, the characteristics of the subject of the 
experiment and his situation at the moment".(l071137) 
The crucial distinction, however, one that can easily be obscured in these examples, is 
that between the determinism of associations at the level of the system of language 
itself, according to the link to the initial idea, and the further influence on the pattern of 
associations by unconscious emotional influences. "Investigation shows, in fact, that, 
apart from the link we have given them with the initial idea, they are found to he 
dependent as well on groups of strongly emotional thoughts and interests, 'complexes', 
whose participation is not known at the moment - that is to say, is 
unconscious. "( 1091138) 
It thus appears that associations may be determined in two ways or from two possible 
directions - either according to their links with the particular idea that serves as their 
starting-point or by the influence of emotional interests "whose participation is not 
known at the moment". The question then becomes that of the possible articulation 
between these two registers of influence upon the determination of associations. For if 
the association to any particular dream element may be determined either by its links to 
that element itself or by the influence of unknown emotional interests, or both. then it 
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is diHicult to see how we might use this association to arrive at a reliahle explanation 
of the meaning of the dream. 
The answer suggested by Freud points us towards the key to the method of free 
association as a whole. For in contrast to association experiments, where the stimulus-
word is selected by the experimenter and imposed upon the subject, in the dream "the 
stimulus-word is replaced by something that is itself derived from the dreamer's mental 
life".(1101l40) It is this condition, the fact that both the dream and its associations 
arise from the mental activity of the dreamer, that renders it probable "that the further 
associations linked to the dream elements will be determined by the same complex as 
that of the element itself and will lead to its discovery".( 110/140) 
III. 
This returns us to the question of the grounds for the principle of determinism that is 
the central tenet of the method of free association. It is clear that not only the validity 
of this method, but the very possibility of the technique of interpretation elaborated 
around it, comes to rest upon the assumption of a necessary connection between 
associations. For if the regularity or reliability of the relation between associations can 
be questioned, then the validity of the technique as a whole is cast in doubt. The 
manner in which the principle of determinism is established and defended will thus be 
fundamental to our conception of the nature and conditions of the technique of 
psychoanalytic interpretation itself. 
The basic principle of the determinism of associations implies the assumption that 
whatever occurs to the dreamer in relation to his dream is in some way connected to 
the meaning that we are in search of. Objections to the plausibility of this assumption 
can themselves be related to more fundamental questions concerning an attribution of a 
meaning to the dream in the fIrst place. For it is this problem, that of the grounds for 
the postulation of a meaning to the dream to begin with, that remains fundamental to 
the question of the procedures or criteria by which that meaning might be determined 
and verified. 
This question raises obvious difficulties for the standard framework of psychological 
investigation. Any attempt to explain the dream in terms of its relation to the 
intentions of the dreamer appears futile, as the dreamer himself has no knowledge of 
that meaning. The alternative approach proposed here by Freud, that of attempting to 
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establish the meaning of the dream by tracing it to the circle of thoughts and interests 
from which it is supposed to have arisen, remains no less problematic. For even if that 
meaning is to be determined in relation to some context of thoughts and interests, it is 
still difficult to know just how we are to settle on the precise context that is relevant in 
any particular instance. 
Apart from the questionable methods suggested to extract this material from the 
dreamer, there still remains no way of assuring ourselves of the validity of any 
associations that do arise. For if the ideas that emerge in response to this method are 
to provide the basis for an explanation of the dream, or to lead us to its meaning, then 
we would require some sort of objective criteria in terms of which the pertinence of 
those associations could be assessed. Even if the dreamer were to provide a quite 
coherent and plausible account of the origin and meaning of his dream, there would 
still be no way of verifying this explanation or of excluding any other equally plausible 
alternatives. 
The attempt to determine the meaning of the dream by means of the method of free 
association is thus faced with two corollary difficulties - the question of the grounds 
for the apparently arbitrary attribution of a meaning to the dream in the first place, and 
the criteria for the specification of an equally random context of associations in relation 
to which that meaning is to be determined. And yet it is preCisely the contingency of 
this process, the dreamer's "freedom" to select any element of his dream for association 
and to pursue any path of association that occurs to him, that will provide the basis for 
the reliability of this method. 
The initial step, in which the dreamer himself selects aspects of the dream for 
association, and divides it up into arbitrary elements of meaning. already provides an 
indication of the context within which the dream is to be situated. In contrast to the 
assumptions of a positive model of meaning, which would require some criteria for the 
specification of units of meaning in the dream, it is clear that the apparently arbitrary 
nature of this procedure constitutes no objection to its validity. For the meaning of 
those elements is not considered as fixed, nor "objective", nor even inherent in the 
elements themselves, but rather remains essentially contingent upon the context within 
which they arise and are situated. 
It becomes clear to what extent Freud can claim that the random delimitation of il 
context of associations is itself "a matter of indifference".(1 05/135) For any 
association. even the most minimal or tangential. ultimately even the absence of 
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associations, will be sufficient to indicate a context of interests in relation to which that 
element might be defined as meaningful. This procedure is thus indifferent to any 
empirical or historical criteria for the verification of associations - their source. their 
status, or even ultimately the nature of their relation to the dream in question. For the 
role of these associations does not depend upon their veracity as memories but solely 
upon their ability to defme a context of thoughts and interests in terms of which the 
sense of that dream might be established. 
It is clear, then, that the question of the criteria for evaluating the relation between the 
dream and its associations must be considered in a new light. For it is this conception 
of the sense of the dream that allows Freud to claim that the mere fact that an idea 
arises in the context of associations to a dream is in itself sufficient grounds for 
establishing its validity, or its relevance to the meaning of that dream. It is thus no 
longer a question of whether the association can be shown to have any necessary 
relation to the meaning of the dream, but rather that the occurrence of the association 
itself serves to establish a context of significance in relation to which that dream might 
be defined as meaningful. 
The principles of the method of free association do therefore indeed have a 
fundamental relation to the grounds for the postulation of a meaning to the dream. 
Not, however, in the obvious sense that the validity of this method depends upon the 
initial assumption of the existence of a meaning. But rather in the sense that the 
method of free association itself serves to produce or to delimit the context of 
signification within which that meaning is to be established. Hence, rather than 
attempting to trace the conditions of the method of free association to some 
hypothetical premiss of the sense of the dream, it could just as easily be argued that it 
is in fact the positive and concrete procedures of the method of free association that 
allow us to postulate and to determine that sense. 
It is such a conception of a register of sense, in terms of which the meaning of any 
element of the dream may be determined, that provides the basis for the assertion of "4.1 
determinism whose rule extends over mentallife".{1061l36) For it is clear that such a 
register of sense, a context of significance delimited by the method of free association, 
provides a coherent and tenable framework for a register of signifying determinism 
within which no thought or remark that arises can be considered arbitrary or 
undetermined, or unrelated to others within that same sphere of associations. And it is 
the principle of the determinism of associations founded in this register of sense that 
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provides the foundation for the validity not only of the method of free association but 
of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it. 
This conception of the conditions under which the sense of the dream is to be 
determined, in terms of its relation to an essentially mobile or contingent context of 
associations, allows us at the same time to account for the possible "over-
determination" of the meaning of any term. For if the meaning of any element of the 
dream is neither flxed nor in any positive sense inherent in that element itself. but 
derives from its relation to a particular context of signification as delimited by the 
method of free association, then by the same token the meaning of that element is 
never finalised, but remains open to moditication by further associations or by further 
elaboration of the system of signification within which its meaning is determined. 
Hence even though it might have an accepted or established meaning, in relation to an 
accepted context of use, no term may claim a tixed or absolute meaning, nor escape 
the possibility of having its meaning altered by modifications in the context of 
signification within which it is situated. Again, the manifest or accepted sense of any 
term, as determined by a recognised circle of associations, may still be influenced by, 
or subject to, a further context of thoughts and interests, which are not themselves 
equally apparent. The meaning of any single manifest term would then be subject to a 
certain degree of ambiguity, according to the various registers of significance by which 
it is supported. 
It would be instructive, perhaps, to contrast this account of the "over-determination" 
of mental processes, and the accompanying conception of the unconscious as a context 
of signification that is not immediately available to consciousness, with Freud's initial 
model of symptomatic over-determination in terms of an economy of libidinal 
investment as laid out in his "Project for a Scientific Psycholo.g)':" (Freud,1950a 
[1895]). This comparison might at the same time allow us to contrast the different 
concepts of determinism entailed by the two accounts according to the distinction 
between a register of mechanical or physiological causality and an alternative register 
of signifying determinism. 
The aim of the "Project" is to elaborate a psycho-physiological model of the psychic 
apparatus around its somatic foundations in the principles of neurological activity. We 
thus fmd an essentially mechanistic conception of the functioning of the psychic 
apparatus, described in terms of the investment and distribution of a hypothetical 
quantity of neurological excitation or cathexis. Even this account of the distribution of 
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cathexis within a neurological model of the psychic apparatus, however, rests upon 
fundamental principles of economic coherence, which regulate the now of that 
hypothetical quantity within a closed system of investments. 
The influence of the unconscious, the over-determination of conscious thought-
processes, is then explained in fundamentally mechanistic terms according to the 
distribution of cathexis from somatic or physiological sources, which diverts the 
passage of directed thought-processes by means of the greater magnitude of 
unconscious investments. It is this account of the displacement and investment of 
neurological excitation within the psychic apparatus that provides the basis for a 
physiological and quantitative conception of the unconscious, as the reservoir of libido 
arising from somatic or instinctual sources. 
In contrast to this physiological model of the determinism of unconscioLls processes, in 
terms of the mechanistic causality of somatic instincts, we now have before us the 
grounds for an alternative signifying model of the psychic apparatus, founded on a 
register of sense which itself constitutes an economy of signification. This gives rise to 
a conception of a procedure of interpretation which does indeed approach any given 
phenomenon within its domain as an "utterance", as a positive manifestation of sense 
that is in principle intelligible, but precisely in the attempt to diagnose, or to determine, 
the conditions in relation to which that utterance might be defined as meaningful. 
The central problem for such an account, and for the technique of interpretation 
associated with it, would be the question of the rules and procedures according to 
which such a closed economy of sense is to be defined. For it is only on the basis of 
the conditions or limits constituting such a register of sense that we are able to 
determine the place, and thus the meaning, of any element or term within that realm. 
The goal of this technique of interpretation would not then rest with the meaning of 
any particular element, nor even ultimately with the sense of the dream itself, but rather 
with the attempt, by means of these procedures, to define or to delimit the register of 
significance in terms of which the appearance of any element within it might be 
rendered intelligible. 
At the same time it becomes clear to what degree it is the dream, the privileged object 
of psychoanalytic investigation, that provides the closed space within which these 
themes may be explored. For it is precisely the problematic nature of the dream, a 
register of representations severed from any obvious relation to either the external 
world of objects or the conscious intentions of the dreamer, that allows the register of 
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sense to emerge in its primacy. And it is the method of free association. the concrete 
procedure by which this register of sense is to be delimited. that proviJes us with the 
practical means by which this register. which ultimately constitutes the space of 
psychoanalytic intelligibility itself, may be elaborated. 
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SECTION THREE 
3.1 On the Distinction between Manifest and Latent 
I. 
The procedure for the investigation of the parapraxis has been established as the basic 
model of psychoanalytic investigation. The application of this procedure to the 
interpretation of the dream is, however, subjected to a qualifying clause which appears 
to be mentioned only in passing, and might thus easily be overlooked or ignored. Qur 
earlier discussion would suggest that we are not lightly to dismiss Freud's attempt to 
situate the two premisses of the technique of interpretation as the limiting condition of 
the argument here as well. (1 13/143) This reference indicates that we must be prepared 
to use the framework of argument already elaborated around those premisses to guide 
our reading of the account that follows. 
Subject to that crucial qualifying clause, then, the basic model of investigation will now 
be applied to the analysis of the dream, giving rise both to a more detailed account of 
the process of interpretation and to a more elaborate conception of the nature and 
structure of the dream itself. The application of this model of investigation to the case 
of the dream will, however, be subject to certain important qualiiications, which open 
onto a more comprehensive account of the foundations and conditions of validity of 
the technique of interpretation as a whole. An examination of the grounds of Freud's 
argument here will show that neither that argument nor the model of investigation that 
it proposes can ultimately be sustained at an empirical level, but demand in both 
instances the introduction of conditions of intelligibility of another order. 
This model of investigation is elaborated around the account found at the end of the 
previous lecture of the analysis of one of the most conunon of parapraxes, the 
temporary forgetting of a proper name.( 1101140) This example is presented there as 
both a practical illustration of a procedure of investigation based on the method of free 
association, and a confirmation of the validity of the principles upon which that method 
is based. This procedure, which demonstrates the possibility of recovering a forgotten 
name by means of free association, is now to serve as the basic model for the 
interpretation of the dream. 
The obvious advantage of this example is that it provides a concrete and plausible 
demonstration of the method, one that can easily be confirmed by inunediate personal 
experience. I find myself temporarily unable to recall a name, which I am nevertheless 
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certain that I know. Despite all my efforts, I find that the name remains inaccessible to 
recall. In place of that forgotten name I am able to produce several substitute names, 
even though I recognise that these substitute names are not the one I am looking for. 
The method of free association is then applied to each of the substitute names, 
allowing us to arrive at the forgotten name by a more roundabout path. "I tind when 
this happens that both the spontaneous substitute name and the ones I have called up 
are connected with the forgotten one and were determined by it."( 1111141) 
The successful outcome of this procedure allows us to demonstrate the manner In 
which both the substitute names and the associations around them are connected to the 
forgotten name in question, thus confirming the validity of the principle of determinism 
which this method assumes. The procedure for arriving at the unknown name merely 
retraces the path from the substitute names and their associations to the forgotten 
name by which they were determined. There is then every likelihood that in the case of 
the dream too, the dream elements and their associations will turn out to be determined 
by the still unknown meaning of the dream. We may thus make use of the same 
procedure in order to arrive at that meaning by way of the associations. 
The procedure for the recovery of the forgotten name by means of free association is 
thus proposed as the model for the investigation of the dream. This account allows us 
to consider the dream elements as substitutes which stand in for, or take the place of, 
the real meaning of the dream, which remains unknown. "Like this substitute name, 
the dream element is not the right thing, but only takes the place of something else - of 
the genuine thing which I do not know and which I am to discover by means of the 
dream-analysis."(llO/140) 
It is this conception of the status of the "substitute" dream elements, and their relation 
to the hidden or "genuine" meaning of the dream, that establishes the basic framework 
for the interpretation of the dream. The analysis of any individual dream element 
entails tracing that element, via the chain of associations, back to the idea from which 
it arose and by which it was determined. This procedure for establishing the meaning 
of any individual element of the dream is then to be "carried over" to the whole dream, 
considered as the sum of such elements, providing the basis for a technique of 
interpretation that will allow us to establish the meaning of the dream as a whole. 
It is here that questions about the legitimacy of this argument ftrst arise. For the 
application of this procedure to the investigation of the dream assumes, in the first 
instance, an analogy between the status of the proper name that has been forgotten and 
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the meaning of the dream that is unknown. Even if the procedure for the recovery of 
the forgotten name is to be considered a valid demonstration of the method of free 
association and the principles which it assumes, it is still by no means clear that the 
attempt to discover the unknown meaning of the dream entails a strictly analogous 
situation. 
It is precisely the question of whether the dream does in fact possess any meaning at all 
that remains a primary issue for this argument as a whole. It is here that the premisses 
of interpretation, the grounds for the postulation of that meaning, must therefore be 
introduced. Again, then, the validity of this argument comes to rest upon the 
legitimacy of those initial premisses. And yet our discussion of those two premisses 
would suggest that however the meaning of the dream is to be conceived, it is unlikely 
to be tractable to any easy reduction to the simple atomic status of a forgotten name. 
The argument around the two premisses suggests rather that we must distinguish 
between the attempt to determine the "meaning" of any individual dream element. in 
terms of its relation to the idea that lies behind it, and a conception of the "sense" of 
the dream as a whole. The distinction in registers established between those premisses 
appears to rule out any attempt to conceive of the sense of the dream merely in terms 
of the simple accumulation of individual elements and their meanings. This difference 
of order would similarly render problematic any attempt to conceive of the technique 
of interpretation as a mere generalisation of this model to the investigation of the 
dream as a whole. 
The procedure for the recovery of the forgotten name thus provides, at best, a model 
for the investigation of the separate elements of the dream, considered in isolation. 
Even at this simplest level, however, certain difficulties remain. When Freud proposes 
the example of the forgotten name as an "excellent model of what happens in dream 
analysis", he goes on to point out that "the difference is only that events that are shared 
between two people in dream-analysis are combined in a single person in the 
parapraxis".(l101l40) It can, however, quite easily be shown that a number of further 
differences, crucial to the credibility of this example, follow from that initial condition. 
It is from this difference that stems the fact that, in direct contrast to the case of the 
dream, the forgetting of the name is accompanied by "a certainty that I know 
it".(1101l40) Hence when I fmd that a name which I know has been lost from 
consciousness, or has become temporarily inaccessible to recall, I am nevertheless 
confident that I do still know it. It is this sense of certainty, derived from the fact that 
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the name has already been registered in my conscious knowledge, that provides the 
rationale for the attempt to recover it, to restore that name to consciollsness. 
The initial positive status of that name as known then provides not just the immediate 
practical rationale for the procedure that follows, but more significantly, the measure 
of its success. For when the name does emerge, or is discovered, it is again that prior 
knowledge that serves as the basis for its recognition as the" genuine thing". And it is 
only once that original forgotten name has re-emerged at the end of the chain of 
associations that we are able to demonstrate the manner in which the associations had 
been connected to it, thus confirming the validity of the principle of determinism that 
this method assumes. 
It can therefore be argued that the plausibility of this example, as well as its value as an 
empirical demonstration, in fact relies on the phenomenological framework that stems 
from the fact that the missing name has already been established in the conscious 
knowledge of the speaker. Similarly, it is only the security of that initial knowledge of 
the name in question, even though it has now become inaccessible to recall, that allows 
us to recognise as "substitutes" the replacement names that arise in its place. The very 
status of those names as substitutes, and hence their role in the process of association, 
is thus derived from, or depends on, the initial status of the original name as known or 
"genuine". 
At each stage of this process, then, the empirical claims of the model for the 
investigation of the parapraxis rest upon the assumption of the initial positive status of 
the "genuine thing" which has become inaccessible. In the case of the dream. however, 
we still lack the grounds for postulating a meaning in the ftrst place. Without any 
independent confirmation that such a meaning does exist, or any form of prior 
knowledge as to what that meaning might be, we lack the measure against which the 
success or validity of this procedure is to be assessed. Hence even if some meuning 
were to be discovered by this procedure, we would still have no reliable grounds for 
confirming the validity of that outcome, nor defending it against any alternative 
interpretation. 
In consequence, the very framework for our attempt to approach the dream elements 
in their status as substitutes, in order to trace them back by association to the meaning 
that lies behind them, becomes somewhat problematic. For without any form of 
primary evidence for the existence of the "genuine thing", the basis for our conception 
of the dream elements as "substitutes" is itself cast in doubt. It is thus not merely a 
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question of a difference in nature between the forgotten name of the parapraxis and the 
unknown meaning of the dream, but more crucially a signiticant difference in their 
respective status, that stands in the way of any simple application of this model to the 
dream. 
It is no accident that it is at precisely this juncture that we find Freud introducing, as a 
change of "nomenclature", the term "unconscious".( (131143) At the same time he 
takes care to emphasise that the term is introduced solely in a descriptive sense. to 
imply no more than "inaccessible to the dreamer's consciousness", or "unconscious at 
the moment".(l131143) Freud thus makes every effort here to indicate that the 
descriptive use of this term, to designate that which is not accessible to consciousnt:ss 
at the moment, is not to be taken in the full systematic sense of the psychoanalytic 
concept. "This nomenclature so far involves no theoretical construction."( 113-
114/144) 
We have rather what might be called a positive use of the term unconscious, associated 
quite explicitly with the empirical model of investigation, to designate merely that 
which lies outside the immediate access of consciousness. "I mean nothing else by this 
than what might be suggested to you when you think of a word that has escaped you 
or the disturbing purpose in a parapraxis".(l131l43) Again, then, it is the initial 
positive status of the word as known or conscious that is the primary point of 
reference for its subsequent description as unconscious. At the same time the 
distinction between "substitute" and "genuine", the two poles between which this 
procedure of investigation is to operate, is itself situated within the empirical realm. 
It is here, in relation to the framework of this empirical model of investigation, that the 
grounds for the distinction between the manifest and the latent aspects of the dream 
are established. For it is at this level that the model of investigation will be applied to 
the individual elements of the dream, in an attempt to explain the meaning of any 
element by tracing it to the idea that lies behind it. Yet it is clear that the viability of 
this procedure, and the validity of the model of explanation elaborated around it, 
assumes that both poles of this model may be defmed in positive terms. For only in 
this way could a relation of explanation be established between them in a manner that 
satisfies the conditions of empirical demonstration. 
Whatever our reservations about this procedure for establishing the meaning of any 
individual element of the dream, it does seem clear that the possibility of extending this 
model to account for the sense of the dream as a whole remains questionable. For the 
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argument around the two premisses, which must be brought to bear at precisely this 
point, would, if nothing else, appear to exclude the prospect of the concept of sense 
conforming to the requirements of this model. We might entertain similar reservations 
as to whether an adequate understanding of the psychoanalytic concept of the 
unconscious, its status and conditions of validity, may be arrived at by a simple 
extension of the descriptive use of this term from the distinction between manifest and 
latent. 
This entire argument rests upon the assumption that the initial model of investigation, 
whose validity has been established within specific parameters, may then be applied to 
the dream with equal validity. This entails an attempt to extend the positive 
framework of this model to the more uncertain instance of the dream, where those 
parameters are not so easily defmed. Yet the attempt to generalise this positive model, 
whose empirical foundations are already suspect, requires that we then assume the 
validity of further premisses whose status is equally doubtful. We are thus forced to 
question the legitimacy of the attempt to apply this model of investigation to the case 
of the dream and the grounds for the distinction between manifest and latent upon 
which it relies. 
Freud's initial step of situating the two premisses of the technique of interpretation as 
the parameters of this argument, as the limiting conditions for the attempt to apply this 
procedure of investigation to the dream, gives us, however, some indication as to the 
strategy of argument that will be followed. We might suspect that it is precisely the 
inadequacy of the attempt to simply generalise this model to the analysis of the dream 
that will serve to expose the limitations of the positive model of investigation itself. 
The questions that can be raised about the empirical validity of this model of 
investigation, and the scope of the distinction between which it operates, will then 
serve to introduce an alternative account of the conditions and goals of the technique 
of interpretation and the concept of the unconscious which it entails. 
II. 
The basic model of investigation centres on the attempt to explain the meaning of any 
individual element of the dream by tracing it back to the latent idea that lies behind it 
and from which it arose. The validity of this model would then require not only that 
both poles can be securely established in positive form, but also that a direct and 
unambiguous relation of explanation can be established between them. It is at the 
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point at which the attempt to explain the meaning of the dream in terms of its relation 
to the ideas which lie behind it starts to run into difficulties that the entire framework 
of this model comes into question. It is thus the practical obstacles encountered in the 
application of this model to the investigation of the dream that serve to expose more 
fundamental difficulties with the principles which it assumes. 
The practical obstacles encountered in the attempt to establish a direct and veritiable 
relationship between the manifest and latent poles of the dream merely serve to bring 
to light more fundamental doubts as to whether this model could ever satisfy the 
requirements of empirical verification, in even the most favourable conditions. Yet it is 
precisely the obstacles that stand in the way of the attempt to establish a valid relation 
of explanation between manifest and latent that will provide the starting point for a 
novel conception of the conditions and orientation of the technique of psychoanalytic 
interpretation, one that completely inverts the positive framework of the empirical 
model of investigation. 
The initial model of investigation, as elaborated around the distinction between the 
manifest and latent aspects of the dream, thus serves to establish the immediate 
framework within which the interpretation of the dream will be pursued. It is this 
model that provides the initial conception of both the goal of interpretation and the 
structure of the dream itself. "If we carryover our conception of the separate elements 
to the whole dream, it follows that the dream as a whole is a distorted substitute for 
something else, something unconscious, and that the task of interpreting the dream is 
to discover this unconscious material." (1141144) 
From this conception of the dream "there at once follow three important 
rules".(l141l44) We would want to consider these three precepts of interpretation as 
direct corollaries of that initial distinction. The primary consequence is that we are no 
longer concerned with "what the dream appears to tell us ... since it cannot possibly be 
the unconscious material we are in search of'.( 1141144) In this way the distinction 
between manifest and latent effects a fundamental displacement in the site of coherence 
or intelligibility of the dream, away from the register of what is experienced in the 
dream itself. The explanation of the dream is no longer to be sought at the level of the 
manifest dream, but is to be established in relation to ideas or processes which lie 
outside it. 
The content of the dream is no longer the primary point of reference for the work of 
investigation, as our interest is no longer directed towards any meaning that might be 
apparent in the dream itself. Instead the preliminary work of interpretation is limited to 
merely calling up associations around that dream. "We must restrict our work to 
calling up the substitutive ideas for each element".(l141l44) Yet, by the same token, 
the value of these associations or substitute ideas is no longer to be considered solely 
in terms of their relation to the manifest dream. "(W)e must not trouble ourselves with 
how far they diverge from the dream element".(l141l44) 
The chain of associations is to be allowed freedom to unfold without the restriction of 
any immediate or apparent relation to the manifest dream. It is within this context of 
associations that the unconscious material will emerge "of its own accord".(l141l44) 
All three of the principles of interpretation that follow from the distinction between 
manifest and latent are thus merely interrelated aspects of the same fundamental theme 
- a displacement of the status of the manifest register in the explanation of the dream 
and the relegation of the manifest element to the role of mere point of departure for the 
context of associations elaborated around it. 
This tendency already implies a certain divergence from the stated goal of 
investigation, formulated as an attempt to account for the meaning of the manifest 
element in terms of its relation to the latent idea behind it. For the discovery of the 
unconscious material of which we are in search is here defined independently of any 
relation to the manifest element that served as our starting point. Far from being our 
primary point of reference, the status of that manifest element is reduced to being no 
more than an arbitrary or disposable stimulus for the chain of associations that will 
allow us to delimit the unconscious material. 
It is in relation to this process of displacement. and the distinction by which it is 
effected, that we may now understand "to what extent it is a matter of indifference 
how much or how little the dream is remembered and, above all. how accurately or 
how uncertainly".(1141l44) For if the dream itself is no longer our primary point of 
reference in the search for the unconscious material, but is rather to be considered "a 
distorted substitute" which merely serves as our starting point in the process of 
association, then so too the distortions or inaccuracies in our recollection of that dream 
no longer constitute a fundamental obstacle to the success of this procedure. 
Here, then. further light is thrown on the difficulties encountered in the initial approach 
to the dream. Any attempt to take the dream as an object of empirical investigation 
faces the immediate difficulty that we have no means of access to that object, except 
via the recollection or description of the dreamer himself. The validity of these 
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investigations becomes dependent on, and restricted by, the nature of the relation 
between the dreamer's recollection and the experienced dream. For the success of our 
enquiries would then appear to depend on the degree to which valid access to our 
object may be achieved by way of the dreamer's account of it. 
The reliability of the dreamer's description of his dream thus becomes the crucial 
question for this particular line of investigation. This would in turn require some 
means of assessing the objectivity of the relation between the dream as experienced by 
the dreamer and his subsequent recollection of it. Yet any attempt to determine the 
accuracy of the dreamer's recollection is inevitably frustrated by our lack of access to 
the dream itself. In the absence of any independent knowledge of the experienced 
dream, we lack the standard against which the veracity of the dreamer's report might 
be assessed and any distortions or uncertainties rectified. 
The introduction of the distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the 
dream alters the focus of our enquiries by displacing the site of intelligibility outside the 
experienced dream. This allows us to completely bypass the difficulties of the previous 
line of investigation by collapsing the importance of the axis along which it was 
deployed. As the meaning of the dream is no longer to be found in the manifest 
dream, the question of our access to that dream is no longer decisive to the success of 
our enquiries. For the manifest dream now serves merely as the starting point for a 
process of association that will allow us to delimit the unconscious material that would 
explain it. 
In this way the distinction between manifest and latent, which relegates the status of 
the experienced dream to that of mere substitute for the genuine material from which it 
arose, serves at the same time to simply bypass the question of the veracity of our 
recollection of that dream. For now both the dream itself, as experienced by the 
dreamer, and his recollection or description of that dream, as well as his associations 
around them, are equally to be considered as distorted substitutes which take the place 
of the real object of our enquiries. 
As a result, what had previously constituted the major obstacle to the validity of these 
investigations, the distortions or inaccuracies of the dreamer's recollection, may now, 
paradoxically, take on a positive value. "If our memory has been inaccurate, therefore, 
it has merely made a further distortion of this substitute - a distortion, moreover, which 
cannot have been without a reason."(l141l44) 
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The distinction between manifest and latent thus opens up a new orientation for the 
interpretation of the dream in terms of the relation between the manifest dream and the 
latent material that lies behind it. The aim of the procedure of investigation deployed 
along this axis is now defined as an attempt to trace the manifest element back to the 
latent idea that would explain its meaning. This procedure, in turn, is made possible by 
the method of free association, and the principle of the determinism of associations that 
it assumes. Yet our attempt to gain access to the latent material by way of the chain of 
associations immediately runs up against an obstacle. We discover that "something is 
opposing our work" .(1141145) 
The attempt to implement this procedure of investigation finds itself opposed by 
various forms of "testing and selecting influences", which interfere with the free 
emergence of associations. These critical objections interrupt the chain of associations 
by rejecting certain of the ideas that arise, on the grounds of their lack of relevance to 
the task in hand. As a result certain key ideas that might lead us to the latent material 
in question are suppressed before they can take shape. 
This illicit process of criticism and selection, which results in the suppression of some 
of the associations that might lead us to the latent material, constitutes an obvious 
difficulty for this model of investigation as a whole. For any opposition encountered 
by the attempt to trace the relation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream 
constitutes an obstacle not just to the practical implementation of this technique, but 
also to the theoretical aspiration of establishing an adequate relation of explanation 
between them. 
To counter the effects of these critical objections and to facilitate the work of 
investigation, Freud introduces the one inviolable rule of the method of free 
association, the rule that the dreamer must not, for whatever reason, hold back any 
idea that occurs to him in association.(1151l45) It is clear that this fundamental 
technical rule, designed to safeguard the goals of this procedure, in fact amounts to the 
formal condition of the method of free association itself. For it is only on the basis of 
the unimpeded emergence of associations that we can hope to trace the manifest 
element back to the latent idea from which it arose. 
We can only then presume that the viability of this entire method of investigation 
depends on the degree of conscientiousness with which the dreamer adheres to this 
rule. Again, however, we encounter a practical obstacle that seems to indicate a more 
fundamental difticulty with the rationale underlying this procedure in general. For this 
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one "inviolable rule" of the technique of interpretation, laid down in an attempt to 
guarantee the success of the method of free association, appears to be made only in 
order to be broken. "The dreamer promises to obey the rule, and we may be annoyed 
afterwards to find how badly he keeps his promise when the occasion arises. "( 115/145) 
It is the dreamer's failure to obey this rule, then, that appears to constitute the real 
obstacle for this procedure. For despite all attempts to convince the dreamer of the 
theoretical justification for this condition, he persists with his illicit suppression of 
certain of the ideas that arise. It becomes apparent that these critical objections are in 
fact the manifestations of a more deep-seated resistance, which is independent of the 
theoretical convictions of the dreamer, and thus impervious to rational argument. "We 
perceive that the work of interpreting dreams is carried out in the face of a resistance, 
which opposes it and of which the critical objections are manifestations."(l161l46) 
Hence we tind that the difficulties encountered by the original model for the scientific 
investigation of dreams have not after all been disposed of. or even bypassed, by means 
of the distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. Instead those 
difficulties have merely been displaced, along with the change in the axis of 
investigation, onto the relation between manifest and latent. where they are now 
encountered in even more intractable fOlm. 
Freud will go on to admit as much by establishing an explidt correlation between the 
problem of distortion and that of resistance. and suggesting that the one may in fact be 
attributed to the other. The problem of distortion, encountered in the attempt to trace 
the relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream, is now linked to a 
dynamic conception of resistance. The greater the intensity of resistance, the more 
tenuous will be the link between the manifest dream and the latent material that 
underlies it. "(A) greater resistance means that the unconscious material will be greatly 
distorted and that the path will be a long one from the substitute back to the 
unconscious material. "(1171147) 
The corollary problems of distortion and resistance, encountered in the attempt to gain 
access to the latent material, constitute the fundamental obstacle for the empirical as 
well as the practical viability of this entire procedure of investigation. For the more 
difficult it is to establish the link between the manifest and latent poles, the less likely it 
becomes that this relation will be able to satisfy criteria of demonstration or 
verification. Yet Freud will claim not merely that these difficulties can be overcome by 
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the psychoanalytic method, but that they in fact take on a positive ami esst:ntial 
function in the work of investigation.(1161l46) 
It is only legitimate then to enquire into the conditions under which such an assertion 
becomes sustainable, or even conceivable. For this would appear to entail a t1agrant 
contradiction of the goals and conditions of the empirical model of investigation, 
according to which it is precisely the obstacles to its validity that are here proposed as 
the condition of its success. How then does it come about that what appears to 
constitute the primary obstacle to this procedure of investigation may now take on a 
positive value? 
III. 
Let us start by taking a closer look at the nature and source of these critical objections 
which arise in opposition to the attempt to gain access to the latent material. Freud 
mentions three types of testing and selecting influences, which lead to the suppression 
of associations on the grounds that the ideas that arise are either not relevant, too 
senseless, or too unimportant to be reported.(lISI14S) 
All three forms of critical objection take the nature of their relation to the manifest 
element as their point of reference. It is the attempt to maintain a relation of relevance 
to the manifest dream, or criticisms based on that relatIon, that now figure as an 
obstacle to the success of this procedure. "Thus on the one hand we keep too close to 
the idea that was our starting point, the dream element itself; and on the other hand we 
interfere with the outcome of the free associations by making a selection."(IISI145) 
This observation itself brings to light a certain contradiction implicit in the rationale 
and goals of this model of investigation. The relation between the manifest element 
and the ideas which arise in association to it has been proposed as the basis for a novel 
explanation of the meaning of the dream. Yet it is that very relation which now 
emerges as an obstacle to the attempt to gain access to the material that would allow 
us to confirm that meaning. For it is precisely the question of the relevance of these 
ideas to the manifest dream that here provides the grounds for opposition to the 
attempt to uncover the latent material behind it. 
This contradiction, however, can be resolved by means of a distinction prepared by 
Freud's earlier comments on the two possible sources of influence on the pattern of 
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associations.( 108-09/138) There he distinguishes between the determinism of 
associations at the level of their relation to the manifest idea that serves as their 
starting point, and the further influence on associations by unconscioLis groups of 
emotionally charged thoughts and interests. This distinction allows LIS to situate the 
fourth source of "illicit selection" that Freud to some extent sets to one side as distinct 
from the other three - the influence of unpleasure on the course of associations. the 
notion that an idea that arises might be too distressing or disagreeable to he reported. 
At that stage it was suggested that these two levels or sources of determinism might to 
some extent work across one another, allowing the determinism of associations at the 
positive level of their relation to the initial manifest idea to obstruct or to mask the 
further influence of unconscious interests. This distinction between the two possible 
registers of determinism provided the starting point for two alternative approaches to 
the principle of determinism itself. The contrasted accounts of the status and grounds 
of validity of the principle of determinism then defined the point of divergence for two 
fundamentally different conceptions of the conditions and orientation of the technique 
of interpretation as a whole. 
The simplest account of the principle of determinism assumes that both manifest and 
latent poles can be specified in positive terms and brought into relation in such a way 
as to demonstrate a relation of determinism between them. The confirmation of this 
principle would then depend on the possibility of establishing a direct or verifiable 
relation between two positive terms situated within the empirical register. The validity 
of the model of investigation elaborated around this principle of determinism is then 
similarly defined in terms of the possibility of establishing an unambiguous relation of 
explanation between the manifest element and the latent idea from which it arose. 
In contrast to this conception of the grounds of validity of the principle of determinism, 
we have sketched an alternative account of signifying determinism, founded on holistic 
principles of coherence within a closed register of sense. The validity of this concept 
of determinism does not rest upon any demonstration of a simple causal or mechanistic 
relation between individual elements, but upon the possibility of deftning a closed 
system of relations within which the influence of signifying determinism would become 
apparent in the pattern of associations. The relation between any specific elements in 
that system will then be considered primarily in terms of their position within that 
register as a whole. 
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The tension between these two different registers of determinism. which not only 
operate across one another, but are to some extent in opposition to one another. is 
apparent in the term "free association" itself. The contradiction embodied in the use of 
the term "free" may thus serve as an index of this underlying distinction in registers. 
such that it is precisely the freedom to say anything, at the positive level of relevance 
or meaning, that allows the influence of a further register of determinism to become 
apparent. 
It is this distinction that underlies the ambiguous status of the fundamental rule which 
implements the method of free association and the question of the dreamer's 
problematic relation to that rule. The distinction, not simply between two different 
registers of determinism, but between the conditions and procedures of interpretation 
associated with each, similarly accounts for the possibility of a successful 
implementation of this rule. The dreamer's failure to obey that rule, or his selective 
adherence to it, would otherwise constitute an immediate restriction to the validity of 
this procedure of investigation as a whole. 
The fundamental rule of analysis is thus situated at the point of intersection between 
two different planes or levels of determinism. It is the tension between these two 
registers of determinism, and the contrasting goals and conditions of investigation 
associated with each, that accounts for the ambiguous status of this rule. From the 
point of view of the aims of the positive model of investigation this rule is designed 
merely to facilitate the attempt to trace the manifest element back to the latent idea 
from which it arose and by which it was determined. But at the same time this rule 
establishes the conditions for the emergence of a further register of signifying 
determinism, defined in terms of the closed boundaries of a register of sense. 
It is the intrusion of effects from this register that is then experienced as an obstacle to 
the relation between the manifest and latent elements of the dream. For the influence 
of this register on the course of associations is manifested both in the form of 
resistance to the work of investigation and as distortion arising in the space between 
the manifest and latent poles. The dreamer's resistance, ftrst apparent in his failure to 
comply with the rule of association, may nevertheless provide us with a point of entry 
into a register of determinism that extends beyond the knowledge of the conscious 
subject. For it is precisely those manifestations that provide us with an indication of 
the influence of a register of signifying determinism that is the register of sense itself. 
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It is the interaction between these two registers of determinism that underlies Freud's 
claim that not only are the critical objections never justified, but that the ideas whil:h 
are suppressed on the basis of these objections turn out to be invariably the most 
important, and constitute the crucial link in the search for the unconsciolls material. 
This assertion already entails a modification of the criteria for the evaluation of 
associations, where it is precisely the rejection of ideas on the basis of their lack of 
relevance to the meaning of the manifest dream that may now be taken as the 
distinguishing mark of their significance. At the same time this claim implies a 
fundamental inversion of the framework of investigation, according to which it is those 
factors which seemed to stand in the way of its success that now become the pivot for 
an alternative account of the conditions and orientation of the technique of 
interpretation. 
IV. 
Again, then, we fmd ourselves at a point of divergence between two fundamentally 
different models of the procedure for the investigation of dreams. This distinction 
concerns not merely our conception of the goals and orientation of that procedure, but 
also more fundamental questions concerning the conditions of validity which each 
model assumes. This contrast can now, however, be clarified in terms of the status 
attributed to the principle of determinism in each. 
Any positive confirmation of the principle of determinism will depend on the possibility 
of the manifest and latent poles of the dream being brought into a relation that satisfies 
the conditions of empirical demonstration. The attempt to maintain a relation between 
the two poles of a sort that would be liable to verification inevitably entails the attempt 
to reduce the distance between them to a minimum. It is then precisely the dimension 
of distortion that is situated as the primary restriction on the validity of the attempt to 
establish a transparent relation between the manifest element and the latent idea that 
would explain its meaning. 
The goals of the model of investigation elaborated around this principle will be shaped 
by a similar attempt to identify the latent pole in positive terms, and to establish its 
relation to the manifest element in terms that would conform to the conditions for valid 
explanation. From this point of view it is clear that the intrusion of distortion into the 
relation between manifest and latent can only be experienced as an obstacle to be 
excluded or reduced to a minimum. And yet it is precisely this register of distortion 
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that provides the point of access to the register of signifying determinism that 
constitutes the locus of the alternative procedure of interpretation. 
We have already noted the ways in which this conception of a register of signitying 
determinism might escape the limitations of a mechanistic account of the relation 
between the manifest and latent elements of the dream and of the principle of 
determinism in general. For this procedure of interpretation relies on those elements, 
the manifest and latent poles, only to the extent that they give provisional definition to 
the attempt to establish a coherent register of signifying determinism. The relation 
between those poles, or between any specific elements of association, will then be 
considered primarily in terms of their position within the register as a whole. 
Our understanding of the goals and conditions of validity of the technique for the 
interpretation of dreams will obviously depend on our conception of the status to be 
attributed to the principle of determinism upon which it depends. Yet at the same time 
it is clear that the account of this technique, and Freud's argument as a whole, can only 
be comprehensively evaluated on the basis of the relation between the two registers of 
determinism and the different goals of investigation associated with each. The two 
approaches are not, then. mutually exclusive. but function rather as complementary 
endeavours that depend for their definition upon their interaction and articulation. 
The question of the primacy to be attributed to either model will. however. remain 
fundamental in determining our conception not just of the orientation of the work of 
investigation, but also of the conditions upon which its status as science is to depend. 
It is this tension between the two accounts of the technique of interpretation, and the 
contrasting conditions of validity that each assumes. that underlies the difficulties to 
which Freud refers here in choosing how to proceed. "You cannot imagine how hard [ 
find it to decide; nor can I yet make the nature of my difficulties plain to 
you."(1171147) Yet this decision centres on precisely the question of the status to be 
attributed to the problem of distortion in the argument that follows. 
These issues are most immediately apparent in the whole range of questions associated 
with the role to be attributed to the corollary problems of distortion and resistance in 
this account. For the status attributed to the problem of distortion will provide the 
surest indication of the underlying approach to the procedure of investigation and the 
level of argument involved. The problem of distortion will carry an almost directly 
inverted value in the argument according to whether it is considered the primary 
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obstacle to the validity of the positive model of investigation or as the necessary point 
of access to the register of sense and the procedure of interpretation that this implies. 
This explains why the question comes to the fore at precisely the point at which the 
model of investigation elaborated in relation to single dream elements is to he applied 
to the dream as a whole. Here we fmd the problem of distortion suddenly transformed. 
allowing Freud to claim that the dreams that betray the most extensive effects of 
distortion are in fact those whose meaning appears most transparent. "There must 
obviously be dreams which have on the whole been subjected to only a little distortion. 
and the best plan would be to begin with them. But what dreams have heen least 
distorted? The ones that are intelligible and not confused ... ? That would be leading 
us quite astray. Investigation shows that such dreams have been subjected to an 
extraordinarily high degree of distortion. "( 1171147) 
Given the complexity of the issues involved, it is not surprising that Freud will choose 
to remain at the level of the positive model of investigation. and to examine the 
meaning of certain manifest elements considered in isolation, rather than turning 
immediately to the consideration of the sense of the dream as a whole. "Instead of 
starting on the interpretation of whole dreams, we will restrict ourselves to a few 
dream-elements, and we will trace out in a number of examples how these can be 
explained by applying our technique to them. "(118/148) 
The various forms of relation between the manifest and latent poles that Freud goes on 
to examine in these examples will, however, all be characterised tirst and foremost as 
modalities of distortion. It is these modalities of distortion, which the framework of 
relations between manifest and latent allow us to identify and systematise, that then 
become the basis for the concept of the dream-work. And it is the various modalities 
of the dream-work, which most clearly demonstrate the influence of unconscious 
processes, that will then provide our point of access to the register of sense. 
It is necessary, however, to remain aware of the implications that follow from this 
procedure of argument. For the primacy given to the framework of the positive model 
of investigation will influence our conception not only of the aim" and goals of the 
process of interpretation, but also of the nature and status of the concepts involved. 
These issues will become decisive in determining the approach to the topic of children's 
dreams in the following lecture, where the relation between the problem of distortion 
and the question of wish-fulfilment first comes into focus. 
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It is significant, however, that it is only once Freud has announced the decision to 
remain at the level of the positive model of investigation in applying this technique to 
the analysis of the dream that he will formally introduce the terms "manifest" and 
"latent" for the fIrst time. "The moment seems to me to have arrived for introducing 
two terms, which we could have made use of long ago. We will describe what the 
dream actually tells us as the manifest dream-content, and the concealed material, 
which we hope to reach by pursuing the ideas that occur to the dreamer, as the latent 
dream-thoughts. "( 120/150-51) 
Freud's argument in this lecture has up to this point been taking full advantage of the 
ambiguity involved in his use of the term "unconscious" in both its descriptive sense, to 
designate the status of the latent material, as well as its more comprehensive 
psychoanalytic usage, to characterise the status of the register of sense. It is precisely 
this elision of the distinction between the two uses of the term that has allowed him to 
set up the conditions for an alternative account of the technique of psychoanalytic 
interpretation under cover of the aims and goals of the empirical model of 
investigation. 
The ensuing argument will endeavour to give defmition to this more comprehensive 
procedure of interpretation by contrast to the goals and conditions of the initial model. 
This argument is accompanied by the attempt to situate the full psychoanalytic sense of 
the concept "unconscious" by means of a similar process, in distinction from the 
descriptive use of the term associated with the latent pole. In each case that procedure 
of argument, where a concept is defIned by contrast to the terms and conditions of the 
empirical register, will involve a crucial and characteristic process of inversion that 
comes to be defInitive of the properly psychoanalytic status of those terms. 
This strategy of argument, whereby a concept is initially situated in positive terms at 
the level of the latent pole, and then separated off by a process of inversion, becomes 
most apparent in Freud's approach to the status of the wish in the interpretation of the 
dream. It is, however, the initial approach to the problem of distortion that provides 
the first introduction to these themes, and which remains the surest indication of the 
procedure of argument involved. It is thus the question of distortion that must be our 
guide in the argument that follows. 
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3.2 The Dreams of Children 
I. 
The argument of these lectures is elaborated around a parallel development of a 
definition of the psychoanalytic object, on the one hand, and of the conditions for its 
interpretation, on the other. The account of the nature and structure of the dream, as 
privileged object of psychoanalytic investigation, is thus interwoven with, and 
inseparable from, the principles of the technique by which the interpretation of that 
dream becomes possible. 
The previous lecture introduced a distinction between the manifest and latent registers 
of the dream. The method of investigation attempts to establish the meaning of any 
manifest element in the dream by tracing it back, via the associations of the dreamer, to 
the latent thoughts that lie behind it. Questions concerning the validity of this method 
of investigation come to focus on the nature of the relation between manifest and 
latent, on the possibility of establishing a link between them strong enough to satisfy 
the demands of empirical verification. It is here that we encounter the twin problems 
of resistance and distortion, the two most serious obstacles to the success of this 
procedure. 
The argument then turns on the question of the status to be attributed to the problems 
of resistance and distortion in the process of interpretation. For it is in the attempt to 
come to terms with the difficulties raised by these two obstacles that the 
psychoanalytic technique in fact takes on its defmitive form. It is these issues which 
underlie the dilemma to which Freud refers concerning the status of the problem of 
distortion in his argument. We have attempted to distinguish the two different levels at 
which this argument might be pursued, and the implications for our conception of the 
nature and conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. 
The choice of children's dreams as the next topic of discussion is immediately referred 
back to this question of how to proceed around the problem of distortion, and situated 
in the context of the issues raised there. Here Freud refers to the suggestion that, for 
the purposes of exposition, it would be best to bypass the problem of distortion 
entirely, and to start with those dreams that show as little distortion as possible. "(W)e 
were saying that our best plan would be to get round the difficulty by keeping to 
dreams in which there was no distortion or only a very little - if such dream.. ... 
exist. "(1 261157) 
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The category of children's dreams is introduced at this point as the type of dream that 
most closely approximates to this ideal requirement of minimal distortion. The 
characteristics which make these dreams "easy to understand and unambiguous" can be 
attributed directly to the absence of distortion. This transparency makes them 
particularly suited to a demonstration of the basic principles of dream interpretation. 
"From these children's dreams we can draw conclusions with great ease and certainty 
on the essential nature of dreams in general, and we can hope that those conclusions 
will prove decisive and universally valid. "(l 2611 57-58) 
Once again, however, we must be careful not to let the advantages of this procedure 
blind us to the qualifications involved. For it quickly becomes apparent that this entire 
category of dreams, introduced here for purposes of exposition, is to some extent an 
artificial one. These dreams are not in fact to be attributed to any specitic phase of 
childhood, nor even necessarily restricted to children at all, but rather constitute an 
ideal "infantile" type structured around the basic condition of an absence of distortion. 
Questions concerning the status of this category of dream can then be focused on the 
role it plays in Freud's argument. 
"This will once more mean a divergence from the historical development of our 
discoveries; for actually it was only after the technique of interpretation had been 
consistently applied and distorted dreams had been completely analysed that the 
existence of dreams that are free from distortion came to our notice. "( 126/157) This 
approach raises issues that go beyond any simple questions of historical chronology. 
For the historical priority attributed to the technique of interpretation over the 
discoveries that it makes possible seems here to entail some form of corresponding 
epistemological priority as well. Freud appears to be suggesting that the very 
existence of this category of undistorted dreams, or at least the possibility of their 
knowledge, is dependent upon the successful implementation of the technique of 
interpretation itself. 
The divergence from the historical development of the technique of interpretation thus 
masks more fundamental questions concerning the epistemological grounds which this 
technique assumes. For it is here suggested that the knowledge of these undistorted 
dreams itself depends upon the overcoming of the problem of distortion, which only 
the prior elaboration of the technique of interpretation makes possible. In that case the 
material derived from these dreams can not in fact serve as the foundation for the 
technique itself. The principles upon which this technique relies mllst be grounded 
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elsewhere, and can not depend on the evidence of these children's dreams for their 
validity. 
We thus become aware of the real issues at stake in Freud's choice of this category of 
dreams to support his argument. For he here resorts to the artificial and somewhat 
problematic category of children's dreams, defined around the criterion of the absence 
of distortion, in order to establish certain basic postulates concerning the nature and 
structure of those dreams. This ideal positive model of children's dream .. , freed from 
the ambiguities and obscurities introduced by the factor of distortion, will then allow 
him to demonstrate the relevance of these postulates to the explanation of dream" in 
general. This demonstration, however, assumes the suspension of the problem of 
distortion that we have suggested is the defming issue for the technique of 
interpretation itself. 
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the postulates and conclusions established in 
positive terms on the basis of this model of children's dreams can in fact be considered 
to be "universally valid" for the interpretation of dreams in general. Our examination 
of the conclusions derived from the study of children's dreams will once again be 
focused on the status of the postulates established under these ideal positive 
conditions, and the legitimacy of the attempt to generalise these conclusions to the 
more obscure instances of distorted dreams. 
II. 
The pertinence of these considerations is immediately borne out by the first point that 
Freud introduces to characterise the dreams of children. "No analysis, no application 
of any technique is necessary in order to understand these dreams."(l26-271l58) The 
assertion that children's dreams present no distortion and therefore require no 
interpretation again emphasises the close relation between the technique of 
interpretation and the problem of distortion. "These dreams are without any dream-
distortion, and therefore call for no interpretative activity." (1281159) 
The correlation between these two issues is now brought into connection with a 
further point by Freud's subsequent remark that in these dreams there would be no 
effective distinction between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. "Here the 
manifest and the latent dream coincide. "(1281159) The interdependence of these two 
issues, the relation between interpretation and distortion, is here situated in term" of 
the common register within which they both arise - that detined by the relation between 
the manifest and latent poles of the dream. 
It is this assertion that makes explicit the degree to which children's dream~ are here 
being proposed in the form of an ideal transparency. For it is the elision of the 
distinction between manifest and latent, the superimposition of the manifest dream and 
the latent thought that explains it, that allows Freud to eliminate the register of 
distortion. By bracketing out the problem of distortion he hopes to be able to 
demonstrate certain basic postulates concerning the nature of these dreams. Yet it is 
clear that the elision of the distinction between manifest and latent at the same time 
collapses the entire framework within which the technique of interpretation has up to 
now been elaborated. 
Again we encounter a certain tension in this argument, where any attempt to detine the 
object in positive terms, to bring the dream forward as a concrete object whose nature 
and structure may be empirically demonstrated, is accompanied by a corollary 
recession of the register proper to its interpretation. We have already suggested that 
Freud is quite aware of this tendency, and constantly attempts, within the confines of 
his argument, to draw attention to the dangers it involves. Here he is quick to 
acknowledge that the very concept of an undistorted dream is an artiticial one. "But 
when we examine these dreams more closely, we shall recognise a small piece of 
dream-distortion even in them, a certain distinction between the manifest content of the 
dream and the latent dream-thoughts."( 128/159) 
The perfect transparency of these children's dreams, and hence their status within this 
argument, is thus an artificial construct that cannot ultimately be maintained. On the 
one hand a minimal degree of distortion has to admitted, implied in the very distinction 
between the manifest and latent registers themselves. And on the other hand a certain 
element of interpretation is assumed, in that we are obliged, in order to understand that 
dream, "to add a piece of information to it from the events of the child's life".(l 2711 58) 
This piece of information is some event or experience from the previous day. "There is 
invariably some experience of the previous day which explains the dream to us. The 
dream is the reaction of the child's mental life in his sleep to this experience of the 
previous day. "(l 2711 58) 
We are provided with three examples which demonstrate quite clearly the relation of a 
dream to an event of the previous day. In each case the example concerns an 
experience of disappointment in the child's daily life that is subsequently remedied in 
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the dream itself. On the basis of these examples Freud will go on to propose that a 
child's dream should be understood as "a reaction to an experience of the previous day, 
which has left behind it a regret. a longing. a wish that has not been dealt 
with".(1281l59) This claim in its turn paves the way, without further ado. for the 
assertion that the dream "produces a direct. undisguised fulfilment of that 
wish."( 128/159) 
With this assertion we fmd ourselves suddenly at the heart of the problematic around 
which the entire theory of dreams revolves. Yet our very proximity to that central 
thesis, that dreams are to be understood as the fuUilment of a wish, throws up a whole 
wall of difficulties. These difficulties centre on the question of the status of this 
proposition and the grounds of its validity. Freud makes no attempt to disguise the 
fact that this assertion is based solely on the evidence of these three carefully selected 
examples. We are forced then to question not only the validity of these particular 
examples as sufficient grounds for the proposition that follows, but also the legitimacy 
of the entire procedure of argument that attempts to derive propositions of universal 
validity from instances of restricted empirical scope. 
Once again it is Freud's apparently naive procedure of reducing his argument to its 
simplest possible terms that brings into focus the difficulties inherent in this procedure 
as a whole. For even if this proposition could in fact be established in positive terms 
on the basis of the restricted evidence of these undistorted children's dreams, it remains 
doubtful whether it could be extended with equal validity to the more complex 
instances of distorted dreams. More immediately, however, it becomes apparent that 
even in the absence of the complicating factor of distortion, these examples still create 
difficulties for an empirical model of psychoanalytic explanation. 
III. 
It is here that Freud refers again to the aetiological role of somatic stimuli in the 
instigation of the dream. This reference returns us to the basic physiological model for 
the explanation of the dream as a direct reaction to a specified somatic stimulus. This 
model of the dream conforms to the conditions of empirical demonstration, providing a 
positive defmition of the two terms involved, as stimulus and response, and holding out 
the possibility of establishing an objective correlation between them via the causal 
intermediary of the reflex arc. 
so 
Freud has from the start expressed reservations about the ability of the physiological 
model of dream formation to account for the most characteristic aspects of the dream. 
The limitations of this model were shown to reflect the restricted explanatory range of 
the empirical model of explanation in general. Yet. despite these reservations. Freud 
now proposes introducing into the framework of this somatic model the notion of a 
"mental stimulus", which is to playa similar aetiological role in the explanation of the 
dream. 
Questions concerning the legitimacy of the attempt to introduce the notion of a mental 
stimulus into the terms of the somatic model of the dream must thus be added to our 
doubts concerning the validity of this model of explanation in general. These doubts 
will focus on the explanatory role played by the concept of the wish that comes to 
occupy the position of this mental stimulus in the empirical model. "In the case of 
children, therefore, the stimulus that disturbs sleep is a mental one - the wish that has 
not been dealt with - and it is to this that they react with a dream. "( 128-291160) 
A ftrst indication can be detected right here in the attempt to set up the model of the 
child's dream as the reaction to an event of the previous day. It is this model that is to 
provide the empirical framework for the explanation of the dream as a fulfilment of the 
wish arising out of that event. The absence of distortion in these examples allows 
Freud to present them as an objective demonstration of the relation between the dream 
and the event, and thus as evidence for the proposition that these dreams are formed in 
direct response to the wish arising out of that event. "The dream produces a direct, 
undisguised fulfilment of that wish. "( 128/159) 
The legitimacy of this demonstration, however, assumes that both poles of this model 
may be defined in objective terms, in order to bring them into a relation that might be 
liable to independent verification. The need to exclude the factor of distortion in that 
relation is thus accompanied by a corollary demand to minimise the role of 
interpretation in establishing the nature of the two poles themselves. Hence the 
attempt to present the child's dream in the form of a direct reaction to an event of the 
previous day. For then there would be no need to question the child, no need to rely 
on any subjective information from the dreamer, in order to establish a direct causal 
relation between the dream and the event. 
The objective structure of this explanatory model is already rendered problematic by 
the difficulty of establishing any defmition of the dream that does not rely on the 
dreamer's own description of it. More important here, however, are the corresponding' 
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difficulties in establishing the status of the other pole of this model, that of the event. 
For just as the dream itself has no independent status as an object apart from the 
dreamer's subjective account of it, so too the role of the event in the instigation of that 
dream can only be defined in terms of its profile as an experience of the dreamer. 
The attempt to set up an empirical framework for explaining the dream as a reaction to 
an event of the previous day thus immediately runs into difficulties with the status of its 
stimulus pole. The difficulty of providing a satisfactory definition of the event within 
the terms of this model already disrupts its objective, external structure and the 
conditions of verification to which it aspires. This instability in the detinition of the 
stimulus pole, however, at the same time directly influences the explanatory role that it 
may play within this model, putting into question the entire causal framework which 
the empirical model assumes. 
The somatic model allows us to account for the occurrence of the dream at the level of 
physiological processes, as a direct reaction to a specified somatic stimulus. It is thus 
possible to defme both poles of this model in somatic terms and to account for their 
relation in terms of physiologically defmed paths of transmission, on the model of the 
reflex arc. The register of physiological processes, which provides the common 
register within which both stimulus and response may be situated, is also established as 
the site of coherence for the explanation of their causal relation. 
The relation between the dream and the event, however. is more problematic. This 
relation is of a different order, one that does not in any obvious sense partake in the 
realm of physiological processes that provides the register of causal coherence for the 
somatic model. For it is clear that neither the dream nor the event in response to 
which it supposedly arises can ultimately be defined apart from the dreamer's own 
experience of them. This inevitably renders problematic the attempt to establish any 
relation of causal explanation between the two terms that does not rely on their 
common situation in the experience of the dreamer. 
The difficulties involved in the shift from the register of physiology to the register of 
subjective representation become apparent above all in the attempt to define the status 
of the stimulus pole and to account for its causal role in this relation. The somatic 
model of the dream at least allows us to defme the aetiological role of the stimulus in 
the objective terms of physiological processes. Yet here it is not in fact the external 
event that is responsible for the instigation of the dream. but rather its 
phenomenological profile as an experience. There is thus no way of specifying the 
causal role of this event without taking into account its subjective signiticance in the 
experience of the dreamer. 
The relation between this subjective experience and the dream is, however, further 
complicated by the difficulty of demonstrating any immediate reaction to that event. 
For it is only subsequently, in the sleep of the dreamer, that the dream arises as a 
somewhat belated reaction to the experience of the previous day. Thus it is not until 
the dream itself has actually arisen that there is any possibility of identifying the 
particular stimulus to which it may be said to constitute the response. The nature and 
position of that stimulus, and hence its causal role in this process, can therefore only be 
established retrospectively on the basis of its significance in the formation of the 
dream. 
The shift away from the somatic register thus presents immediate difficulties for this 
whole model of explanation and the structure of mechanical causality which it assumes. 
For despite the attempt to preserve an empirical model of the dream as the direct 
reaction to an event of the previous day, it is clear that neither that event nor its causal 
role in this relation can ultimately receive positive specification in terms that this model 
would require. The difficulty of providing a definition of the stimulus term which does 
not rely on its subjective significance in the experience of the dreamer renders 
problematic the entire causal framework upon which the somatic model relies. 
In the somatic model it is the possibility of providing a positive definition of the 
stimulus, in the objective terms of physiological processes, that is a primary assumption 
in the explanation of the effects to which it gives rise. The shift into the register of 
subjective representation, however, would seem to imply conditions of interpretation 
that directly contradict the assumptions of the somatic model, as we can no longer 
provide an objective specification of the stimulus term, nor therefore assume the 
primary status of that term in the explanation of what follows. Instead we must resort 
to a form of explanation that can only account for the causal role of the stimulus in 
retrospect, on the basis of an interpretation of the dream itself. 
It is clear, then, that despite the apparent similarity between the terms "mental 
stimulus" and "somatic stimulus", there can be no direct substitution of one for the 
other within the causal framework of the somatic model. For on the one hand there is 
no way of defming that mental stimulus in terms that would satisfy the demands of this 
model, without lapsing back into a characterisation in terms of its physiological 
substratum. And at the same time the problematic empirical status of the term "mental 
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stimulus" means that it cannot play the same explanatory role in this account as does 
the somatic stimulus within the causal mechanism of the physiological model. 
The similarity of terminology serves here only to mask the fact that the causal role 
played by these two terms is not at all equivalent. The difference in the status of the 
two terms can only be understood in terms of the difference between the two registers 
within which they are to be situated - that of mental representations and that of 
physiological processes. And it would appear that the conditions of explanation within 
these two registers are not in fact of the same order. Rather, the difference between 
these two registers itself gives rise to a distinction between two contrasting modes of 
explanation whose terms and conditions appear to be different, if not opposed. 
IV. 
Freud uses the example of children's dreams to set up an empirical model for the 
explanation of the dream as the reaction to a wish arising out of an event of the 
previous day. The absence of distortion in these examples allows him to establish the 
two poles of this model in positive terms and to demonstrate a direct relation of cause 
and effect between them. Yet this demonstration is only made possible by the 
suppression of the entire sphere of representation underlying the dream and the elision 
of the conditions of interpretation appropriate to it. It is only by ignoring the role of 
interpretation in establishing those poles in the first place that he is able to present this 
relation in the objective causal terms of the empirical model. 
The causal framework of this model then gives rise to a number of difficulties that can 
be traced directly to the suppression of the register of representation. For the objective 
structure of the model is itself the first product of the elision of the conditions of 
interpretation appropriate to that register. The attempt to reintroduce the problematic 
of representation, under the guise of a "mental stimulus", while maintaining the 
framework of this model, inevitably gives rise to certain diffIculties with the causal 
status of that term. These difficulties come to devolve upon the concept of the wish 
that is to be situated in the position of the mental stimulus within this model, and the 
question of its role in the explanation of the dream. 
"In the case of children, therefore, the stimulus that disturbs sleep is a mental one - the 
wish that has not been dealt with - and it is to this that they react with the 
dream. "(128-29/160) The physiological model of the reflex arc provides the basic 
framework for this account of the dream as a reaction to the stimuli that impinge on 
sleep. The conception of the function of the dream as the guardian of sleep then 
merely elaborates on this essentially somatic model, by introducing the notion that the 
dream must serve somehow to protect sleep against the disturbance of those stimuli. 
"In so far as a dream is a reaction to a psychical stimulus, it must be equivalent to 
dealing with the stimulus in such a way that it is got rid of and that sleep can 
continue. "( 129/160) 
It is in its role as guardian of sleep that the dream arises as an attempt to fend off, or to 
"deal with", the stimulus that threatens to disturb sleep. This essentially physiological 
conception of the function of the dream as guardian of sleep provides the economic or 
dynamic underpinning for the relation between the dream and the wish. And yet what 
remains unresolved in this account is precisely the question of the means by which this 
process of "dealing with" the wish occurs. "We do not yet know how this dealing with 
the stimulus by the dream is made possible dynamically ... "( 129/160) 
This question can hardly be dismissed as an incidental or peripheral issue. For it 
concerns the very process of wish-fulfilment which is to stand as the central postulate 
of Freud's entire theory of the dream and its interpretation. The failure to provide a 
plausible explanation of that process within the dynamic or mechanical terms of this 
account can only then be considered as a sign of a fundamental deficiency in the 
account as a whole. The inability to account for the nature of the relation between the 
wish and the dream may then be considered as a symptom of a certain causal gap in 
this model, one which can be traced directly to the attempt to preserve the term') in 
which it is framed. 
This issue takes on focus when considered in the light of the earlier difficulties 
associated with the status of the wish, in its definition as a mental stimulus arising Ollt 
of the event. For if the function of the dream is to be that of "dealing with" the 
stimulus, let us not forget that the mental stimulus has itself only just been configured 
as a wish which was not "dealt with" in the experience of the previous day. The 
double use of this problematic term cannot be coincidental here, nor the symmetry by 
which the function of the dream is now proposed as dealing with a wish that has itself 
not been dealt with in the event. 
The introduction of the notion of a mental stimulus into the framework of relations 
between dream and event thus results in a strange form of causal doubling, whereby 
this relation is now divided into two complementary phases. The initial experience 
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gives rise to a residue. a mental stimulus or wish, that has not been dealt with in the 
event. The process by which the dream arises in reaction to that stimulus is then 
situated as the direct complement of the process by which the stimulus itself fLfst arose 
out of the event. Any difficulties with the mechanics of the process by which the 
dream deals with the wish must therefore be referred to the complementary process by 
which that wish is itself defined as the residue of the event. 
In both cases the use of this ambiguous phrase indicates a certain ditticulty in 
accounting for the nature of this process within the terms of the empirical model. And 
in both instances it might be suggested that these difficulties. which appear as causal 
gaps in the mechanical framework of this model, are a consequence of the failure to 
consider the role of representation in that relation. For it is not the event itself that 
gives rise to the dream, but rather the experience constituted around it. This 
experience, however, does not cause the dream in any direct or immediate manner, but 
rather in its turn gives rise to a certain residue - the memory which persists in sleep. It 
is this memory that serves as the mental stimulus that gi ves rise to the dream. 
The attempt to maintain the external framework of this model of dream formation, 
based on an objective relation between dream and event, thus results in a series of 
slippages or displacements around the causal status of the stimulus pole. And yet there 
is still no way of accounting for the causal role of that memory in the formation of the 
dream except by configuring it as a regret or longing left behind by the experience. It 
is this element of regret, the longing that has not been dealt with in the event, that 
constitutes the disturbing force of the mental stimulus that is responsible for the 
instigation of the dream. 
The introduction of the notion of a mental stimulus into this relation thus serves to 
negotiate the causal gap produced by the suppression of the register of representation 
in the empirical model. The framework of this model at the same time demands that 
this mental stimulus be configured as a regret or a longing, in order to produce the 
necessary causal impetus required to account for its role in this process. This in turn 
means, however, that examples have to be chosen where the event gives rise to an 
experience of disappointment, which would provide the force of "longing" necessary to 
justify the causal role of the wish in the process of dream formation. 
In this way it becomes apparent to what extent the restricted validity of this model of 
explanation. tied as it is to a limited range of examples of a specific type, is a direct 
result of the positive terms which it assumes. From this point of view it does indeed 
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appear that the role of the wish in this process is a necessary postulate, because there is 
no other way of accounting for the nature of the relation between event and dream. 
And yet at the same time it is clear that the validity of any proposition maintaining the 
causal role of a wish in this model of dream formation will necessarily be tied to the 
nature of the experience of disappointment that underlies it. 
The difficulties involved in this account can thus be traced in every instance to the 
terms of the attempt to construct an empirical model for the explanation of the dream 
around a direct causal relation between two objective poles. For the status of those 
two poles, as well as the possibility of demonstrating a relation of cause and eftect 
between them, assumes the suppression of the register of representation that is the true 
site of their relation. The problematic status of the mental stimulus in this account 
could then be attributed directly to the attempt to reintroduce in a positive term the 
very register of representation upon whose suppression this entire model is predicated. 
This would suggest that the difficulties associated with the role of the mental stimulus 
in this model might be resolved by considering it in the context of the sphere of 
representation within which it properly arises. This would also provide us with a first 
approach to accounting for the problematic causal status of the wish that comes to 
occupy the position of the mental stimulus in this model of explanation. That concept 
of wish, or at least its explanatory status in this model, could then be considered as the 
positive embodiment of all the causal difficulties that follow from the suppression of 
representation in the empirical model of the dream. 
It becomes increasingly evident that the empirical framework of this model, the status 
of its terms, and the nature of the causal relation that it posits between them, is in fact 
predicated upon the suppression of the register of representation that is the true site of 
this relation. This leads us to suspect that the return of the register of representation 
would imply the subversion of the entire framework of this model and the conditions of 
explanation that it assumes. Far from being able to demonstrate any relation of 
mechanical causality between the two poles of this model, it would no longer be 
possible to maintain the positive status of those poles themselves. 
Any form of interpretation that wished to take the question of representation into 
account would be forced to abandon the presuppositions of this mechanical model of 
dream formation and to situate the register of representation as its primary object of 
interest. A technique of interpretation oriented upon the problematic of representation 
would no longer be able to assume the positive status of the poles of this model in its 
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attempt to explain the nature of the relation between them. Instead we would have to 
consider an alternative model of interpretation grounded directly in the register of 
representation itself, which attempts on that basis to determine the status of the term'i 
involved. 
This would mean abandoning the procedure of the progressive model of dream 
formation, which takes as given the positive status of the wish and attempts to account 
for the nature of the dream on the basis of what it knows about that wish. Instead we 
would be forced to grant priority to the process of dream formation itself, as a process 
grounded essentially in the register of representation, and ask rather on that basis, what 
must a wish be such that a process of representation might result in its fulfilment? 
V. 
Some of the implications of such an argument can be pursued through a discussion of 
the two postulates which Freud now adduces as the two "chief characteristics" of 
dreams. "What instigates a dream is a wish, and the fulfilinent of that wish is the 
content of the dream - this is one of the chief characteristics of dreams. The other, 
equally constant one, is that a dream does not simply give expression to a thought, but 
represents the wish fulfilled as a hallucinatory experience." ( 129/160) 
Our fIrst question will concern the status of these two postulates, their grounds and 
conditions of validity. For these two characteristics, presented here in the form of 
dogmatic propositions concerning the nature of dreams in general, are quite clearly 
derived in the fIrst instance from the examples of children's dreams that we have been 
examining. We must therefore ask whether the evidence presented for these two 
postulates in the limited instance of children's dreams is such as to warrant their 
validity for dreams in general. 
In the light of the argument outlined above, we might suspect that the status of these 
two propositions is more profItably to be considered in terms of their relation to one 
another, rather than on any empirical grounds. For if the fIrst proposition, concerning 
the role of the wish in the instigation of the dream, is put forward in the form of a 
dogmatic postulate requiring independent verification, it is clear that the status of the 
second, concerning the process by which that wish is fulfIlled, will remain equally 
problematic until the first has been resolved. 
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Yet it remains difficult to see by what means appropriate veritication for this tirst 
proposition might be obtained. For if the validity of this proposition cannot be 
established here, in the ideal conditions of undistorted children's dreams. it is not likely 
to be any more easily established in the more complex instances of adult dreams. And 
even if this proposition were to be adequately grounded in the evidence of these 
examples. there is still no reason to believe that a proposition established under these 
restricted conditions could be applied with equal validity to the more obscure instances 
of distorted dreams in general. 
Freud himself points out that it is only on the basis of "far-reaching investigations" that 
we could hope "to establish the fact that what instigates a dream must always be a 
wish" .(130/161) The question remains. however, as to just what form of investigation 
would be sufficient to provide the necessary verification for this tirst proposition. 
There is every reason to suspect that this postulate is itself a fundamental principle of 
the technique of interpretation, and would thus be assumed by those investigations 
themselves. Freud has already suggested that it was only once the technique of 
interpretation had been fully elaborated that investigations of this nature became 
possible. 
Once again we encounter the outline of a vicious circle whereby the validity of a 
proposition fundamental to the technique of interpretation can only be established on 
the basis of evidence obtained by the implementation of that technique itself. This 
suggests that the problematic status of both these postulates is to be traced to the 
attempt to maintain the first in the form of a dogmatic postulate requiring independent 
verification. Exactly the same difficulties were seen to arise around the proposition put 
forward as the first of the two premisses of the technique of interpretation. This raises 
the possibility that a similar form of argument might underlie the relation between the 
two propositions characterising the essential nature of the dream itself. 
In the case of the two premisses of interpretation it was shown that the difficulties 
resulting from a dogmatic formulation of these principles and their relationship could 
be comprehensively resolved by an inverse procedure of argument that attempted to 
establish the validity of the first premiss in the form of a necessary postulate required 
to account for the possibility of the second. This yielded a conception of the status of 
that fundamental premiss in the mode of a transcendental postulate. upon which the 
very possibility of the technique of interpretation is to rest. It might be hoped that a 
similar procedure of argument will allow us to situate the key postulate of wish-
fulfilment, itself fundamental to the technique of interpretation, in its appropriate form. 
We might then suspect that Freud is making strategic use of the problematic status of 
this flrst postulate to have the general validity of the second accepted more easily. 
This in turn suggests that the correct procedure of argument would be to derive the 
necessary validity of the fIrst proposition from the universality of the second. "Of the 
two general characteristics of dreams which I have here brought forward, the second 
clearly has more prospect of being accepted without contradiction than the Erst. [t is 
only by means of far-reaching investigations that we shall be able to establish the fact 
that what instigates a dream must always be a wish and cannot be a worry or an 
intention or a reproach; but this will not affect the other characteristic - that the dream 
does not simply reproduce this stimulus, but removes it, gets rid of it, deals with it, by 
means of a kind of experience." (130/161) 
This conception of the relation between these two propositions would suggest that the 
most effective way of determining the conditions of validity of the first postulate would 
be to approach it via an examination of the second. This approach would follow 
directly from the issues at stake in the preceding discussion of the status of the wish in 
the empirical model of explanation. For that argument applies equally to the status of 
this fIrst proposition, which merely formulates the role of the wish in the instigation of 
the dream. Any attempt to situate this postulate as a dogmatic proposition whose 
validity must be established on independent grounds remains hampered by the 
problematic empirical status of the wish itself. This renders the second postulate 
equally inaccessible until the status of the first can be determined. 
An alternative conception of the relation between these two propositions, which 
attempted to establish the necessity of the ftrst in terms of the universality of the 
second, might provide us with a more productive approach to considering the 
conditions of validity of this crucial fIrst proposition. This approach would conform 
not only to the mode of argument already encountered in determining the status of the 
premisses of interpretation, but also to the procedure followed by the technique of 
interpretation itself. For we do not begin with any positive knowledge of the wish, and 
then proceed to examine the process by which that wish comes to be satisfted in the 
dream. Interpretation starts rather with the outcome of the process of dream 
formation and attempts to determine the role of the wish in it. It is to be hoped that a 
similar procedure of argument will allow us to arrive at an appropriate status for this 
first proposition in terms of the conditions of the process of wish-fulfilment itself. 
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VI. 
What instigates the dream is a thought of the form: "I should like to go on the lake". 
The dream does not simply give expression to this thought, but represents it fulfilled in 
a hallucinatory experience: "I am going on the lake". This hallucinatory experience 
then makes up the content of the manifest dream. This transformation already 
introduces an element of distortion into the manifest dream, for that thought is now 
represented in the form of an actual experience. "Thus even in these simplest children's 
dreams a difference remains between the latent and the manifest dream, there is a 
distortion of the latent dream-thought: the transformation of a thought into an 
experience. In the process of interpreting a dream this alteration must tirst be 
undone."( 129/161) 
We may therefore distinguish two different but complementary models for the 
explanation of the dream - a progressive model of dream formation and a retrospective 
model for the interpretation of that dream. The dream arises through a process of 
hallucinatory transformation, by which the wish is represented as an actual experience. 
This process gives rise to a certain degree of distortion in the manifest dream, which 
serves as the primary obstacle to the attempt to discover the wish that underlies that 
dream. The technique of interpretation is obliged to take as its immediate object of 
investigation the outcome of this process, the element of distortion itself, and attempts 
on that basis to determine the nature of the wish that could account for the formation 
of the dream. 
The technique of interpretation thus operates in precisely the opposite direction to the 
process of dream formation. For it takes the product of this transformation, the 
hallucinatory experience making up the manifest dream, and attempts to reverse that 
process in order to arrive at the wish that lies behind it. The technique of 
interpretation proceeds to interpret the content of the manifest dream by asking what 
kind of wish would account for that experience or explain its origin. It begins by 
examining the nature of the experience making up the content of the manifest dream -
"I am going ... " - and seeks to reinstate the wish-clause that would render that 
experience intelligible - "I should like to go ... ". 
These two models are therefore distinguished not simply by the reversal of their 
direction or mode of operation, but more crucially by an inversion in the status of the 
terms involved. The concept of the wish, which featured as the primary assumption of 
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the progressive model of dream formation, is now posited in the form of a final term in 
the procedure of interpretation. It is the revised status attributed to the problem of 
distortion in the procedure of interpretation that makes this inversion of the 
explanatory status of the wish possible. For the element of distortion is now taken as 
the primary object of interpretation, while the role of the wish is considered in its status 
as a necessary postulate required to render that dream intelligible. 
In this way the explanatory status of the wish becomes associated with the basic 
conditions of the technique of interpretation itself, in its role as a condition of the 
intelligibility of the dream. It is this inversion in the explanatory status of the wish that 
now provides us with an alternative approach to the conditions of validity of the 
postulate of wish-fulfIlment, which itself serves as a fundamental principle of that 
technique. For just as the concept of the wish is now situated in its explanatory role as 
a condition of interpretation, so too we might attempt to derive the validity of this 
fundamental postulate from its status as a necessary condition of intelligibility, upon 
which the very possibility of the technique of interpretation is to rest. 
This procedure of argument entails an obvious contrast to that of the empirical model 
of explanation, which would consider the validity of this proposition solely in terms of 
evidence derived from a direct examination of the dream itself. Freud has, however, 
already gone to some lengths to demonstrate the difficulties involved in any such 
attempt to derive the validity of psychoanalytic postulates from evidence obtained at 
the level of the object. The problem of distortion then features as the primary obstacle 
not only to the methods of this form of investigation, but equally to the attempt to 
generalise its findings with any validity. The role of the wish similarly remains the 
most inaccessible or refractory aspect of the dream under these conditions. 
The immediate advantage of associating the explanatory role of the wish with the 
conditions of the technique of interpretation would be to give us access to the form of 
universality and necessity required if this postulate is to serve as a nmdamental 
principle of the psychoanalytic method. At the same time it is clear that the status of 
this proposition, and the validity of the technique of interpretation elaborated around it, 
would no longer be restricted in the same way by the problem of distortion. For, as we 
have shown, it is in fact precisely the revised status attributed to the problem of 
distortion that permits this procedure of interpretation to establish the status of the 
wish in the fonn of a necessary condition of intelligibility. 
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In direct contrast to the empirical model, which attempts to suppress the prohlem of 
distortion, only to re-encounter it as thf:! constant limit of its validity. the technique of 
interpretation establishes the question of distortion as its immediate object and staning-
point. The positive status attributed to the problem of distortion then serves as the 
initial point of reference for the procedure of interpretation, in so far as the register of 
representation is now acknowledged to be fundamental to the intelligibility of the 
dream. For the status here attributed to the issue of distortion is itself merely an 
indication of a more fundamental revision in the status of the register of representation 
as a whole, as the site of coherence for the procedures and principles of the technique 
of interpretation in general. 
VII. 
lt may appear that this line of argument creates as many difficulties as it can be said to 
resolve. At this stage, however, these suggestions amount to no more than a 
provisional formulation of a mode of argument which can only really take shape 
through pursuing their implications in a reading of the text itself. Similarly, the real 
test of these hypotheses will be their productivity in dealing with the issues at stake in 
Freud's argument, and their ability to corne to terms with difficulties that would 
otherwise necessarily remain obscure. This argument can, however, be shown to have 
an immediate application in the analogy that Freud now proposes to establish between 
the models for the explanation of the dream and the parapraxis. 
Freud has outlined a model for the explanation of the parapraxis as the outcome of a 
conflict of intentions, where a second purpose comes to disturb a conscious function. 
The argument then turns on the claim that the product of this disturbance can be 
shown to be the result of a compromise between the conflicting aims of the two 
purposes. He now proposes to fit the model of the dream into the same pattern of 
explanation. The need to sleep is thus situated as the dominant purpose underlying the 
dream, as implied by the very conditions of the state of sleep itself. The mental 
stimulus, or wish, can then be situated as the disturbing purpose which comes into 
conflict with this dominant tendency, by pressing to be dealt with during sleep. 
This conception of the role of the mental stimulus as a disturbance to sleep follows 
directly from the manner in which the notion of mental stimulus was introduced above. 
as a form of excitation "responsible for disturbing the sleep of an adult by preventing 
him from establishing the mood required for falling asleep - the withdrawing of interest 
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from the world" .(128/160) At the same time the withdrawal of interest from thl;! 
external world is here already in place as the basic condition underlying the state of 
sleep, and thus as the preliminary form of the dominant tendency in the dream. This 
condition has been established from the very beginning of this account as the basic 
psychological characteristic of the state of sleep. 
The wish to sleep, in the form of a withdrawal of interest from the external world. can 
thus quite legitimately be situated here as a defming characteristic of the dream itself. 
in so far as the possibility of dreaming assumes the state of sleep as its underlying 
condition. This psychological characterisation of the state of sleep then establishes the 
grounds for the apparently physiological conception of the function of the dream as the 
guardian of sleep. For that concept of the function of the dream, as an attempt to 
protect sleep against the disturbance of stimuli, merely elaborates on the basic 
psychological condition underlying the dream, the wish to preserve sleep. to go on 
sleeping. 
The function of the dream as guardian of sleep, here configured as the dominant wish 
to sleep, may thus be directly derived from the psychological condition defining the 
state of sleep in general, the withdrawal of interest from the external world. And just 
as it is this wish that underlies the function of the dream as guardian of sleep, so too 
the wish that serves as the disturbing stimulus has been defmed from the start in terms 
of its role as a disturbance to sleep. "The disturbed purpose can only be that of 
sleeping. We may replace the disturbing one by the psychical stimulus, or let us say by 
the wish which presses to be dealt with, since we have not learned so far of any other 
psychical stimulus that disturbs sleep."(l30/161) 
It thus appears that the functional model of the dream has from the start been 
structured in terms of the original dynamic model for the explanation of the parapraxis 
as the outcome of a disturbance between two conflicting tendencies. In the same way, 
the dream is now to be explained as a compromise, the result of this connict between 
the wish to sleep and a further wish which presses to be dealt with during sleep, in the 
form of a disturbing stimulus. "Here the dream, too, is the result of a compromise. 
One sleeps, but one nevertheless experiences the removing of a wish; one satisfies a 
wish, but at the same time one continues to sleep. Both purposes are partly achieved 
and partly abandoned."(130/161-62) 
It is at this stage, however, that the problematic status of the wish in this account 
brings into focus all the difficulties associated with the original model of the parapraxis. 
For the explanation of the parapraxis as the outcome of a contlict between two 
opposing tendencies depends in the first instance on our ability to identify the purposes 
involved. Until we have some reliable means of determining the nature of these 
purposes we are faced with the problem of explaining how they came into conmct in 
the first place. The validity of this model for the explanation of the dream would be 
immediately restricted by the problematic empirical status of the wish, and our 
difficulty in positively identifying the disturbing stimulus involved in the instigation of 
the dream. 
The model for the explanation of the parapraxis fmds itself faced with difficulties that 
are in fact characteristic of any model of psychoanalytic investigation. This model 
proposes an explanation of the parapraxis as the product of a conmct of intentions 
between two opposing tendencies. Yet on the one hand we have no independent 
means of determining the nature of at least one of the purposes involved in this 
conflict. And on the other hand the immediate outcome of that conflict, the distortion 
produced by the compromise between them, serves to obscure the nature of the 
tendencies themselves. The product of this conflict of purposes, the parapraxis itself, 
thus merely serves as an obstacle to the validity of the model for its explanation, by 
preventing any demonstration of the terms involved. 
The argument outlined above, however, provides us with a consistent approach to 
resolving the difficulties of this account. For that argument would suggest that the 
problematic position of the concept of distortion in this model of explanation is to be 
directly attributed to the positive status of the terms which it assumes. In that case the 
two primary difficulties faced by this account would merely constitute interlinked and 
complementary aspects of the same underlying difficulty with the conditions of this 
model. The problematic status of the tendencies at the root of this conflict thus 
inevitably gives rise to a conception of the outcome of that conflict as a site of 
distortion that stands in the way of any attempt to identify the purposes themselves. 
If we were able to escape these presuppositions, it would become possible to invert the 
terms of this account to yield an alternative form of deductive explanation that avoids 
the difficulties inherent in the empirical model. This would provide us with a form of 
explanation that no longer relied on the positive status of the intentions for an 
explanation of the conflict to which they give rise, but would rather take that point of 
conflict as its primary point of reference in the attempt to identify the tendencies 
involved. The revised status attributed to this site of conflict, as our immediate object 
of investigation, would then serve as the point of departure for our attempt to 
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determine the role of the wish in that connict. Our conception of the nature and status 
of that wish will therefore be crucial to the viability of this procedure as a whole. 
VIII. 
Freud's definition of the function of the dream as the guardian of sleep establishes the 
initial point of reference for this procedure of argument. It is this conception that 
allows him to situate the need to sleep as the dominant tendency in the dream, one that 
may be considered a defining characteristic of dreams in general. The need to sleep, 
established here as the condition of dreaming, then serves as a fixed and constant point 
of reference, in relation to which we may attempt to determine the nature of the other 
wish that comes into conflict with it. It is that site of opposition, the point of contlict 
with the dominant tendency, that then provides our primary point of reference in 
defining the role of the mental stimulus that disturbs sleep. 
This returns us to the question of the mental stimulus and its role in the instigation of 
the dream. The mental stimulus has been defmed from the start in terms of its role as a 
disturbance to sleep, and hence on the basis of its conflict with the attempt to preserve 
sleep. That mental stimulus, therefore, only figures in the construction of the dream to 
the extent that it has come into conflict with the dominant tendency as a threat to 
sleep. This would suggest that any mental stimulus which encroaches on sleep, and 
thus comes into conflict with this dominant tendency, has the capacity to give rise to a 
dream. Similarly, we might argue that the capacity of any mental stimulus to disturb 
sleep is in itself sufficient grounds for that mental stimulus to play the role of a wish in 
the formation of the dream. 
This opens the possibility of a more formal defmition of the role of the wish in the 
instigation of the dream. purely in terms of the capacity of a mental stimulus to disturb 
sleep. It is clear that the actual nature of this mental stimulus would not be the primary 
consideration in this account. For the role of that mental stimulus in the instigation of 
the dream would be considered solely in terms of its capacity to disturb sleep, and thus 
to come into opposition with the dominant need for sleep. Hence any mental stimulus 
could playa role in the instigation of the dream, to the extent that it has the capacity to 
disturb sleep. Similarly, it is only to the extent that this mental stimulus encroaches on 
sleep, and thus comes into conflict with the dominant tendency, that it functions as a 
wish in the instigation of the dream. 
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This definition of the role of the wish in the formation of the dream follows directly 
from the dynamic model of the dream as the outcome of a connict between two 
opposing tendencies, the need to sleep and a disturbing stimulus. For it is only to the 
extent that a mental stimulus has come into conflict with the demand to sleep, only to 
the extent that it figures as a disturbance to sleep, that that mental stimulus is to be 
considered a wish. Within this dynamic model, the fact that a dream has arisen in itself 
implies that something has come into opposition with the dominant tendency to sleep. 
To the extent that we have a dream, therefore, to the extent that a dream has arisen to 
mark the site of this disturbance, we may posit the role of a disturbing stimulus, and 
hence the role of a wish in the instigation of that dream. 
Within this simple framework of intelligibility we may thus derive by formal inversion 
the necessity of the postulate that what instigates the dream is always a wish. For the 
role of that wish in the formation of the dream is now defined solely in terms of the 
capacity of any mental stimulus to disturb sleep, and thus to come into opposition with 
the dominant need for sleep. Hence, rather than any positive conception of the wish as 
an independent empirical entity which then gives rise to the dream, the fact of dream 
formation is itself now established as the grounds for positing the role of a disturbing 
wish. 
This definition of the role of the wish in the instigation of the dream would then 
immediately provide us with the form of necessity and universality required if this 
postulate is to serve as a fundamental principle of the technique of interpretation. At 
the same time it would provide us with the basis for a more productive approach to the 
question of how it is that the dream can be considered the fulfilment of that wish. For 
the problem has been one of explaining under what conditions this process of dream 
formation, this process of representing a thought as a hallucinatory experience, can be 
said to "deal with" that stimulus, and thus to satisfy the wish. 
The dynamic model of dream formation allows us to sketch a preliminary approach to 
this question. For it now becomes clear that the dream's ability to deal with that 
stimulus, and thus to satisfy the wish that it represents, is in fact only considered in 
terms of the role of the stimulus as a disturbance to sleep. The role of the wish in the 
instigation of the dream can thus be defmed precisely in terms of the capacity of any 
mental stimulus to disturb sleep. And the function of the dream as guardian of sleep 
can similarly be characterised by the attempt to protect sleep against the disturbance of 
that stimulus. The process of dream formation, to the extent that it serves the function 
97 
of protecting sleep, does not therefore have to remove the stimulus itself, but merely 
the threat that it poses to sleep. 
The process of dream formation attempts to deal with the disturbance posed by any 
mental stimulus that arises during sleep by integrating that stimulus into a dream. The 
process of transforming this stimulus into a hallucinatory experience is then to be 
considered a process of wish-fulfilment to the extent that it removes the capacity of 
that mental stimulus to disturb sleep. The transformation of that mental stimulus into 
an experience itself removes its potential as a disturbance to sleep by representing it as 
an actual state of affairs. In this way the process of dream formation manages to pre-
empt the disturbance posed by any wish that presses to be dealt with during sleep by 
representing it as fulfilled, realising it as a hallucinatory experience. 
At the same time it is clear that this wish that presses to be dealt with during sleep 
cannot be said to have been satisfied in any real sense. For it is merely the capacity of 
that stimulus to disturb sleep that has been removed in this process of hallucinatory 
representation. The wish has merely been fobbed off, or defused, to the extent that it 
posed a threat to sleep. The only wish that can really be said to have been satisfied in 
this process is in fact the opposing wish to go on sleeping. We thus arrive at the 
paradoxical situation where the representation of one wish as fulfilled in fact merely 
serves to satisfy the opposing wish to preserve sleep. 
IX. 
The nature of the dream as a form of wish-fulfilment can only be adequately 
appreciated on the basis of this dynamic model of dream formation as the outcome of a 
conflict between two opposing tendencies. It is this dynamic model that then underlies 
the conception of the dream as a compromise formation, as the product of a 
compromise between the need to sleep and the demands of a disturbing wish. In this 
way both the dominant tendency to preserve sleep and the instigatory role of a 
disturbing wish become integral to our conception of the nature of the dream itself. 
For just as in the parapraxis we must distinguish between a disturbing purpose and a 
disturbed one, so too the process of dream formation will remain unintelligible unless 
we posit this conflict of tendencies that underlies it. 
It is not the actual nature of these tendencies, however, but the connict between them 
that remains of primary importance in this account. The common factor in this 
dynamic model, which underlies the explanation of both the parapraxis and the dream, 
is not the particular tendencies involved. but rather the primary fact of an opposition 
between them. This would once again suggest that it is the site of connict between the 
opposing tendencies, rather than those tendencies themselves, that serves as the 
positive element in this dynamic model of the dream. This would similarly allow us to 
argue that it is the fact of that distinction itself, the possibility of distinguishing the role 
of two opposing tendencies in this process, that is here invoked as the primary 
condition of intelligibility for the psychoanalytic object in general. 
The attempt to situate the principle of conflict as a fundamental condition of 
psychoanalytic intelligibility would then merely formalise in an epistemological sphere 
the argument that it is the site of the opposition between them, rather than the positive 
nature of the tendencies themselves, that serves as the immediate object of 
psychoanalytic investigation. This argument would provide us with a link between the 
dynamic model of dream formation and the earlier structural model for the explanation 
of the dream in terms of the distinction between its manifest and latent registers. For 
there too we have suggested that this model of explanation does not ultimately rest 
upon any positive conception of the terms involved, but rather on the nature of the 
relation posited between them. 
The distinction between manifest and latent could then itself be considered one of the 
conditions for the intelligibility of the dream. The first step of the procedure of 
interpretation, exploring the distinction between manifest and latent in order to 
establish the nature of the thoughts that lie behind the dream, would then depend in the 
flrst instance on nothing more than the status of this distinction as a necessary 
condition of intelligibility. Yet the implementation of that distinction will at the same 
time allow us, in principle, to extract the latent thoughts that will account for that 
dream. For this procedure, in its turn, merely entails the possibility of re-instating the 
wish clause that had been collapsed into the manifest dream by the process of dream 
formation itself. 
Once again, then, it is the critique of the positive terms of the empirical model for the 
explanation of the dream that clears the way for a more flexible, dynamic conception of 
the procedure of interpretation. The validity of this procedure neither relies on, nor 
presumes, the positive status of the latent wish in the process of dream formation, 
which is in any case elusive and undemonstrable. For the role of the wish in this 
process is no longer tied to the nature of the mental stimulus in the latent pole. nor 
dependent on our ability to bring that latent thought to light. It is rather the distinction 
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between the manifest and latent registers in the dream that must itself provide the basis 
for our attempt to determine the nature of the terms involved. Just as the distinction 
between manifest and latent tendencies now becomes a fundamental condition of 
psychoanalytic investigation, so too the role of the wish in this process must be derived 
in the first instance from the nature of that relation itself. 
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3.3 The Censorship of Dreams 
1. 
"The study of the dreams of children has taught us the origin, the essential nature and 
the function of dreams. Dreams are things which get rid of (psychical) stimuli 
disturbing to sleep, by the method of hallucinatory satisfaction. "(136/168) The basic 
model of children's dreams has allowed Freud to elaborate an integrated functional 
definition of the dream as an attempt to protect sleep against disruption by mental 
stimuli. This functional definition of the dream allows him to account for both its 
origin, in the disturbance of a mental stimulus that presses to be dealt with during 
sleep, and its essential nature, as a process of hallucinatory representation which serves 
to remove that disturbance. 
"Whenever a dream has been completely intelligible to us, it has turned out to be the 
hallucinatory fulfilment of a wish. This coincidence cannot be a chance one nor a 
matter of indifference."(l36/168) From one point of view, this finding will ultimately 
always remain a matter of coincidence. For no matter how regular or widespread this 
observation may be, there always remains the possibility that we shall encounter a 
dream that does not turn out to be the fulfJ.lment of a wish. Freud has himself pointed 
out that there are in fact many dreams that appear to involve a worry or an intention or 
a reproach, rather than a wish. The question then arises as to his grounds for claiming 
that these dreams too can be shown to involve the satisfaction of a wish. 
From the point of view of the argument put forward above, on the other hand, this 
fmding would involve no coincidence at all. For the role of the wish in the formation 
of the dream has been proposed as a defining characteristic of the dream itself, as the 
condition of its intelligibility. The very possibility of a successful interpretation of that 
dream would thus inevitably turn upon the role of a wish in its formation. It then 
becomes a question of whether this approach to the principle of wish-fultilment, and 
the dynamic model for the explanation of the dream elaborated around it, offers any 
advantages over the empirical argument when we turn to the wider class of dreams in 
general. 
Freud now turns from the examples of children's dreams to an examination of dreams 
in which distortion plays a more obvious part. Distortion is immediately defmed in 
terms of its status as an obstacle to the work of interpretation. "Dream-distortion is 
what makes a dream seem strange and unintelligible to us. "(136/168) It is distortion 
that stands in the way of our attempt to determine the role of the wish in the dream. 
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and thus prevents us from discovering its meaning. The overcoming of distortion is 
therefore a primary condition for the successful interpretation of that dream. "Our 
immediate task, then, is an enquiry which will lead to an understanding of this 
distortion in dreams. "(136/168) 
Freud will go on to elaborate a dynamic account of distortion that traces it back to the 
operation of a particular psychic function, that of "dream-censorship". It is censorship 
that is responsible in the first instance for the distortion encountered in the attempt to 
trace the meaning of the manifest dream back to the latent wish that underlies it. This 
preliminary account of the operation of censorship in dream formation then sets up the 
framework for a more comprehensive account of the role of the dream-work. "We can 
also say that dream-distortion is carried out by the dream-work; and we want to 
describe the dream-work and trace it back to the forces operating in it."( 1361168) 
It is here, precisely in relation to the question of distortion, that the distinction 
structuring the argument of these lectures will again come into play. The initial model 
of investigation, situated in the empirical sphere and directed towards the overcoming 
of distortion, will thus make way for an account of the interpretation of the dream 
elaborated around the register of distortion itself. An alternative conception both of 
the meaning of the dream and of the role of the wish in it, defined by contradistinction 
to the use of these terms in the empirical sphere, will similarly provide the basis for a 
more comprehensive account of the conditions of validity of the technique of 
interpretation as a whole. 
II. 
We are presented with an example of a dream that seems to have been chosen precisely 
for its clarity and coherence. For it presents none of the fragmentation or confusion 
usually associated with dreams, apart from some gaps in its content. Freud points out 
that these gaps are not the result of any uncertainty in the dreamer's recollection of the 
dream, but constitute rather gaps or omissions in the dream itself. "(W)hat is 
remarkable and interesting from our point of view is that the dream shows several gaps 
_ gaps not in the dreamer's memory of the dream but in the content of the dream 
itself. tI( 138/170) 
The coherent text of this dream makes it quite simple to identify the points at which 
those gaps have arisen. In each case it involves a passage of direct speech where a 
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particular word or phrase, the "performative", has been suppressed. If we make the 
insertions called for by the context we arrive at the content of the dream, which turns 
out to be "the model of a shameless libidinal phantasy" .(138/171) Hence we may go 
on to infer that it was in all likelihood precisely on account of the objectionable nature 
of this phantasy that all direct references to it were deleted from the manifest dream 
itself. "You will, I hope, think it plausible to suppose that it was precisely the 
objectionable nature of these passages that was the motive for their suppression. "( 138-
39/171) 
Freud makes use of the analogy of newspaper censorship in wartime as the simplest 
illustration of the suppression of offending passages. "In these empty places there was 
something that displeased the higher censorship authorities and for that reason it was 
removed. "(139/171) This instance of suppression by omission constitutes the most 
straightforward example of censorship. In other cases censorship does not operate by 
direct suppression once these passages are already in place, but gives rise to certain 
modifications and circumlocutions in the formulation of the passages them<;elves. The 
manifest dream then refers to these matters only by "approximations and 
allusions" .(139/171) 
The third form of operation involves the rather more complicated instance of a 
complete reorganisation of material, a displacement of emphasis, so that the central 
themes of the latent thoughts do not appear in the manifest dream at all. "As a result 
of this displacement of accent, this fresh grouping of the elements of the content, the 
manifest dream has become so unlike the latent dream-thoughts that no-one would 
suspect the presence of the latter behind the former. This displacement of accent is 
one of the chief instruments of dream-distortion and is what gives the dream the 
strangeness on account of which the dreamer himself is not inclined to recognise it as 
his own production. "(1 401 I 72) 
We are thus faced with three possible instances of censorship, ranging from the most 
straightforward case of direct suppression by omission to the more complex instance 
where a complete reorganisation of the material of the manifest dream removes any 
reference to the latent thoughts. It is this third instance, where no trace of the latent 
material can be detected in the dream itself, that will constitute the real difficulty for 
Freud's argument. For if the censorship has managed to sever all connection with the 
latent dream-thoughts, such that we can no longer point to any trace of those latent 
thoughts in the manifest dream, then on what grounds can we claim to explain the 
meaning of that dream in terms of its relation to a wish that lies behind it? 
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This third instance becomes the true horizon of the argument that Freud hopes to 
elaborate around the simplest case of direct censorship. The legitimacy of that 
argument must therefore be considered in terms of its possible application to the more 
problematic instance. A first indication of the way forward is provided by a comment 
that would appear almost incidental if not for the categorical manner in which it is 
formulated. "Wherever there are gaps in the manifest dream the dream-censorship is 
responsible for them. We should go further, and regard it as a manifestation of the 
censorship wherever a dream-element is remembered especially faintly. indefinitely and 
doubtfully among other elements that are more clearly constructed. "( 139/172) 
Freud has begun by claiming that the meaning of the dream is to be traced back to the 
role of a wish in its formation. He has then suggested that distortion is what makes a 
dream seem unintelligible to us. He has gone on to claim that it is the censorship that 
is responsible in the first instance for this distortion. We now encounter the general 
claim that whatever is unclear or uncertain in the dream is to be regarded as a sign of 
censorship. Thus whether these gaps in the content of the dream are due to obscurities 
in expression in the dream itself, or simply to doubts or uncertainties in recall. they are 
to be considered first of all as an index of the operation of the censorship. 
This in turn allows us to arrive at a more formal defmition of the role of the censorship. 
considered from the point of view of the work of interpretation rather than the process 
of dream formation itself. For anything in the dream which cannot be explained, any 
aspect of the dream which remains unintelligible, is now to be attributed to the 
operation of censorship. This claim. that the censorship is what prevents the dream 
from being understood, would merely entail a corollary formulation of the basic notion 
that it is the censorship that obscures the meaning of the manifest dream by severing its 
relation to the latent content that lies behind it. 
Freud's subsequent remarks will support this formulation of the status of censorship. 
For he will go on to establish a direct relation between the operation of censorship in 
the dream and that of resistance to the work of interpretation. "What we met with as 
resistance in our work of interpretation must now be introduced into the dream-work 
in the form of the dream-censorship. The resistance to interpretation is only a putting 
into effect of the dream-censorship."(1411173-74) 
This parallel between the operation of resistance and of censorship then forms the basis 
for the notion that the operation of censorship is not confmed to the construction of 
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the dream. but "persists as a permanent institution" whose aim is the maintenance of 
that distortion against any attempt at deciphering the dream.( 1411173-74) 
At the same time Freud has been quite explicit in cautioning against any attempt to 
understand the operation of this function of censorship in any substantive or localised 
sense. The effects of distortion and resistance are not to be conceived in terms of the 
operation of any particular apparatus or agency of censorship, but rather simply in 
terms of the relation between forces in the dream. "For the time being it is nothing 
more than a serviceable term for describing a dynamic relation. The word does not 
prevent our asking by what purpose this influence is exercised and against what 
purpose it is directed. " (14011 73) 
Freud thus proposes a dynamic model of the operation of censorship, structured once 
more in terms of the relation between conflicting tendencies in the dream. He will go 
on to suggest that this dynamic approach to the censorship is fundamental not only for 
the understanding of the dream, but for the explanation of human life in general. We 
would want, therefore, to consider the framework of this dynamic model of 
explanation in terms that could indeed support the scope of these aspirations. For our 
understanding of this claim will inevitably be influenced by our conception of the 
purposes involved and the nature of their relationship as a whole. 
III. 
The "immediate task" of the present lecture has been formulated as "an enquiry which 
will lead to an understanding of this distortion in dreams".(l36/168) The explanation 
of distortion turns upon the notion of censorship. For it is the operation of censorship 
that is responsible in the first instance for the distortion that obscures the meaning of 
the dream. At the same time Freud suggests that it will be possible to carry out a 
parallel derivation to account for the effects of resistance to interpretation. Resistance 
to the work of interpretation is merely a "putting into effect" of the same censorship 
that is responsible for the distortion encountered in the dream. 
Censorship is thus the common term invoked to account for both the effects of 
distortion in the formation of the dream and the effects of resistance in the 
interpretation of that dream. It is this notion that allows Freud to establish an explicit 
parallel between the two major obstacles to the technique of interpretation, by 
suggesting that they have a common source. "(J)ust as the strength of the resistance 
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varies in the interpretation of each element in a dream, so too the magnitude of the 
distortion introduced by the censorship varies for each clement in the same 
dream."( 141/174) 
Freud has begun his account of the role of censorship in the dream with a survey of 
some of its basic forms of operation, in order to establish "what it does".(136/168) He 
now turns from the survey of the mechanisms of censorship to an examination of its 
source, in an attempt to determine the nature of the forces by which it is implemented. 
It is precisely at this point that we find the introduction of the dynamic model of 
censorship prefaced by a warning against the dangers of a positive or substantive 
reading of what is in the first instance no more than a descriptive or explanatory 
terrn.( 140/173) 
The very notion of "the censorship", as a permanent institution in the psychic 
apparatus, shows how difficult it is to avoid introducing anthropomorphic and 
teleological assumptions into an account of this nature. For it is a small step from 
describing a process in terms of its perceived outcome to describing it as a function in 
terms of the purpose that it serves and then going on to attribute responsibility for that 
function to a particular agency in the psychic apparatus. Hence Freud's explicit caution 
against any localising conception of the censorship as a particular "office" in the 
psychic apparatus, "from which a censoring influence of this kind issues".( 140/173) 
The dynamic model of the operation of censorship is introduced in an attempt to 
counteract the anthropomorphic tendencies inherent in this process of derivation, 
which tend to become lodged in the concept of censorship itself. Freud emphasises 
that .. the notion of censorship is to be understood primarily in terms of a dynamic 
relation between the forces at work in the process of dream formation. The term 
would then serve merely to designate the effects of a particular process, the outcome 
of a dynamic relation between opposing tendencies operating in the dream. It is this 
conception that is to provide the framework for the attempt to determine the nature of 
the particular forces involved. 
It is here that our understanding of the status and grounds of validity of the dynamic 
model of explanation in general will have a direct influence on our conception of the 
nature of these "tendencies" or "purposes". Only an appreciation of the appropriate 
formal status of the principles of this model can prevent us from slipping straight back 
into all the teleological assumptions entailed by the concept of "purpose" itself. Hence 
the warning against the dangers of a positive reading of an explanatory term. For any 
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substantive conception of the purposes at work in the dream woulJ simply involve LIS 
once more in all the conceptual difficulties that the dynamic model of explanation 
might allow us to avoid. 
The use of the English term "purpose" here, where the German has "Tendenz", merely 
serves, of course, to accentuate the dangers of a teleological reading of this account. 
The translator's footnote to the use of this term does, however, refer us back to the 
introduction of this term into the original model of the parapraxis in the third 
lecture.( 40/66) This footnote thus refers us directly to the root of this entire argument 
in Freud's initial discussion of the sense of a psychical process. We may therefore 
consider the position of the term "purpose" here as an index to all the issues at stake in 
that initial argument, and thus to the concept of sense around which that argument 
turns. 
It was in the initial discussion of the sense of a psychical process that it first became 
possible to distinguish two divergent readings of the concept of sense itself. We thus 
distinguished between a functional or psycho-physiological reading of this term, in the 
direction of "intention" or "purpose", and an alternative reading of this notion in terms 
of a broader context of significance. We attempted to indicate some of the ways in 
which this conception of the sense of a psychical process can help us to overcome the 
empirical limitations of any explanation of the parapraxis that relies on the problematic 
psychological notions of intention and purpose. 
This distinction between the notions of purpose and intention, on the one hand, and 
those of sense and significance, on the other, served as the point of departure for our 
attempt to elaborate a more comprehensive account of the technique of interpretation, 
in distinction from the original model for the investigation of the parapraxis. This 
involved a procedure of interpretation oriented upon the signifying context that 
supports the parapraxis rather than any functional structure of intentions that might lie 
behind it. For the initial model for the investigation and explanation of the parapraxis 
remains hampered by the psycho-physiological conceptions that provide its empirical 
foundation. 
We proceeded to consider an alternative account of the principles and conditions of the 
technique of interpretation, defmed in contrast to the limitations of the psycho-
physiological model of the parapraxis and the functional principles that it assumes. 
This argument has culminated in a critique of the empirical foundations of the initial 
dynamic model of the parapraxis in favour of principles of explanation detined solely at 
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the level of formal conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. This has allowed 
us to elaborate a dynamic model for the explanation of the dream that depends 
primarily on the possibility of distinguishing between opposing tendencies at work in 
the dream, rather than on any positive or empirical conception of the nature of those 
tendencies themselves. 
The attempt to rid this argument of any residual reliance upon psycho-physiological 
notions has thus amounted to a critique of the empirical foundations of psychoanalytic 
principles in general. We have argued that the validity of these principles can only be 
effectively sustained at the level of epistemological conditions of interpretation. 
formulated in the mode of necessary principles of explanation. Only in this way can 
these principles attain to the form of necessity and universal validity adequate to their 
status as fundamental principles of the technique of interpretation. Similarly. we have 
demonstrated that it is only by this means that we can resolve the difficulties that arise 
from the attempt to found these principles at the level of empirical procedures and 
postulates. 
It should now be possible to carry through this argument to a critique of the 
substantive notions entailed in the dynamic model of censorship itself. We would want 
to maintain the formal priority of the dynamic principles of explanation, elaborated 
around the possibility of distinguishing between conflicting tendencies at work in this 
process, over any attempt to determine the positive nature of those tendencies 
themselves. Only in this manner can we avoid the conceptual difficulties that inevitably 
accompany the attempt to ground this model in an empirical investigation of the 
"purposes" or "tendencies" that it postulates. For these tendencies themselves 
constitute no more than explanatory postulates, hypothetical processes at work in the 
psychic apparatus, invoked to account for given effects in the dream. 
This provides some indication of the issues at stake in Freud's caution against a 
substantive reading of what are postulated in the fIrst instance as descriptive or 
explanatory terms. The term "purpose", which quite clearly serves merely to support 
the causal structure postulated by this account, is the most obvious instance of a 
functional embodiment of an explanatory term. An appreciation of the appropriate 
status of this term then provides us with a guideline in our approach to a whole range 
of other concepts invoked to support psychoanalytic explanation, including those of 
"cathexis", "libido", "drive", "wish", and "intention". For we would want to reconsider 
the status of each of these concepts in terms of the role it plays within the broader 
economy of psychoanalytic explanation, as a causal postulate ultimately founded at the 
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level of explanation, which then receives functional embodiment at the level of the 
object. 
It is clear that our understanding of the status of these explanatory concepts in 
psychoanalysis will have a direct influence on our conception of the role they play in 
the model of the psychic apparatus. Our conception of the status and foundation of 
that model of the psychic apparatus as a whole will similarly be determined by our 
approach to the principles of explanation upon which it depends. For the model of the 
psychic apparatus proposed by psychoanalysis merely constitutes a functional 
systematisation of those fundamental explanatory concepts and the principles from 
which they are derived. The central structural distinction around which this model is 
elaborated, the notion of a divided psychic apparatus, can thus itself be considered an 
embodiment of the fundamental principle of conflict that we have shown to lie at the 
heart of the dynamic model of explanation. 
It is this dynamic principle of conflict or opposition, established as a formal principle of 
explanation, that then provides the framework for the postulation of unconscioLls 
processes operating in the psychic apparatus. For the postulate of the existence of 
processes which have no immediate empirical manifestation can clearly only be justitied 
in the fIrst instance as a necessary postulate required to support the dynamic model of 
explanation. It is those dynamic principles of explanation, and the argument elaborated 
around them, that must therefore provide the foundation for our attempt to establish 
the status of the central concepts in psychoanalysis. The attempt to determine the 
appropriate status of those dynamic principles of explanation will thus remain our point 
of reference in the argument that follows. 
Similarly, we should be wary of any substantive rendering of a concept that is 
postulated in the form of a necessary condition of interpretation. Any simplistic 
physiological or functional reduction of a concept such as "the Unconscious" would 
merely stand in the way of the attempt to grasp the common principle that allows 
Freud to go beyond the distinction between Cs. and Ucs., or even Ego and Id, towards 
the postulation of a notion such as the Death Drive. In each case we are dealing with 
concepts elaborated around a dynamic principle of opposition that is situated as the 
condition of intelligibility of the psychoanalytic object in general. The status of the 
concepts invoked to structure that dynamic relation is in each case derived from those 




"The purposes which exercise the censorship are those which are acknowledged by the 
dreamer's waking judgement, those with which he feels himself at one."( 1421174) 
Censorship is attributed to the influence of the dreamer's faculty of judgement. all the 
ethical and critical judgements with which the ego identifies. This faculty. however. 
appears to be precisely the same as that which is responsible for the critical objections 
that constituted the initial obstacle to the method of free association. The issues of 
censorship and resistance are thus brought into relation to one another, situated as 
obstacles to the work of interpretation, and attributed to a common source. "You may 
be sure that if you reject an interpretation of one of your own dreams which has been 
correctly carried out, you are doing so from the same motives for which the dream-
censorship has been exercised, the dream-distortion brought about and the 
interpretation made necessary."(l421l74) 
"The purposes against which the dream-censorship is directed must be described in the 
first instance from the point of view of that agency itself."(l 4211 74-75) Here, then. we 
have a procedure of derivation already identified as characteristic of the dynamic model 
of explanation. The effects of censorship have been attributed to the interests of 
waking judgement, to the dominant influence of those judgements with which the 
waking ego identifies. The purposes against which that censorship is implemented are 
now defmed solely in terms of their relation to those dominant trends, and thus in 
terms of their point of conflict or opposition with those "waking judgements". 
These "purposes" that come into conflict with the dominant tendencies will then be 
identified as wishes. In conformity with dynamic principles of explanation. these 
wishes will be given, in the flrst instance, no positive content. Instead they are merely 
situated in relation to their point of conflict with those dominant tendencies. They will 
thus be characterised in terms of their opposition to the standards of waking 
judgement. Hence, "they are invariably of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the 
ethical, aesthetic and social point of view".(142/175) So too, their expression in the 
dream is inevitably subject to censorship and distortion, because they are by detinition 
wishes that come into conflict with the judgements of the censoring agency. 
Certain consequences immediately follow. In the first place it is clear that the 
dreamer's information can no longer serve as the basis for our conclusions about the 
nature of these wishes. For the appearance of those wishes in the dream is now 
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defmed precisely in terms of their opposition to the judgements and sentiments of the 
waking ego. Our investigations can therefore no longer rely on the dreamer's 
contirmation, but must instead be maintained against all his claims and protests to the 
contrary. Any attempt to determine the nature of the wishes involved in the formation 
of dreams will thus have to be carried out in opposition to the conscious knowledge of 
the dreamer. 
The investigation of these censored wishes finds itself oriented in opposition to the 
judgements of the waking ego. The dreamer's judgements concerning those wishes can 
therefore no longer serve as a point of reference, except by contrast. For we will be 
forced to postulate the existence of wishes that are not only unknown to the dreamer, 
but which directly contradict those of which he is aware. The role of these wishes in 
the dream will be defmed in the first instance precisely in terms of their opposition to 
the tendencies acknowledged by the dreamer. It is the occurrence of censorship and 
distortion, therefore. that provides the point of inversion around which the postulation 
of unconscious wishes first becomes possible. 
Distortion and censorship themselves become our justification for the postulation of 
wishes not recognised by the dreamer. For the occurrence of these wishes in the 
dream is postulated in the first instance solely in terms of their conflict with those that 
he does recognise, and thus on the grounds of their opposition to the judgements of 
the waking ego. Censorship and distortion are thus situated as necessary conditions 
for the appearance of those wishes in the dream. Similarly, the manifestation of a 
directly contrary sentiment in the ego can no longer be any argument against the 
existence of an unconscious wish. For it is precisely that contradiction that is here 
established as the grounds for postulating the existence of its unconscious opposite. 
Only a framework of argument such as that already elaborated around the dynamic 
principles of explanation can support this sort of move beyond the evidence of the 
empirical realm. For this step amounts to an overthrow of the entire structure of proof 
and demonstration upon which the empirical model of investigation has relied. along 
with a fundamental displacement in the notion of evidence itself. Hence the need to 
establish the principles of psychoanalytic interpretation at the level of formal principles 
of explanation, which no longer depend upon the availability of evidence from the 
empirical sphere. For those interpretations will have to be maintained not merely in the 
absence of any immediate empirical support. but in the face of direct counter-evidence 
presented by the dreamer himself. 
III 
The work of investigation into the nature of the censored wishes that appear in the 
dream must thus be carried out in direct opposition to the knowledge of the waking 
ego. Hence it is the ego of the dreamer that is now encountered as the primary 
obstacle and source of resistance to our interpretations. The success of these 
investigations will turn on the attempt to remove the obstruction provided by the 
dreamer's ego and to overthrow the ego's claim to stand as the ultimate judge and 
arbiter on the legitimacy of our fmdings. The first step entails an attempt to 
demonstrate that the dreamer's claim to be an objective and impartial judge in these 
matters is undermined by the conflicts and contradictions to which the ego is itself 
subject by its position in the dream. 
"These wishes, which are censored and given a distorted expression in dreams. are first 
and foremost manifestations of an unbridled and ruthless egoism. "( 142/175) This 
statement not only runs directly counter to all our expectations, but also appears to 
contradict everything that has been said above. For the first step towards a positive 
characterisation of these censored wishes appears to attribute them to the ego, or at 
least seems to put them on the side of the ego. And yet Freud will go on to suggest 
that the ego, "freed from all ethical bonds, also finds itself at one with all the demands 
of sexual desire, even those which have long been condemned by ollr aesthetic 
upbringing and those which contradict all the requirements of moral 
restraint. "( 1421175) 
It is thlls apparent that any straightforward account of the positive nature of the ego, 
or of the relation between ego and wish, or even the basic framework of conscious and 
unconscious processes, will be of no immediate use to LIS here. For the purposes that 
exercise the ~censorship have been attributed to the waking judgements with which the 
dreamer's ego feels itself "at one". And yet the ego now finds itself "at one" with all 
the prohibited sexual wishes against which that censorship is implemented. Little 
wonder, then, that the dream shows signs of an unbridled egoism, or that the ego 
appears to play the chief part in it. 
"This 'sacro egoismo' of dreams is certainly not unrelated to the attitude we adopt 
when we sleep, which consists in our withdrawing our interest from the whole external 
world. "(1421175) Once again, the situation in the dream is traced to the fundamental 
condition of a withdrawal of interest from reality. This withdrawal of interest. the 
severing of links with the external world, has already been identified as the primary 
psychological characteristic of the state of sleep. The immediate consequence is an 
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inevitable heightening of narcissistic cathexis, as the ego withdraws any investment 
from external objects in favour of the self-enclosed narcissism of sleep. 
We have previously argued that the severing of the relation to the external world 
entails a corollary disruption, or suspension, of the relation to the faculty of critical 
judgement. It is this suspension of the relation to the critical faculty that frees the ego 
from the bonds of moral restraint and allows free rein to the demands of sexual desire. 
We find the ego veering from an identification with the demands of waking judgement. 
the tendencies that exercise censorship, to an identification with those against which it 
is implemented. Hence the ego fmds itself at one with the most basic sexual wishes. 
which may now choose their objects without inhibition. 
The withdrawal of interest from the external world in sleep is thus accompanied by a 
corollary suspension of the axis of critical judgement. As a result, the ego is freed 
from the immediate demands both of external reality and of moral restraint. leading to 
the uninhibited expression of sexual desires. This lifting of inhibitions would then 
account for the conditions of hallucinatory fulfilment of wishes in sleep. Yet it is the 
ego itself that will provide the immediate object of those wishes. The over-riding 
narcissism of the dream may thus be attributed to a direct sexual investment of the ego, 
as the primary object of hallucinatory gratification, which becomes merged with the 
demands of sexual desire. 
It is clear, then, that the status of the ego in the dream must itself be considered in 
terms of a dynamic relation between opposing tendencies. The dynamic model of 
explanation may thus be brought to bear on the ego. in order to demonstrate its 
precarious position at the intersection of the conflicting demands of critical judgement 
and sexual desire. It becomes apparent to what degree the ego is inevitably the site of 
distortion, resistance and misrecognition, produced by the effects of this connict. We 
may therefore question the ego's claim to sovereign status as an objective judge on 
these matters, and hence its right to contest the fmdings and postulates of 
psychoanalytic interpretation. 
V. 
The strategy underlying the rhetoric of Freud's argument in the rest of this lecture 
involves a precisely analogous attempt to bring the dynamic model of explanation to 
bear on the positions of common opposition to the findings of psychoanalysis. This 
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strategy entails a procedure of dialectical argument which attempts to bring to light the 
conflicts and contradictions underlying these positions by making explicit the 
assumptions upon which they rely. This sets up the framework for implementing 
dynamic principles of explanation, in order to demonstrate that the resolution of these 
contradictions requires the dissolution of the position of common reason which they 
assume. This procedure clears the way for the recognition of wishes which are not 
only unknown to the ego, but contrary to everything it stands for, thus establishing the 
grounds for the postulation of the existence of the unconscious itself. 
This argument will be pursued at two levels, that of moral or ethical objections to the 
fmdings of psychoanalysis, and that of intellectual or theoretical criticism" of the 
principles from which they are derived. The thread of this argument is not always easy 
to make out underneath the rhetoric, as it is pursued on two fronts, alternating 
between issues of moral or emotional outrage and more obvious questions of 
theoretical principle. In both cases, however, the objections will be traced to the 
position of the psychological subject which they defend. Freud will go on to suggest 
that these criticisms constitute merely two complementary forms of resistance that can 
be attributed to a common emotional source. And in both instances the difficulties will 
be resolved by dynamic principles of explanation aimed at overthrowing the moral and 
theoretical prejudices that support the position of the psychological subject. 
The initial step of this strategy turns on the attempt to emphasise or exaggerate the 
reprehensible, repugnant or evil nature of the wishes that psychoanalysis claims to find 
in the dream. "Lusts which we think of as remote from human nature show themselves 
strong enough to provoke dreams. Hatred, too, rages without restraint. "(14311 75) 
These comments are aimed at arousing moral outrage against the postulates and 
fmdings of psychoanalytic interpretation, suggesting that they are to be rejected as 
contradicting basic tenets of human decency and dignity. This line of argument will 
culminate in the suggestion that psychoanalysis is responsible for an immoral and 
degenerate view of mental life that merely serves to detract from the true worth of 
mankind. 
Freud's counter to this accusation then amounts to a justification of a dynamic view of 
mental life in general. "On the contrary; I am exhibiting to you not only the evil 
dream-wishes which are censored but also the censorship, which suppresses them and 
makes them unrecognisable. We lay stronger emphasis on what is evil in men only 
because other people disavow it and thereby make the human mind, not better, but 
incomprehensible. If we now give up this one-sided ethical valuation. we shall 
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undoubtedly find a more correct formula for the relation between good and evil 111 
human nuture."(147/180) 
The real issue at stake here, however, concerns the attempt to use the nature of the 
fmdings of psychoanalytic investigation as an argument against the premisses and 
principles from which they are derived. This question is directly related to the peculiar 
status of psychoanalytic principles, and the manner in which Freud has been obliged to 
formulate the initial premisses of the technique of interpretation. For, given the 
provisional and hypothetical manner in which those premisses have been laid down, it 
would appear that their legitimacy is directly dependent on the plausibility of the 
findings that follow from them. Freud had himself, after all. suggested as much at the 
time. "The outcome of our work will decide whether we are to hold to this 
assumption and whether we may then go on to treat it in turn as a proven 
finding. "( 100/129) 
It is thus the initial status of those premisses, and the manner in which they were laid 
down, that now renders Freud's argument susceptible to this sort of attack. This may 
also account for the sudden outbreak of rhetorical flourishes here, as Freud attempts to 
make the most of the ethical issues involved. For it is easy enough to deal with the 
more obvious objections based on the immoral or unpleasant aspects of these fmdings. 
Freud will merely suggest that the rejection of the findings of psychoanalysis on 
grounds of their conflict with the moral or aesthetic criteria of humanist sentiment 
amounts to a form of resistance. "When you reject something that is disagreeable to 
you, what you are doing is repeating the mechanism of constructing dreams rather than 
understanding it and surmounting it."{l45-461178) 
It is more difficult, however, to defend against similar objections on a theoretical level, 
which contest the plausibility or the empirical validity of these findings in general. 
Freud is thus forced to admit to the difficulties facing his argument here. "If on the 
basis of these premisses we had arrived at plausible findings from dream-interpretation, 
we should have been justified in concluding that the premisses were valid. But how 
about it if these fmdings seem to be as I have pictured them? We should then be 
tempted to say: These are impossible, senseless or at least most improbable findings; 
so there was something wrong about the premisses.' "(1441176) 
Freud's response to this difficulty will once more take an unexpected direction. Rather 
than attempting to avoid these objections, or to deal with them on this ground. he will 
attempt to formulate them in terms more favourable to his argument by tackling them 
115 
in a more extreme version. "(F)irst, we can further strengthen the criticism of our 
dream-interpretations. The fact that the findings from them are so disagreeable and 
repellent need not, perhaps, carry very great weight. A stronger argument is that the 
dreamers to whom we are led to attribute such wishful purposes by the interpretation 
of their dreams reject them most emphatically and for good reasons." ( 144/177) 
With this we fmd ourselves back on the grounds of the initial model for the 
investigation of the parapraxis. There Freud made use of a similar strategy in order to 
focus the argument concerning the validity of the method of investigation onto the 
position of the speaker involved. We were presented with a series of instances, from 
the simplest case where the speaker is both aware of the disturbing intention and able 
to confirm our interpretation, to the more problematic instance where the speaker not 
only has no knowledge of the disturbing intention, but also strenuously rejects our 
interpretation. In the most favourable instance the validity of our interpretation is 
confirmed by the speaker. The more problematic instance, however, where the 
speaker was not prepared to support our interpretation, required the introduction of 
the hypothesis that there were processes at work in him of which he knew nothing. 
The whole account elaborated around the model of the parapraxis appeared, then, to 
founder at this point. For this method of investigation, whose validity appears to rest 
in the first instance upon the evidence provided by the speaker, can now only be 
applied to the more problematic examples by way of the apparently arbitrary 
hypothesis of unconscious mental processes. The scope and validity of this model for 
the investigation of the parapraxis is thus immediately limited by its reliance on a 
hypothesis that appears to have no further grounds of justification. We similarly noted 
that in order to preserve the continuity between the various cases Freud was forced to 
introduce a further, subsidiary hypothesis - that of the suppression of intentions in the 
speaker. This postulate was then presented as the "indispensable condition" for the 
occurrence of a slip of the tongue.(65-66/92-93) 
It is to this preliminary account of the method of psychoanalytic investigation, 
therefore, that we must look for the structure that underlies Freud's argument here. 
Once again he appears eager to bring the question of the validity of interpretation to 
rest upon evidence obtained from the dreamer. Yet here he will push this strategy 
through to such an extreme form that it appears to remove any support he might hope 
to gain from it. For it is not simply the case that the dreamer has no supporting 
evidence to offer, nor even that the dreamer rejects our findings as unlikely. Rather, 
the dreamer's rejection of our interpretation is here founded on unambiguous evidence 
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to the contrary, which appears to directly disprove our claims. "But when they kel in 
themselves the precise contrary of the wish we have interpreted to them and when they 
are able to prove to us by the lives they lead that they are dominated by this contrary 
wish, it must surely take us aback."(144-4SIl77) 
The possibility of holding to our findings in the face of direct counter-evidence from 
the dreamer would once again appear to rest upon the introduction of the hypothesis of 
the existence of mental processes of which the dreamer knows nothing. And yet it is 
precisely the unresolved question of the grounds or the justification for assuming this 
hypothesis of unconscious mental processes in the first place that remains the most 
problematic issue at the heart of this account. "Granted that there are unconscious 
purposes in mental life, nothing is proved by showing that purposes opposed to these 
are dominant in conscious life. Perhaps there is room in the mind for contrary 
purposes to exist side by side. Possibly, indeed, the dominance of one impulse IS 
precisely a necessary condition ofits contrary being unconscious."(145/l78) 
Just as in the case of the parapraxis, then, the plausibility of this whole argument 
appears to rest upon the introduction of an arbitrary and unfounded hypothesis of the 
existence of unconscious mental processes. There is, however, one crucial difference 
that distinguishes this account from the earlier model for the investigation of the 
parapraxis. And that is the introduction of the dynamic factor of censorship. It is the 
dynamic model of censorship that provides the framework within which the dominance 
of one impulse in consciousness may serve rather as a sign of the existence of its 
unconscious opposite. It is now precisely the dreamer's disavowal, his rejection of 
these wishes as contrary to everything he stands for, that provides our primary point of 
reference in exploring those unconscious processes. 
We have shown above how the introduction of the dynamic model of explanation 
makes possible a complete transformation in the status of the problem of distortion in 
the interpretation of dreams. The formal status of those dynamic principles of 
explanation then serves to establish the general framework within which the 
postulation of unconscious processes becomes possible. Here it is the introduction of 
the factor of censorship into this dynamic model of explanation that provides the 
specific point of reference for the general postulate of the possibility of unconscious 
processes. For it is the framework of the dynamic model of censorship that allows us 
to postulate the existence of unconscious wishes in direct opposition to those apparent 
in the conscious portion of the mind. 
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It is the dynamic model of censorship, then. that establishes the framework within 
which it becomes possible to suggest that the dominance of one impulse in the mind is 
in fact a "necessary condition" of its contrary being unconscious. This same notion of 
censorship then serves to provide retrospective justification for Freud's initial claim 
concerning the role of the suppression of an intention in the parapraxis, which was 
similarly posited as the "indispensable condition" for the occurrence of the parapraxis. 
Far from being an auxiliary or subsidiary hypothesis to the postulation of the 
unconscious, it is in fact this condition of "suppression" or "rejection" due to 
censorship that now provides the grounds for the concept of the unconscious itself. 
Hence it is the introduction of the dynamic factor of censorship that will now allow 
Freud to go beyond any simple descriptive use of the term "unconscious" towards 
establishing this concept in its comprehensive psychoanalytic sense. "With this the 
unconscious acquires a new sense for us; the characteristic of 'for the time being' or 
'temporary' disappears from its essential nature. It can mean permanently unconscious 
and not merely 'latent at the time'."(l481181) 
SECTION FOUR 
4.1 Symbolism in Dreams 
I. 
The model for the investigation of dreams is elaborated around the distinction hetween 
the manifest and latent registers of the dream. The meaning of the manifest dream 
comes to rest upon the nature of the latent thoughts which lie behind it. The dream 
appears unintelligible to us precisely because its relation to those latent thoughts has 
been severed or obscured. The procedure for interpreting the dream turns on the 
attempt to re-establish that connection, in order to explain the manifest dream in terms 
of its relation to the latent thoughts from which it arose. 
The practical basis for this technique of interpretation is to be found in the method of 
free association, which uses the dreamer's associations to re-establish that relation. 
The theoretical model of dream formation is based on the findings of the method of 
free association and the discoveries which it makes possible. This theoretical model is. 
in effect, developed to account for the difficulties encountered in the attempt to trace 
the relation from the manifest dream to the latent thoughts from which it arose. It thus 
examines the nature of the relations between the manifest and latent elements in the 
dream and attempts to account for the manner in which that relation has become 
obscured. 
The problem of distortion constitutes the most general difficulty for any attempt to 
trace the relation between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. The problem 
of resistance, which first arises as a practical obstacle in the method of free association. 
is situated as the complementary difficulty at the level of the technique of 
interpretation. The notion of censorship, one of the major theoretical innovations of 
the psychoanalytic theory of the dream, is introduced to account for the effects of both 
distortion and resistance. It is censorship, therefore, that features as the common 
source of the two major difficulties facing any attempt to interpret the dream. 
The operation of censorship becomes one of the defming conditions of the process of 
dream formation. Censorship fmds its point of deployment above all in the attempt to 
obscure the relation between the manifest dream and the latent thoughts which gave 
rise to it. The aims of censorship are served by all the peculiarities inherent in the 
process of dream formation itself, all the obscurities which arise in the process by 
which the latent thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream. At the same time. 
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it introduces further measures of its own to secure this aim and to pn:vent rc(;ognit ion 
of the latent thoughts involved. 
We can thus separate out two sources of distortion in the process of dream formation. 
On the one hand we have what might be considered the non-tendentious sources of 
distortion. all the obscurities and oddities of expression inherent in the process itself. 
which arise from the transformation of the latent thoughts into visual images. We may 
also distinguish the further influence of forms of distortion that are to be attributed 
directly to the operation of the censorship. which makes use of aU these obscurities of 
expression for its own ends. The conjunction or interaction of these two sources of 
distortion in the dream provides the framework for our approach to the register of the 
dream-work as a whole. 
The field of the dream-work is constituted by all the processes involved in the 
transformation of the latent thoughts into the manifest dream. This register is defined 
by the interaction between two sources of distortion - the obscurities associated with 
the nature of this transformation itself. and the further sources of distortion introduced 
by the censorship in its struggle against the wish. The "natural" factors involved in this 
process - all the characteristics of dream formation attributable directly to the 
transformation of thoughts into visual images - thus become the battlefield. or site of 
appropriation. for the dynamic interplay between the conflicting demands of censorship 
and wish. 
The use of symbols in the process of dream formation constitutes the flfSt of these 
"natural" sources of distortion. This factor is explicitly distinguished from the effects 
-of the censorship. and attributed directly to the process by which the latent thoughts 
are represented in the manifest dream. We would want, therefore, to use the topic of 
symbolism in dreams to situate the most general conditions of the process of dream 
formation, as it turns on the transformation of thoughts into visual images. How we 
conceive the problem of symbolism will determine our approach to the general 
question of the relations between words and images in the dream as a whole. 
II. 
The manner in which this topic is raised is of particular interest for what it tells us 
about Freud's approach to the problem of symbolism in general. The role of 
symbolism in the dream is introduced in the flfst instance as a new source of distortion, 
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as a further obstacle to the intelligibility of the dream. It is thus considered in relution 
to the technique of interpretation as a failure, a "gap" in the method of free associution. 
"We come upon this other factor which prevents dreams from being lucid. this new 
contribution to dream-distortion, by noticing a gap in our technique. "(1491182) 
There is no general discussion of the foundations for our knowledge of symbols. The 
problem of symbolism is defmed rather in terms of its relation to the aims and goals of 
the technique of interpretation, as a shortcoming of the method of free association. 
There are instances where associations to certain elements of the dream fail to 
materialise. Freud claims that it is possible to distinguish these instances from 
manifestations of resistance, as they regularly occur in relation to specific dream 
elements. "(W)e begin to recognise that a fresh general principle is at work where we 
had begun by thinking we were only faced by an exceptional failure of 
technique. "( IS0/183) 
We are thus introduced to the notion that certain manifest elements have a tixed 
meaning that can be defmed independently of their role in any particular dream. Freud 
postulates a constant or generic relation between certain dream elements and the ideas 
behind them, which can therefore be understood apart from the associations of the 
dreamer concerned. This raises the possibility of a stable translation of these elements 
on independent grounds, without relying on any information from the dreamer. "A 
constant relation of this kind between a dream element and its translation is described 
by us as a 'symbolic' one, and the dream element itself as a 'symbol' of the unconscious 
dream-thought. "( IS0/183-4) 
The notion of symbolism is introduced as a "general principle" that allows us both to 
account for this gap in the method of free association and to make up for it on the 
basis of our own knowledge. Yet Freud gives no account of the grounds for this 
knowledge of the meaning of symbols, apart from suggesting that the reliability of this 
procedure stems from "an accumulation of many similar cases".(IS0/183) He will 
defer any discussion of the theory which makes such a flxed translation of certain 
dream elements possible, suggesting that a knowledge of symbolism is neither specific 
to psychoanalysis, nor an essential part of its theory of dreams. "(S)ymbolism is not 
particular to dreams alone and is not characteristic of them".( 152/ 18S) 
The whole question of the knowledge of symbolism and the grounds for postulating a 
fixed meaning for certain elements of the dream is thus in a sense separated off and 
situated outside of psychoanalysis. Freud implies that the problem of the general 
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validity of the theory of symbolism is not in fact one that is fundamental to 
psychoanalysis or its technique for the interpretation of the dream. What is part icular 
to psychoanalysis is the use to which this knowledge is put in the process of 
interpretation. The issue of symbolism and its role in the interpretation of the dream is 
thus defined from the start in terms of its relation to the principles and goals of the 
method of free association, which forms the basis for that technique of interpretation. 
The occurrence of symbolism in the dream is characterised primarily in terms of the 
possibility of a "constant translation" for specific dream elements. The meaning of the 
symbol is supported by a fixed relationship between certain manifest and latent 
elements in the dream. This makes a direct translation of those manifest elements 
possible, allowing us to determine their meaning on independent grounds. An 
understanding of symbols would then, in certain cases, allow us to explain the meaning 
of the whole dream without relying on any information from the dreamer. "They i.lllow 
us in certain circumstances to interpret a dream without questioning the dreamer, who 
indeed would in any case have nothing to tell us about the symbol. "( 151/ 184) 
The whole point of this account, however, is to emphasise the difference between such 
a procedure and the principles of the method of free association itself. The 
interpretation of symbols is explicitly distinguished from the method of free 
association, where "constant replacements of dream elements never come to 
light'.(1501183) A knowledge of the meaning of symbols may thus provide us with II 
fixed translation of particular elements in the dream. This process of direct translation, 
however, merely plays a subsidiary or auxiliary role in the procedure of interpretation 
as a whole. "Interpretation based on a knowledge of symbols is not a technique which 
can replace or compete with the associative one. It forms a supplement to the latter 
and yields results which are only of use when introduced into it. "( 1511184) 
The interpretation of symbols and interpretation on the basis of the method of free 
association are here explicitly distinguished and situated in relation to one another. A 
knowledge of symbolism supplies us with the meaning of certain manifest elements, 
which can then be understood apart from any acquaintance with the dreamer. This 
knowledge, and the meaning of the symbol itself, rests on grounds that have nothing to 
do with the circumstances of the dreamer or the role played by the symbol in that 
particular dream. Such a procedure of translation, however, gives us no insight into 
what Freud calls the dreamer's "psychical situation", except when situated in the 
context of his associations around that dream.(l511185) 
It is this notion of the "psychical situation" of the dreamer that appears to play thl.! 
defining role in establishing the contrast between these two forms of interpretation. 
Similarly, it is this psychical situation, delimited by the associations of the dreamer. that 
appears to constitute the proper locus of the psychoanalytic method as a whole. The 
whole question of the meaning of symbols, a form of interpretation based on a fixed or 
constant relation between a dream element and its meaning, thus appears to be raised 
here only in order to distinguish it from the method of free association. This would 
suggest in turn that the meaning of any particular dream element is not in fact of 
primary concern to the psychoanalytic method, which is aimed rather at delimiting the 
psychical situation of the dreamer by way of his associations around that dream. 
Hence the manner in which the topic of symbolism is introduced as a gap in the 
technique of interpretation, as the occasion for a failure of associations. Certain dream 
elements remain "mute" and the dreamer can produce no associations to them. The 
chain of associations would remain interrupted unless the analyst intervened with an 
interpretation of his own. What is important. however, is not the meaning of that 
particular element, but rather that the interpretation of the symbol clears away the 
obstacle that it constitutes, and allows the flow of associations to continue. The 
interpretation of the meaning of this element is not considered an end in itself, but 
merely serves as a supplementary technique in relation to the aims of the 
psychoanalytic process as a whole. 
We thus have a contrast here between a form of interpretation oriented towards the 
meaning of particular dream elements and one oriented towards the configuration of 
the "psychical situation" of the dreamer. The manner in which these two forms of 
interpretation are defined in relation to one another suggests that it is not the meaning 
of these symbols, nor ultimately of any particular dream element, that is of primary 
concern to the psychoanalytic process. The interpretation of that element must rather 
be considered in the context of the attempt to delimit the configuration of the psychical 
situation underlying the dream as a whole. Our approach to the problem of symbolism 
must similarly allow us to establish the conditions determining the process of dream 
fonnation in general. 
III. 
The topic of symbolism is introduced in the first instance as a question of technique, a 
problem of "mute" dream elements which defy the method of free association. This 
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raises the possibility that certain elements in the manifest dream have a fixed meaning 
that does not derive from their occurrence in any particular dream. At the same time it 
is clear that the dreamer himself has no knowledge of that meaning or insight into the 
source of this element. As a result the meaning of that symbol is not brought to light 
by the dreamer's associations, and would remain an obstacle to the process of free 
association if we did not intervene with an interpretation of our own. 
The meaning of such a "dream-symbol" therefore has no relation to the circUffi'itances 
of the dreamer, and does not depend on the position of that element in any particular 
dream. It is this factor which appears to distinguish this type of relation between an 
element and its meaning from the other forms of relation already identitied between 
manifest and latent elements in the dream. Thus, on the one hand, this type of 
"symbolic" relation appears to be more specific and more constant, in that it implies a 
fixed relation between that element and the idea which it represents. And yet, on the 
other hand, it points to conditions which go beyond the role of that element in any 
dream, to the extent that its meaning appears independent of the circumstances in 
which it arises. 
This provides some indication of the curious position occupied by the topic of 
symbolism in Freud's account. It is included with the other three types of relationship 
between the manifest and latent poles of the dream, as one of the four basic modalities 
of relation between manifest and latent elements in general. At the same time it is 
separated off and introduced as a distinct topic that appears at once more specific and 
yet more general than the others. This suggests that we might hope to use the topic of 
symbolism to situate the general conditions of relations between manifest and latent 
elements in the dream as a whole. And yet Freud's attempts to establish the nature and 
conditions of this peculiar type of relation leave us no closer than before. 
"The essence of this symbolic relation is that it is a comparison, though not a 
comparison of any sort. Special limitations seem to be attached to the comparison, but 
it is hard to say what these are. Not everything with which we can compare an object 
or a process appears in dreams as a symbol for it. "(152/185) The relation underlying 
the use of symbols in dreams is thus defmed as a "comparison" between manitest and 
latent elements. This type of relation is not, however, equivalent to the relation of 
comparison in general, or to any kind of comparison, but is to be distinguished by 
specific limiting conditions. And yet Freud fmds himself unable to determine just what 
these distinguishing conditions might be. 
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"We must admit, too, that the concept of a symbol cannot at present be sharply 
delimited: it shades off into such notions as those of a replacement or representation, 
and even approaches that of an allusion."(l52/185) These other forms, however, 
appear to be precisely the same as the three modalities of relations between dream 
elements already specified - replacement of part for whole, allusion, and plastic 
representation or portrayal. Once again this type of symbolic relation, initially defined 
as a fixed and limited relation between manifest and latent elements, now appears to be 
so broad as to include or to subsume the other three forms of relationship as well. 
Symbolism in dreams, then, concerns a fixed or constant relation between manifest and 
latent elements that may yet involve aspects of all three of these other modalities. In 
certain examples this relation is supported by a straightforward similarity, and "the 
comparison which underlies them is obvious".(l52/185) In other cases it is predsely 
this element of similarity that is lacking, and the basis for that comparison, the 
"common element" which that relation presupposes, remains impossible to detect. And 
yet, if we can no longer determine the basis for that comparison, the element of 
similarity that provides the foundation for that relation, then how are we to justifY 
characterising that relation as one of comparison in the first place? 
Similarly, if the meaning of the symbol is supported by a relation of comparison 
between specific manifest and latent elements in the dream, then it is strange that the 
dreamer should have no insight into the nature of that relation. It is not merely that the 
dreamer should make use of a symbol in the dream without knowing from where it 
derives its meaning. Nor even that the dreamer should feel "no inclination to 
acknowledge the comparison even after it has been pointed out to him".(l52-31l86) 
The whole method of free association is, after all, designed precisely to overcome the 
obstacle posed by the fact that relations between manifest and latent elements in the 
dream are not in general available to the conscious knowledge of the dreamer. 
What is striking is that, in contrast to the other modes of relation between manifest and 
latent elements in the dream, no information about the meaning of the symbol should 
come to light in the process of free association itself. If the meaning of that symbol 
does in fact rest upon a relation of comparison, one might legitimately expect that it 
would be precisely the process of free association that would bring that relation to 
light. Instead we have a relation of comparison between certain elements in the dream 
that not only falls outside the sphere of conscious knowledge, but also appears to have 
no contact with the sphere of unconsciolls associations which subtend that dream. 
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IV. 
The attempt to determine the nature and conditions of the relation supporting the 
meaning of the symbol in the dream has not proved particularly informative. Freud 
turns from an account of that relation to an examination of the types of elements 
involved in it. We are provided with a catalogue of dream symbols, organised first in 
terms of the type of element that is subject to symbolic representation, and then in 
terms of the elements that serve as symbols in the manifest dream itself. If we were 
able to specify the defming conditions of these two groups of elements - those whi(;h 
receive symbolic representation and those of the symbols them<ielves - it might then 
become possible to throw further light on the question of the relation between the two 
groups as a whole. 
It is here that Freud points to "a strange disproportion", between the set of symbols 
and the set of elements which receive symbolic representation.( 153/187) Although the 
elements which can serve as symbols in the dream show great variety, the range of 
ideas that actually receive this type of representation is, on the contrary, extremely 
limited, and restricted to a small complex of topics concerning the themes of 
generation and sexuality. Thus on the one hand we have a surprisingly wide variety of 
possible symbols in the dream, to the extent that there appears to be a free 
displacement between them and a whole range of equivalent symbols can serve to 
represent the same element. And yet at the same time the set of elements which are 
given symbolic representation appears to be subject to strict limiting conditions. 
The disproportion between these two groups of elements raises a number of questions, 
not all of which have an obvious relation to the question of symbolism itself. For the 
conditions of this disproportion between the two sets of elements involved in the 
relation of symbolism in dreams would appear to have as much to do with the question 
of sexuality as it does with that of symbolism. This would suggest that the conditions 
under which symbolism comes to playa role in the dream are in some way related to 
the limiting condition which gives the set of sexual elements its unity or identity. 
Similarly, it is interesting that it should be in relation to the topic of symbolism that we 
should find the issue of sexuality raised for the first time in these lectures. 
The problem of symbolism thus brings us into immediate contact with the question of 
sexuality. This suggests that it may be the topic of sexuality that holds the key to the 
role of symbolism in the dream. This observation would also provide a possible 
indication of why it is that a direct investigation of the relationship between symbolism 
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and dreams has so far yielded no immediate solution. For it appears that it is in fal:t 
the relationship between the topics of symbolism and sexuality that offers the more 
promising line of approach to the problem of symbolism in general. The conditions of 
this relation should at the same time allow us to approach the question of why it is that 
the dream should provide the site of articulation where this relationship between 
symbolism and sexuality first becomes apparent. 
Freud remarks that this conjunction itself gives rise to objections against the validity of 
psychoanalytic interpretations of symbolism. Why, after all, should the meaning of 
symbols in dreams so consistently be reduced to the topics and themes of sexuality'? 
He goes on to suggest that a proper understanding of these issues would depend on a 
more comprehensive insight into "the development of sexual ideas in human 
beings".(l57/191) Rather than pursuing this avenue, which would require a more 
detailed discussion of the topic of sexuality in general, Freud will instead attempt to 
deal with these objections by turning to the question raised earlier of "how we in fact 
come to know the meaning of these dream-symbols, upon which the dreamer himself 
gives us insufficient information or none at all" .(1581192) 
Once again it is emphasised that our knowledge of the meaning of these symbols is 
derived not from the field of psychoanalytic work, from the information or associations 
of any particular dreamer, but rather from material drawn from a range of objective 
studies in the various fields of mythology, folklore, anthropology and philology. And 
once again Freud will make no attempt to enter into the question of the validity of the 
findings of these various disciplines. Instead he will merely suggest that the 
convergence of the material from these sources provides sufficient support for the 
interpretation of symbolism in dreams. "If we go into these sources in detail. we shall 
fmd so many parallels to dream symbolism that we cannot fail to be convinced of our 
interpretations."( 159/192) 
We are provided with a wide range of examples from these different fields of research, 
all of which illustrate the symbolic representation of sexual themes in various spheres 
of language use, whether poetic, mythical, colloquial or traditional. It is the question 
of language that supplies the common thread running through these examples, just as it 
is the methods and principles of etymology and philology that constitute the common 
methodological framework for these other disciplines. This would suggest that the 
study of the origins and development of language might provide us with a scientific 
basis for the understanding of symbols and the conditions governing their use. The 
correlations between the tindings of these various branches of cultural research would 
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similarly constitute a source of objective support for psychoanalytic interpretations of 
symbols in dreams. 
Freud will go on to suggest that findings in the field of comparative philology allow LIS 
to trace the conditions of symbolic representation to a more primitive stage of 
language development where the connection between words and things was more 
intimate. Symbolism would then constitute an enigmatic residue of this archaic mode 
of language, which has since been surpassed and forgotten. The prevalence of 
symbolic imagery in the dream would imply a return to these more primitive conditions 
of representation, where the relation between words and images is treated in a more 
concrete fashion than in waking thought. The relation between symbolism and 
sexuality would similarly suggest that these themes might have a conunon origin, or 
have developed out of common roots, in the earliest phases of language development. 
This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the difficulties raised by the 
philological hypotheses upon which Freud relies here, which would necessarily lead us 
far afield. Freud has himself, however, repeatedly pointed out that these questions are 
not specific to psychoanalysis, nor fundamental to the general validity of its technique 
for the interpretation of dreams. The whole approach to the topic of symbolism has, 
after all, been structured precisely by the distinction between the method for the 
interpretation of symbols and a technique of interpretation founded on the method of 
free association that is unique to psychoanalysis. It is this distinction, similarly. that 
will provide the context for the question of the conditions under which symbols 
become appropriated for the purpose of sexual representation in dreams. 
What is of specific interest for psychoanalysis, and for this argument in particular, IS 
the use to which these symbols are put in the process of dream formation. Here Freud 
remarks that where symbolism in other fields is by no means concerned solely with 
sexual topics, in the case of dreams it appears that "symbols are used almost 
exclusively for the expression of sexual objects and relations".(l661201) It is this 
conjunction that raises many interesting questions for psychoanalysis and for its 
understanding both of the nature of sexuality and of the dream. In order to approach 
this question, however, we must first consider some of the broader conditions of the 
process of dream formation as a whole. It is accordingly to the account of the dream-
work that we must tum next. 
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4.2 The Dream-Work 
I. 
Freud has elaborated a novel technique of investigation which brings to light the latent 
thoughts that underlie the dream. This technique allows us to explain the meaning of 
that dream in terms of its relation to the latent thoughts from which it rose. The 
example of children's dreams provides a simplified model of the process by which the 
latent thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream. It has thus been possible to 
establish the nature of these latent thoughts as wishful tendencies left over from the 
experiences of the previous day and to account for dream formation as a process of 
wish-fulfilment. 
The model of dream formation centres upon two basic processes - the transformation 
of the latent thoughts into visual images, and the realisation of the wish in an 
hallucinatory experience. We have suggested that an examination of the interrelation 
between these two aspects might provide the key to an understanding of the process of 
wish-fulfilment as a whole. The goal of interpretation is then detined as one of 
undoing the effects of this transformation - image back into thought and experience 
back into wish - in order to determine the nature of the thoughts that lie behind the 
dream. 
It is here that we encounter the problem of distortion, an obstacle both to the success 
of this procedure of interpretation and to the validity of the model of explanation 
elaborated upon it. Freud has identified censorship and symbolism as the two primary 
sources of distortion in dreams and provided us with an account of two complementary 
techniques - free association and the interpretation of symbols - that allow us to deal 
with these obstacles. A grasp of these two techniques will thus provide us with the 
means of access to the register of latent thoughts underlying the dream. 
The basic account of the goals and conditions of the procedure for the investigation of 
the dream is in effect now complete. Not all dreams, however, display the simplified 
picture of dream formation that is assumed by the model of children's dream'>. The 
transformation of the latent thoughts into the manifest dream is subject to a whole 
range of other forms of distortion which serve to further complicate the relation 
between the manifest and latent registers of the dream as a whole. It is this range of 
additional sources of distortion, associated with the process of transformation itself, 
that is known as the dream-work. 
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The theory of the dream-work, a systematic exposition of the various modalities of 
distortion and transformation involved in the relation between the manifest and latent 
registers of the dream, constitutes Freud's major theoretical contribution to an 
understanding of the process of dream formation. This account provides the basis for 
the psychoanalytic explanation of the mechanisms involved in the process of symptom 
formation and in psychic processes in general. It is important, therefore, to consider 
the status of the theory of the dream-work and to examine its relation to the model of 
investigation already elaborated. 
This theory attempts to account for the difference between the manifest and latent 
registers of the dream in terms of the transformations which the latent material 
undergoes in the process of dream formation. This account itself presumes the 
successful completion of the work of investigation, for it is only once the latent 
material has come to light that it becomes possible to compare the two registers and to 
examine the nature of the differences between them. The very possibility of a theory of 
the dream-work, a systematic account of the processes by which the latent material is 
transformed into the manifest dream, thus rests on, or assumes, a positive knowledge 
of the latent material involved. 
There is thus a certain interdependence between the theory of the dream-work and the 
model of investigation already elaborated. On the one hand there can be no theory of 
the dream-work without access to the latent material. And yet there can be no access 
to that latent material without taking into account the forms of distortion introduced by 
the modalities of the dream-work. Again it is the problem of distortion that provides 
the point of intersection between them. For the effects of the dream-work are tirst 
encountered as an obstacle to the goals of that model of investigation. Similarly, it is 
an understanding of the dream-work that constitutes the crucial step in tracing the 
manifest dream back to the latent thoughts from which it arose. 
Simple demands of conceptual coherence obviously require that these two aspects be 
considered separately. Indeed, it is only the separation of these two issues that makes 
a systematic exposition of each possible. This separation, which produces the 
empirical account of the model of investigation on the one hand and a positive theory 
of the dream-work on the other, has, however, certain implicit consequences. 
Foremost among these, as we have already noted in the account of the model of 
investigation, is the tendency to elide the problematic of representation that in fact 
constitutes the site of the articulation between them. 
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It is necessary, therefore, to be aware of the nature of the relation between these: two 
accounts and to consider the possible implications for our understanding of the dream-
work itself. For there is the danger that our conception of the dream-work will absorb 
all the positive conditions and assumptions which supported the elaboration of an 
empirical model of investigation to begin with. The value of the theory of the dream-
work would then become limited by the very conditions that establish its status as a 
body of metapsychological theory. 
We have seen how Freud's account of the model of investigation has been carried 
through under the ideal condition of a direct and undisguised relation between the 
manifest and latent elements of the dream. Hence the attempt to privilege the model of 
children's dreams where the factor of distortion is held to a minimum, allowing a model 
for the explanation of the dream to be elaborated around the transparent relation 
between those manifest and latent poles. We have noted the difficulties that arise from 
this approach and the simplifications that necessarily follow from the attempt to 
exclude the register of representation. 
The account of the dream-work will now be situated as the direct complement of that 
model of investigation, as an attempt to systematise the register of distortion and 
representation that has been suppressed in the positive model. This theory, the 
account of the modalities of distortion that accompany the transformation of the latent 
material, will be based on a comparison of the manifest and latent registers of the 
dream as a whole. Freud makes no attempt to disguise the fact that this account 
constitutes a "summary description" based on the completed interpretation of a large 
number of dreams.( 1711205) 
The theory of the dream-work claims to account for the differences that arise between 
the latent and manifest registers of the dream on the basis of a systematic description 
of the modes of transformation that occur between them. This account is based upon a 
comparison of the manifest and latent registers of the dream, and therefore assumes the 
positive status of the latent pole, which itself depends upon the successful outcome of 
the work of investigation. This latent pole then stands at the core of a progressive 
model of the dream-work which examines the changes undergone by that latent 
material in the course of its transfonnation into the manifest dream. 
The danger of this progressive model of the dream-work, however, is that the themes 
of interpretation and representation become elided in favour of a quantitative and 
mechanistic account of the transformations undergone by the latent material in the 
131 
course of its passage into the manifest dream. At best we arrive at a conception of the 
dream-work as a process of transcription or translation that allows the original material 
of the latent thoughts to be expressed in a different form in the manifest dream. In 
either case, the result is a model of dream formation as a process of transformation to 
which some pre-existent original material is subjected. 
We may contrast this progressive model of the dream-work with our attempt to 
maintain the primacy of the axis of interpretation, and the resultant foregrounding of 
the problem of representation that this entails. This account begins with the given 
elements of the manifest dream and, following the regressive orientation of the 
procedure of interpretation, seeks to decipher those elements by bringing to light the 
context of latent thoughts that would render them intelligible. The regressive 
orientation of the procedure of interpretation accordingly allows us to consider the 
relation between manifest and latent elements as one of representation rather than 
transformation. 
This account opens up the way for a more flexible conception of the status of the latent 
thoughts as a whole. For we could then consider the latent register as a shifting 
context of signification supporting the meaning of the manifest elements in the dream. 
rather than any pre-existent nucleus of original material. The role attributed to the 
latent thoughts in the formation of the dream would similarly no longer depend upon 
any primary evidence for their prior existence. The status of that latent material 
would. on the contrary, depend solely upon its position as a context of intelligibility for 
the interpretation of the manifest dream. 
The contrasted orientation of these two accounts has a fundamental influence on our 
understanding of the nature of the process of interpretation itself. A progressive, 
transformational model of the dream-work. which examines the modes and 
mechanisms of the process by which the latent material is transformed into the manifest 
dream, gives rise to a conception of the task of interpretation as an attempt to "undo" 
this transformation, in order to arrive at the original latent material. The interpretative 
model, on the other hand, aims merely to render that dream intelligible by considering 
the possible modalities of representation and signification by which the meaning of a 
manifest element might be determined. 
This approach brings into focus once more the question of the nature of the relations 
between thoughts and images in the dream. We may in fact consider this question as 
one of the defining problems of the process of dream formation as a whole. For. in 
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direct contrast to the customary mode of signification in the language of waking 
thought, where it is a word which represents an image, here we have a visual image 
which stands in for a word or phrase. The problem of the dream-work centres 
precisely on this change of modality according to which the manifest dream appears 
unintelligible to us because we no longer understand the nature of the relation between 
the manifest images and the thoughts that would explain them. The theory of the 
dream-work aims to defme the conditions of this relation in the dream, and to account 
for the manner in which it differs from that of waking thought. 
II. 
The fIrst thing that becomes apparent from a comparison of the manifest and I.ttent 
registers of the dream is a simple quantitative difference in the amount of material -
"the manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent one".( 1711205) This 
difference suggests that a process of compression or condensation has occurred in the 
course of dream formation, which results in the latent thoughts being expressed in a fur 
more concise form in the manifest dream. Hence the notion that the manifest dream 
can be considered an "abbreviated translation" of those latent thoughts. An 
understanding of the process of condensation will give us a flrst indication of the 
nature and conditions of this process of translation as a whole. 
The most basic model of condensation would attribute the difference in the quantity of 
material in the manifest and latent registers to a simple process of selection and 
omission in the course of dream formation. As a result of this tiltering process only a 
fraction of the latent material would pass over into the manifest dream. This purely 
passive model of condensation, however, is clearly inadequate to account for the 
change of modality that occurs between the manifest and latent registers of the dream. 
Freud will instead focus on a more active conception of condensation, as a 
constructive process responsible for combining elements of the latent material into a 
single unity in the manifest dream. 
The construction of composite fIgures in the dream provides the simplest illustration of 
this process. Here features and attributes of various people are combined into a single 
image, which then serves to represent all those different characters in the manifest 
dream. This process concentrates upon some attribute that the various fIgures have in 
common. This common feature then serves as the nucleus for the formation of the 
composite image upon which these different associations converge. "The process is 
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like constructing a new and transitory concept which has this common element as its 
nucleus. "( 171-2/206) 
This process would itself account for the factor of compression observed in the content 
of the manifest dream. This suggests that there is some fundamental economic 
consideration at work in the process of dream formation which leads it to seek out the 
most economical means of expressing the latent thoughts. "The production of 
composite structures like these must be of great importance to the dream-work, since 
we can show that where in the fIrst instance the common elements necessary for them 
were missing, they are deliberately introduced - for instance, through the choice of 
words by which a thought is expressed. "(1721206) 
The dream-work goes to some trouble to seek out suitable points of convergence that 
will allow a single image to represent more than one latent element in the manifest 
dream. Here Freud refers to the manipulation of linguistic structures in the process of 
dream formation, the preference for word play and ambiguous verbal form, that allow 
more than one meaning to be attached to them. Above all. it is a question of the 
apparently arbitrary means employed to construct the verbal forms that make this 
process possible. Hence the emphasis on the construction of artifIcial verbal structures 
out of fragments of accepted linguistic forms, producing novel compound structures 
which articulate disparate trains of thought. 
The crucial issue here is the disregard shown for the rules of syntax or the standard 
criteria of meaningful thought. The dream-work is prepared to ignore any 
considerations of intelligibility in favour of artificial and arbitrary forms of expression 
aimed solely at facilitating the process of multiple determination. Freud suggests that 
the effects of condensation indicate that there is some underlying economic principle at 
work in the process of dream formation. This economic or quantitative consideration 
would then account for both the operation of condensation and the disregard for 
intelligibility manifested in the dream. 
The primacy of this quantitative factor, the predominance of considerations of 
economy over any considerations of intelligibility, poses an immediate and obviolls 
difficulty for our understanding of the dream as a whole. For on the one hand we have 
a convergence of meanings on a single manifest element, so that the same element may 
have widely divergent or even contradictory meanings in the manifest dream. And on 
the other hand that process of condensation appears sometimes to disregard the 
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question of meaning entirely. and to privilege elements whose only role is to provide u 
bridge from one train of associations to another. 
The result is a complex web of relations between manifest and latent registers that not 
only appears to rule out the possibility of any reliable interpretation, but throws doubt 
upon the very grounds for considering the manifest dream a translation of the latent 
thoughts in the fIrst place. "Thus the dream-work carries out a very unusual kind of 
transcription of the dream-thoughts: it is not a word-for-word or a sign-for-sign 
translation; nor is it a selection made according to fIxed rules - as though one were to 
reproduce only the consonants in a word and to leave out the vowels; nor is it what 
might be described as a representative selection - one element being invariably chosen 
to take the place of several; it IS something different and far more 
complicated. "( 1731208) 
The difficulties facing the technique for the interpretation of the dream could not be 
more clearly stated. For the effects of this process of condensation are such as to lead 
us to question the very basis for postulating any signifIcant relation between the 
manifest and latent registers of the dream. If the dream is to be considered a process 
of translation, it is one that ignores all known principles of representation, any 
accepted criteria of intelligibility, and any respect for the meaning of the material that it 
transcribes. Yet the possibility of interpretation depends precisely upon our ability to 
establish the rules according to which this process of transcription is carried out, and 
thus to determine the nature of the conditions regulating relations between manifest 
and latent elements in the dream. 
One response to this difficulty would be to simply abandon the attempt to interpret the 
manifest dream, and return to a simple mechanistic explanation of this process. For is 
it not precisely the predominance of a quantitative factor that accounts for the 
disregard shown for the criterion of intelligibility in the process of dream formation? 
And yet, even if the question of economy does constitute the primary consideration 
underlying the mechanism of condensation, the point remains that it is the factor of 
meaning that provides the privileged point of application for this process. Thus it is 
above all the role of verbal ambiguity in the process of condensation, the use of term.;; 
with more than one meaning, that allows the dream to articulate different trains of 
thought around the same material. 
The example of the condensation of various images into a single composite figure in 
the dream has the drawback of allowing this point to be elided in favour of a simple 
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quantitative conception of a process of compression. The examples of verbal 
condensation in jokes or parapraxes, however, allow a more effective demonstration of 
what is at issue here, by bringing the question of meaning more clearly to the fore. 
Thus we may observe the operation of condensation in the technique of certain jokes, 
where the effect turns upon the use of an ambiguous word that allows a second train of 
thought to be introduced, subverting the meaning of the first. In the case of 
parapraxes, the product of the slip of the tongue is an artificial verbal compound which 
has no meaning of its own, but is constructed out of verbal elements from the 
competing trains of thought articulated in it. 
A similar process is apparent in the example of neologisms in dreams - anomalous 
verbal structures that are not part of accepted language and have no meaning of their 
own, but which serve merely as the point of articulation for two otherwise unrelated 
chains of association. We may posit a further instance where an existent word is 
introduced into the dream with no other purpose than to provide a convenient bridge 
between two trains of thought. Here that word is quite clearly taken out of context, 
with no regard for its accepted meaning, and features merely for formal reasons of its 
verbal structure being suited to provide a nucleus of condensation. An analogous 
effect may be observed where passages of recollected speech are inserted intact into 
the dream, yet obviously torn from their original context and without regard for their 
original meaning. 
It is these last instances of the treatment of language in the process of dream formation 
that are most instructive, because they highlight the conflict between the accepted 
meaning that a word might possess and the role attributed to it in the process of dream 
formation. Here the meaning of that word would in fact constitute an obstacle to the 
interpretation of the dream, as its position in the manifest dream is not at all 
determined by its meaning. That meaning has rather been ignored in favour of the 
purely formal or external attributes of the word which make it a suitable point of 
articulation for the process of condensation. Words, sentences, linguistic structures in 
general, may thus be cut up and manipulated without regard for their meaning. but 
rearranged instead as if they were simple building-blocks in the process of dream 
formation. 
These considerations also provide a first indication of the role played by the mechanism 
of displacement in this process, suggesting an integral link between the two 
mechanisms of condensation and displacement in the formation of the dream. Freud 
has already suggested that it is in fact a process of displacement at the level of the 
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wording of the latent thoughts that makes the process of condensation possible. The 
process of displacement gives rise to a complete reformulation of the latent thoughts. 
introducing a form of wording that will facilitate condensation with other elements in 
the manifest dream. The process of displacement thus gives emphasis to different 
aspects of the latent material, diverting attention away from its primary content onto 
peripheral and subsidiary aspects of its wording. 
Once again it is the examples of the displacement apparent in jokes that serve to 
highlight the issue in question here. Certain jokes also make use of external 
associations of sound or contiguity to provide the artificial verbal bridges that allow 
the leap from one circle of thoughts to another. The effect of these jokes. however. 
arises precisely from the realisation that there is in fact a deeper connection of meaning 
between the two trains of thought, which is only brought to our notice by that verbal 
bridge. The primary characteristic of displacement in the dream, on the other hand, is 
to disregard considerations of meaning entirely. Hence the effect of a weak pun, or a 
bad joke. where the precondition of any further link of content or meaning is 
abandoned in favour of purely contingent associations. 
This effect of random allusion by the most remote or arbitrary means, without any 
regard for meaning or intelligibility, poses an obvious difficulty in the interpretation of 
the dream. It is precisely this effect, therefore, that serves the interests of censorship in 
the dream, which aims to sever all links between the manifest and latent registers. 
opposing any attempt to understand the connection. The result is a relation between 
the manifest dream and the latent thoughts that bears no trace of any resemblance or 
similarity between them. The manifest dream can thus be considered neither a 
transcription of the content nor an expression of the meaning of the latent thoughts. 
Rather, we have a process of representation organised according to quite different 
principles. 
We do, however. have an indication of the manner in which the two mechanisms of 
condensation and displacement combine in transforming the latent thoughts into the 
manifest dream. On the one hand, the process of displacement has the effect of 
stripping the latent elements of any meaning that they might have in waking thought. 
The process of condensation then makes use of the fragmentary material of the latent 
thoughts to create the new unities and composite formations that make up the manifest 
dream. The result is the production of an entirely novel register of representation 
organised according to criteria quite alien to those of rational thought or waking 
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experience. For the role of any element in the manifest dream is no longer determined 
by its content or its meaning, but rather by its position in a network of associations. 
The combined effect of these two processes thus takes us some way towards 
accounting for the comprehensive transformation in the conditions of representation 
that occurs between the latent and manifest registers of the dream. This aspect of the 
dream-work may be summed up in the notion that words are treated as things in the 
process of dream formation. The latent thoughts are made up of perfectly coherent 
thought processes articulated according to the normal laws of waking thought. The 
position of any element in those latent thoughts is thus determined primarily in terms of 
the intrinsic importance of its content within the structure of meaningful thought. In 
the process of dream formation, however, the conditions of rational thought are 
entirely disregarded in favour of quite different criteria of representation. 
It is clear that these considerations definitively rule out any attempt to interpret the 
meaning of the manifest images in terms of any simple relation to the content of the 
latent thoughts. For the primary effect of the two processes of condensation and 
displacement is to sever precisely that axis of meaning that is the support of waking 
thought. The severing of the axis of meaning then creates the conditions for the 
emergence of quite novel conditions of representation in the manifest dream. It is the 
attempt to determine the principles governing this register of representation, or at least 
to characterise them in terms of their opposition to the accepted criteria of rational 
thought, that must guide our examination of the central process of the dream-work -
the transformation of thoughts into visual images. 
III. 
The transformation of thoughts into visual images is a theme that has featured from the 
very beginning of this account as one of the fundamental features of the process of 
dream formation, one that might even be considered defmitive of the dream itself. For 
it was in the place of any formal defmition of the dream that Freud started by 
establishing two characteristic features that are common to all dreams - the state of 
sleep and the predominance of visual irnages.(cf. 87f.1116f.) The orientation of this 
entire account has been structured by the relationship elaborated between these two 
essential characteristics. 
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The fIrst characteristic, the state of sleep underlying the dream, becomes the b"1Sis for 
the reflex-arc model of the dream as the response to a stimulus which disturbs sleep. 
This conception establishes the foundation for the empirical model for the explanation 
of the dream in terms of its relation to that stimulus. Even when the initial psycho-
physiological model of the dream is abandoned, this notion will continue to provide the 
framework for the explanation of the manifest dream in terms of its relation to the 
latent thoughts from which it rises. 
In the elaboration of this reflex-arc model of the dream the other primary 
characteristic, the role of visual images in the process of dream formation, is to some 
extent neglected, and appears to be discarded along with the whole question of sense 
that had featured so predominantly up to that point. Yet it is precisely the 
predominance of visual images in the manifest dream, in spite of the differences in the 
nature of the stimulus involved, that stands as the immediate obstacle to the attempt to 
trace the dream directly to that stimulus. The question of the change of modality in the 
process of dream formation thus constitutes a primary difficulty for the psycho-
physiological model of the dream, and ultimately for the empirical model of 
explanation as a whole. 
The predominance of visual images in the dream provides the first indication that 
dream formation cannot be considered a merely passive process of reaction to a 
stimulus, but entails a productive activity of transformation. The transformation of 
mental processes into visual images becomes the basis for the notion that the scene of 
action in dreams is different from that of waking ideational life. Freud suggests that 
this change in modality, the "qualitative difference" involved in the process of dream 
formation, appears to be the result of an active process of working over - one that 
might "bring us nearer to the essence of dreams" .(96/125) 
In the lecture on children's dreams we are once again presented with two fundamental 
characteristics of the dream. The first of these is the central proposition that the dream 
constitutes the fulfllment of a latent wish. We have already discussed the foundation 
for this proposition in the defmition of the function of the dream as guardian against 
disturbances to sleep. The other chief characteristic is that "a dream does not simply 
give expression to a thought, but represents the wish fulfilled as a hallucinatory 
experience".(1291l60) We have suggested that the explanation of the process of wish-
fulfilment is to be sought here, in the conditions of this transformation of a latent 
thought into a hallucinatory experience. 
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Freud has already mentioned the translation of words into visual images. the "plastic" 
representation of thoughts. as one of the basic forms of relation between manifest and 
latent elements. Here. however. we are dealing not with the transformation of 
individual elements into visual images, but with the articulation of the latent thoughts 
as a whole into a hallucinatory experience based in a predominantly visual modality. 
As Freud points out, not everything in the latent thoughts is necessarily changed into a 
visual image. Some elements may in fact retain their form and appear directly in the 
manifest dream as articulated thoughts or coherent speeches. The function and 
significance of these elements, however, is radically transformed when they make their 
appearance in the manifest dream. 
The fundamental question here, then, concerns the conditions governing this 
transformation of the latent thoughts into a register of hallucinatory experience. Yct it 
is the translation of words into visual images, this change in the modality of 
representation, that provides the key to the difference in the principles of organisation 
governing the two registers. For it is in the transition from a register of latent 
thoughts, articulated according to the principles of waking thought, to a register of 
visual experience in the manifest dream, that all the characteristic features of dream 
formation are to be found. It is in the contrast between the principles governing the 
articulation of the latent thoughts and those governing a field of hallucinatory 
experience, therefore, that the conditions of the process of wish-fulfilment in the dream 
must be sought. 
The shift from the register of the latent thoughts to that of the manifest dream is 
summed up in the contrast between a mode of "alphabet writing" and a register of 
visual experience organised according to the principles of "picture writing" .(175/210) 
The latent register is made up of a complex network of rational thought. generally 
expressed in a verbal modality and articulated according to the accepted principles of 
logic and syntax. The formation of the manifest dream, as a transition to a mode of 
representation organised around visual images, introduces the task of providing a 
visual representation for that latent material. It is above all the difference in the means 
of representation available to these two registers that is expressed in the notion of a 
translation of words into visual images. 
The limitations of the means of representation in the visual modality thus constitute the 
fundamental condition of the difference in the principles of organisation of the two 
registers. It is the restrictions of visual representation that first bring into focus a 
distinction that Freud draws here between the concrete and the abstract elements of the 
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material of the latent thoughts. By the concrete elements Freud means the substantive 
content, the "raw material" of the latent thoughts, all the elements involving simple 
representations of people, objects and events. There is an obvious tendency for the 
process of dream formation to favour these concrete or substantive elements of the 
dream thoughts, as their close relation to a particular content facilitates the process of 
visual representation. 
To these concrete elements of the latent thoughts Freud contrasts the abstract elements 
of language, all the logical relations between concepts, the network of syntactical 
articulations making up the tissue of thought itself. It is these aspects of the latent 
thoughts that prove more resistant to visual representation. For unlike the concrete 
elements, whose meaning is closely tied to some particular sensory image or object. 
these elements have no substantive content of their own, but deal only with relations 
between other terms. Freud suggests that part of the preliminary work of dream 
formation involves a process of reformulating the latent thoughts in order to introduce 
the type of linguistic element that favours direct visual representation in the dream. 
This process is conceived as one of a regressive reduction of abstract concepts to their 
origin in a concrete image or situation. 
Freud's account here is hampered by this simplistic distinction between the concrete 
and abstract elements of language, and the more general difficulties associated with the 
empiricist model of language development upon which he relies. On this account the 
meaning of the flrst words would be derived directly from a relation of designation to 
particular objects or events. In the course of the development of the language these 
simple substantive terms would be elaborated into more abstract concepts, gradually 
freeing themselves from any direct reliance on perceptual images. At the same time 
this process would allow these words to become linked up with other words and 
elaborated into more and more abstract relations of thought. Dream formation would 
then involve a regressive process of reducing thought to its most primitive concrete 
terms, allowing the transformation of these words back into the visual images from 
which they arose. 
The distinction between concrete and abstract terms in language does, however, serve 
to bring into focus the contrasted axes that underlie these different parts of speech. 
The meaning of concrete or substantive terms is conceived as supported by a direct 
relation of designation to particular objects or sensory images. It is this relation of 
designation, the relation between a word and its perceptual content, that provides the 
basis for its transformation into a visual image in the manifest dream. The abstract 
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parts of speech, on the other hand, are supported by lateral relations of logical 
articulation between terms, having no direct relation of designation to any substantive 
content of their own. It is these aspects of the latent thoughts, the entire network of 
lateral relations making up the network of thought itself, that will be lost in an 
exclusively visual mode of representation. 
While the majority of these relations are thus ignored or abandoned in the course of 
dream formation, Freud suggests that the dream does succeed in representing certain 
aspects of the logical relations among the latent thoughts in a more indirect manner, by 
way of peculiarities in the form of the manifest dream itself. The process of dream 
formation, for example, takes account of the more general relations of conceptual unity 
amongst the elements of the latent thoughts by combining the whole material into a 
single dream. Here the visual or experiential unity of the dramatic situation in the 
manifest dream provides the most general framework for the representation of the 
logical and conceptual relations among the various aspects of the dream thoughts. 
The logical relations between the latent thoughts are thus expressed in the tirst instance 
by the visual and dramatic unity of the manifest dream. This principle is carried 
through to the representation of the smaller details in the dream itself. Here relations 
of logical implication between elements of the latent thoughts are represented in terms 
of spatial association or unification in a single visual experience. A visual contiguity 
between two elements in the manifest dream may then provide an indication of a 
similar logical or conceptual association between the corresponding elements of the 
underlying latent material. An essentially spatial and pictorial logic of appearances 
thus replaces the more familiar logical and syntactical articulation of the latent 
thoughts. 
This difference in the principles of representation governing the two registers is in fact 
already implied in the notion of a transformation of words into visual images. The 
latent thoughts. articulated in the verbal modality of waking thought, are oriented 
along the diachronic axis of language in accordance with the rational principles of logic 
and syntax. The verbal and sequential mode of the latent thoughts, however, gives 
way to a fundamentally visual and spatial mode of representation in the manifest 
dream. Here the elements of the manifest dream are organised according to spatial and 
pictorial principles of composition, which take the place of the verbal and syntactical 
principles of articulation among the latent thoughts. 
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The contrast between verbal and visual, while the most obvious and striking aspect of 
the shift from latent to manifest, is thus merely an indication of a more fundamental 
transformation in the principles of representation underlying those two registers. The 
question of the transformation of words into visual images is therefore neither an 
essential nor an absolute criterion of this process. For verbal elements may still make 
their appearance in the manifest dream, just as visual and dramatic aspects of memory 
may playa role in the latent thoughts. It now, however, becomes possible to account 
for the peculiar role played by verbal elements in the manifest dream, in terms of the 
transformation in the principles of representation underlying that change in modality. 
The role of verbal elements in the manifest dream may thus be understood in terms of 
the contrast between the principles of articulation governing the logic of the latent 
thoughts and their position in a field of hallucinatory experience organised according to 
essentially visual and spatial principles of representation. These verbal elements are 
torn from their legitimate linguistic context in the latent thoughts and inserted into the 
pictorial logic of the manifest dream. At the same time they are stripped of the 
meaning associated with their position in a context of syntactical articulation, and serve 
rather as raw material for a process of visual and pictorial composition. The 
significance and function of the same verbal element may thus be radically transformed 
according to its position in the latent or manifest registers. 
The contrast in the principles of organisation underlying the two registers reaches its 
most acute expression in the notion that "nonsense and absurdity in dreams have their 
meaning" .(1781212) The grounds for this claim must be sought in the comprehensive 
transformation in the principles of logic and representation that occurs between the 
register of latent thought and that of the manifest dream. An element that might be 
considered meaningless or absurd in the rational logic of waking thought may yet play 
a significant role in the manifest dream, where it serves as the representation of a 
judgement or criticism in the latent thoughts. Conversely, an expression of judgement 
in the manifest dream may in fact involve the direct transmission of an element of the 
latent thoughts into the dream itself, where its significance becomes entirely 
transformed by that change of context. 
The problem of the transformation of words into visual images thus takes us to the 
heart of the question of the difference in the principles of representation governing the 
manifest and latent registers of the dream. The transition from a verbal to a visual 
modality itself entails a comprehensive transformation of the linguistic and syntactical 
principles of rational thought into an essentially spatial mode of representation. It is at 
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this level, in terms of the transition from the syntactical and diachronic principles of 
logical articulation to the spatial and pictorial principles governing the organisation of 
the visual field, that we can account for some of the other characteristic features of the 
logic of dreams. 
One of the most characteristic aspects of dream formation is its flagrant disregard for 
the basic criteria of rational thought - the logical principles of contradiction, opposition 
and negation. The absence of these logical principles is initially expressed in the 
observation that the alternative "either/or" is never to be found in the manifest dream. 
The process of dream formation tends rather to ignore this disjunction and to attribute 
equal value to both terms of the alternative, giving them independent representation in 
the dream. Elements which would be considered as contradictory or mutually 
exclusive in the logic of waking thought are thus treated as equally valid, and appear 
side by side in the manifest dream. 
This attitude to the principle of disjunction would of itself account for the 
characteristic fate of a range of other logical relations in the process of dream 
formation. All relations of contradiction, opposition and negation, which might be 
considered to depend upon that fundamental principle of disjunctive exclusion, then fall 
away, and with them the entire logical framework of rational thought. This process is 
carried to its conclusion when we fmd these contradictory and mutually exclusive 
opposites combined into a unity and represented by a single common term in the 
manifest dream. There is then no way of immediately telling from the appearance of 
this one element whether it is to be taken in a positive or a negative sense. 
This tendency to combine contradictory opposites into a single unity, ignoring the 
principle of disjunction, raises obvious difficulties for the work of interpretation. We 
have, however, already become familiar with the basic conditions of this process at the 
root of the mechanism of condensation. There we noted a process of combining the 
elements of the latent thoughts into a single unity around the common nucleus 
provided by a visual image in the manifest dream. Similarly, it was made clear that this 
mechanism is prepared to abandon any strict considerations of similarity or 
resemblance in order to produce condensation at any cost. Legitimate criteria of 
difference and disjunction at the level of the latent thoughts are thus ignored in favour 
of an overriding tendency to combination in the formation of the manifest dream. 
The primacy of this process of combination and condensation in dream formation 
would account for numerous features of the manifest dream. For all the effects of 
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pictorial and spatial composition around a visual nucleus in the formation of the 
manifest dream could be traced to a central principle of conjunction, replacing the 
verbal and syntactical articulations based on accepted principles of opposition and 
contradiction among the latent thoughts. The relative positions of a principle of 
disjunction and a principle of conjunction could then similarly be invoked to account 
for a whole range of characteristic logical effects involved in the transition between 
latent and manifest registers. 
This relation between a principle of disjunction and a principle of conjunction could 
thus be situated as the fundamental contrast underlying the difference in the logic of 
representation in the latent and manifest registers. The relative positions of these two 
basic principles of logical articulation would then provide the framework for the other 
essential contrasts already noted - the transition from a sequential to a spatial logic and 
the transformation from a verbal to a visual mode of representation. The relation of 
these two principles would then be situated at the nucleus of a process of dream 
formation that entails the elision of disjunctive principles of verbal and syntactical 
articulation in favour of a process of spatial and pictorial composition in a visual field. 
The irrational appearance of the manifest dream could then be considered as the 
outcome of a process by which the relations of disjunctive articulation supporting the 
latent thoughts are collapsed into relations of conjunction and combination. Elements 
of the latent thoughts now find themselves deployed within a visual field. organised 
around spatial principles of contiguity and composition, without regard for their 
original meaning. The significance of these elements is entirely transformed by their 
position in this novel register of hallucinatory experience, articulated in accordance 
with a spatial and pictorial logic of composition. It is in the principles governing the 
coherence of representation within this field of hallucinatory experience that we might 
hope to determine some of the conditions of the process of wish-fulfilment in dreams. 
At the same time it becomes clear that we have already encountered an outline of this 
process in the relation between the first two mechanisms of the dream work, in the 
combined effects of condensation and displacement. The mechanism of displacement 
was conceived as a process of stripping the elements of the latent thoughts of any 
meaning that might derive from their position in a context of logical and syntactical 
articulations. These isolated elements then provide the raw material for a process of 
condensation in which words are treated as things to be combined into a spatial and 
pictorial field of visual experience in the manifest dream. Any attempt to interpret 
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these elements in terms of the meaning they might have in the context of rational 
thought is therefore bound to be misleading. 
This account may also provide an indication of the role played by the fourth and tinal 
mechanism of the dream-work - that of secondary revision. The function of secondary 
revision consists in arranging the material of the manifest dream into a more or less 
continuous whole that approximates to the criteria of rational thought. The imposition 
of a framework of logical coherence upon the material of the dream has the effect of 
configuring that dream as a meaningful whole. Yet it is clear from what we have said 
above that any meaning attributed to that material within a logic of narrative 
development is one that inevitably contradicts its role in the formation of the dream. 
For the principles of representation by which the dream is organised are diametrically 
opposed to the narrative logic of waking thought. 
The process of secondary revision thus entails a fundamental re-orientation of the 
principles of representation in the dream, from the spatial principles governing the 
production of material back into the narrative and sequential mode of waking thought. 
Hence the notion that the operation of secondary revision constitutes a "preliminary 
interpretation" of the manifest dream, in accordance with the logical criteria of rational 
thought. The meaning produced by this operation, however, can only constitute a 
direct obstacle to the analysis of that dream. For any attempt to interpret the dream in 
term.;; of a narrative logic of meaningful content at the level of the manifest dream 
entails a fundamental misunderstanding of the principles according to which that dream 
was formed. 
It is this conflict of axes that provides the foundation for Freud's claim that the clearest 
and most coherent dreams are in fact the ones that show the effects of the most 
comprehensive distortion. For the imposition of a framework of narrative continuity 
upon the material of the manifest dream necessarily entails a contradiction of the 
underlying principles of spatial coherence by which that material is organised. The 
facade of meaning that the dream then derives from this framework of narrative 
intelligibility similarly constitutes the most effective obstacle to an understanding of the 
principles of representation by which the process of wish-fulfilment in the dream 
becomes possible. The process of secondary revision, as a function aligned on the side 
of recollection and waking thought. is thus shown to operate in the direct interests of 
censorship in the dream. 
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The first task is therefore to clear away the effects of this preliminary interpretation, to 
break down the framework of narrative continuity imposing a meaning on the content 
of the dream. Here the basic procedure of the technique of free association once again 
proves essential to the psychoanalytic method, taking up each element of the dream in 
isolation as the starting point for an independent chain of associations. This procedure 
has the effect of interrupting any coherent narrative structure in the manifest dream and 
elaborating a field of associations around each element that will cast new light upon 
that dream's significance. In this way the focus of interpretation is turned away from 
the content of the manifest dream towards delimiting a context of associations within 
which the external principles of coherence underlying that dream will become apparent. 
Once again we arrive at a conception of a technique of interpretation that considers the 
content of the manifest dream only in so far as it provides the starting point for the 
attempt to delimit the external principles of coherence from which the significance of 
that dream derives. At the same time it is clear that the mechanisms of the dream-
work play a fundamental role in defining the conditions and parameters of this 
procedure. For it is the mechanisms of the dream-work that establish the framework 
within which the process of wish-fulfilment takes place, whether in the formation of a 
dream or a neurotic symptom. These four mechanisms thus constitute the 
indispensable co-ordinates and guidelines for the psychoanalytic technique of 
interpretation in general. 
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SECTION FIVE 
5.1 Archaic and Infantile Features 
1. 
The psychoanalytic account of the dream rests upon the distinction of a register of 
latent thoughts underlying the manifest dream. This latent material is shown to involve 
perfectly coherent thoughts and wishes left over from the experiences of the previous 
day. The peculiarities of the manifest dream are then attributed to the nature of the 
transformation which those latent thoughts undergo in the process of dream formation. 
It is the various mechanisms of the dream-work that are responsihle for transposing the 
latent thoughts into a mode of expression that is incomprehensible to waking thought. 
It becomes apparent that the distinction between manifest and latent does not in fact 
provide an adequate framework for understanding the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious in psychoanalysis. For it is the manifest dream that hears all the 
indications of a mode of expression completely alien to rational thought. while the 
latent thoughts, although unconscious in a descriptive sense, are formulated in the 
mode of normal waking thought. It is not the latent thoughts. but rather the form into 
which they are transposed under the influence of the dream-work, that provides our 
point of access to an exploration of the mechanisms of unconscious thought. 
The uncovering of the latent thoughts which lie behind the dream constitutes the 
practical goal of the procedure of investigation that aims to explain how any particular 
dream arose. It is the register of the dream-work, however, the various mechanisffio.; by 
which those latent thoughts are transformed into the manifest dream, that becomes the 
real focus of theoretical interest. It is the dream-work, rather than the latent thoughts, 
that must be considered the essential component of the process of dream formation. 
Similarly, it is the systematic examination of the register of the dream-work that 
provides our first indication of the formal and logical principles governing the 
operation of unconscious processes of thought. 
In this lecture Freud will place the emphasis on the regressive orientation of the dream-
work, as a process responsible for introducing a primitive or archaic mode of 
expression into the dream. Dream formation is thus considered as a process of 
regressive transformation by which abstract thoughts are reduced to the perceptuul 
images from which they first arose. The transformation of the latent thoughts into 
visual images, which reduces these thoughts to their most concrete perceptual 
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elements, at the same time returns us to a mode of expression associated with 
conditions of language and thought that have long since been superseded in the course 
of intellectual development. 
The process of regressive transformation in the mode of expression in dreamli may thus 
provide us with insight into the original conditions of language and thought. This 
process will similarly provide the framework for an exploration of the initial stages of 
individual development. For the hypermnesic character of dreams, their access to 
material from the earliest years of childhood, is tied to the outcome of this regressive 
transformation in the conditions of representation. liThe prehistory into which the 
dream-work leads us back is of two kinds - on the one hand, into the individual's 
prehistory, and on the other, in so far as each individual recapitulates in an abbreviated 
form the entire development of the human race, into phylogenetic prehistory 
toO."( 199/235) 
The relation between regression in the form of expression and regression at the level of 
individual development is thus immediately collapsed into the problematic of 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis. In this way the question of the relationship between 
formal regression in the conditions of representation in dreams and the access of 
dreams to material from the earliest stages of childhood is reduced to a question of 
distinguishing between ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to the latent 
thoughts. The notion of phylogenetic inheritance then serves merely to obscure the 
point of articulation between language and the individual, closing down one of the 
most productive avenues for our attempt to situate and define the concept of the 
unconscious. 
The question of the relations between phylogenesis and ontogenesis is one of the most 
problematic aspects of Freud's work, and one that will feature more centrally in the 
later part of these lectures. At this stage it may suffice merely to situate the problem 
by indicating the point at which the issue arises. It is apparent that this question arises 
directly out of Freud's emphasis on the regressive orientation of the process of dream 
formation rather than the formal and logical aspects of the dream-work. This would 
suggest that the difficulties associated with the notions of ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
development can, in this instance at least, be attributed to undue reliance on an 
undifferentiated concept of regression, on the one hand, and failure to adequately 
situate the problematic of representation, on the other. 
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It might then be hoped that the attempt to give priority to the formal and logi<.:al 
attributes of the dream-work, as the key to the conditions of representation underlying 
the dream, would allow us to avoid the difficulties inherent in the notion of 
phylogenetic transmission. A formal account of the principles of representation 
involved in the process of dream formation would constitute a more promising register 
within which to pursue the possible relations between formal and material regression in 
the dream. This account would at the same time provide a more suitable framework 
within which to elaborate a properly psychoanalytic definition of the concept of the 
unconscious. 
II. 
The formal regression in the mode of expression in dreams constitutes the point of 
departure for an examination of their hypermnesic character. The fact that dreams 
have access to material that is not otherwise available to waking memory will in its 
turn lead to the introduction of the question of infantile sexuality. It is important. then. 
to consider Freud's approach to the problem of infantile amnesia, as the orientation of 
his argument here will provide the framework for his approach to the question of 
infantile sexuality in general. The position of the topic of infantile sexuality in this 
argument will have a similar influence on our conception of the status to be attributed 
to the infantile sexual wishes discovered in dreams. 
The problem of infantile amnesia is defined by the relation between two phenomena, 
neither of which is necessarily conclusive in itself. On the one hand we have the 
remarkable absence of memories from the first years of childhood, despite the well-
developed capacity for language and thought that is already apparent. This generalised 
absence of memory for the infantile years is complemented by the persistence of certain 
isolated memory images whose retention cannot be justified in terms of any inherent 
importance or significance. The correlation between these two issues will provide the 
framework for the psychoanalytic approach to the question of infantile experience and 
its residues. 
Freud will suggest that the position of these isolated "screen memories" is the outcome 
of a process of distortion and displacement similar to that observed in dreams. He thus 
postulates an underlying relationship of significance between these screen memories 
and infantile experience, but one that has been subjected to the innuence of the 
mechanisms familiar to us from the account of the dream-work. The account of 
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relations between manifest and latent elements in the dream then provides the basis for 
the attempt to trace these screen memories back to the experiences from which they 
arose. The method of free association may thus be used to circumvent the obstacles of 
censorship and distortion, giving us access to memories of childhood experiences that 
had long since been forgotten. 
The fact that these memories may emerge spontaneously in dreams is an indication that 
these experiences had not actually been forgotten, but had merely become inaccessible 
to conscious recall owing to the effects of censorship and distortion. The factor of 
censorship is thus invoked to account for the nature of the relation between the "false" 
or "substitute" memories and the experiences which they screen. The operation of 
censorship will similarly provide the primary point of reference in the attempt to 
determine the nature of those experiences themselves. Once again we tind the concept 
of censorship playing a pivotal role in a dynamic model for the investigation of material 
that has become inaccessible to recall. 
In the lecture on censorship we discussed the role played by this factor in the dynamic 
procedure for determining the nature of the wishes that instigate dreams. These 
wishes, which emerge in conflict with the demands of censorship, are initially defined 
solely in terms of their opposition to the accepted standards of the waking ego. Hence 
those wishes are by defmition characterised as evil or immoral. Freud will now attempt 
to provide a positive determination for the content of these wishes by bringing them 
into relation with their source in infantile material. The validity of this procedure, 
however, must be considered in terms of the dynamic model of explanation that 
continues to provide the frame of reference for this account. 
It has already been established that dreams are instigated by wishes which contradict 
the moral standards of the subject, and are thus experienced as alien by the waking 
ego. These wishes will now be attributed to a period of the individual's past when they 
were not in fact foreign to the ego, but constituted a recognised part of mental life. 
Freud thus posits an original phase of unified experience, before the opposition 
between censorship and wish arose, when these wishes were an accepted part of 
conscious experience. It was only subsequently that these wishes were experienced as 
contradicting the integrity of the ego, and were thus separated off and repressed, 
instituting a permanent opposition between censorship and wish. 
This process of repudiation and suppression, however, must now be considered an 
integral element in the definition of those wishes. For it is only the process of 
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repression, along with the change in the status of the wish that this implies. that can 
account for the persistence of the wish in a form cap'lble of emerging in the 
construction of a dream. Despite the postulation of an ideal phase of unified 
experience, therefore, when the wish was available in its positive profile, it is the factor 
of repression, the opposition between censorship and wish, that now constitutes the 
primary reference in the attempt to define the status of that wish and to account for its 
role in the instigation of the dream. This procedure of argument is fundamental to the 
attempt to determine the status of the complex of infantile and Oedipal wishes as a 
whole. 
Freud begins by focusing on the hostile and aggressive wishes encountered in dreams. 
These impulses - "wishes for getting rid of someone" - are attributed in the frrst 
instance to the umestricted egoism of the dreamer. (203/240) The narcissistic 
conditions of the dream, however, merely replicate the original conditions of 
unbounded egoism in the earliest phases of infancy. The enclosed narcissism of the 
state of sleep allows these egoistic and aggressive wishes to emerge once more in the 
construction of a dream. "But as soon as we were led to look for the origin of these 
wishes in the past, we discovered the period of the individual's past in which there was 
no longer anything strange in such egoism and such wishful impulses, directed even 
against his closest relatives." (204/240) 
It is thus the absolute self-interest of the infant that issues in umestrained impUlses of 
hostility and aggression against any obstacles to the gratification of its egoistic wishes. 
This state of primary egoism then accounts for the manifestations of hostility against 
anyone in the infant's immediate environment that might be perceived as a rival for 
attention and affection. It is only subsequently that these manifestations of egoistic 
self-interest come under the sway of the moderating influence of love and concern for 
others. "Children love themselves first, and it is only later that they learn to love others 
and to sacrifice something of their own ego to others .... Not until later does the 
impulse to love make itself independent of egoism. "(2041240) 
Freud thus makes use of the postulate of an original state of primary egoism in order to 
establish a dynamic framework of relations between hostile and affectionate impulses. 
The relation between the hostile and affectionate attitudes will now provide the 
framework for an account of the infant's relations to its parents and siblings. It is 
interesting to note, however, the emphasis that Freud places upon the hostile impulses 
in developing the structure of Oedipal relations around the theme of rivalry in love. 
For it is only once the dynamic framework of hostile and affectionate impulses is 
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already in place that the sexual component of Oedipal relations will be introduced, as a 
somewhat subsidiary or peripheral issue. 
"There is no need to feel surprised, therefore, if, in a large number of people, dreams 
disclose their wish to get rid of their parents and especially the parent of their Own sex. 
We may assume that this wish is also present in waking life and is even conscious 
sometimes, if it can be masked by some other motive ... It is rarely that the hostility 
alone dominates the relationship; far oftener it is in the background of more 
affectionate impulses by which it is suppressed, and it must wait until a dream isolates 
it, as it were."(206/243) 
We have seen that the postulation of aggressive and hostile wishes in the dream is 
justified in the fIrst instance around the condition of censorship and repudiation. It is 
thus the opposition between ego and wish that provides the initial grounds for the 
determination of these wishes, which are encountered in a distorted form in dreams. 
Only then will Freud proceed to infer an original phase of ideal unity of experience, 
prior to the institution of the split between ego and wish, when egoism was of such an 
extent to embrace such wishful impulses. This phase of primary egoism then serves to 
provide both a source and a positive content for these distorted wishes, attributing to 
them an origin in infantile attitudes and experiences. 
The same procedure of argument will structure Freud's approach to the other group of 
wishes encountered in dreams, the "forbidden" sexual wishes. Here the postulate of an 
infantile phase of perverse sexual activity will play exactly the same role in the 
argument as that played by the postulation of an original phase of primary egoism. It is 
necessary, therefore,- to maintain the primacy of the dynamic principles of explanation 
that provide the framework for this argument. For it might otherwise appear that the 
phase of infantile sexual activity is to be situated as a positive point of origin for a 
simplified developmental account of the sexual impulses. 
The sexual wishes encountered in dreams will thus be traced to a source in infantile 
experience. The excessive sexual impulses manifested in dreams will be attributed to 
the nature of the infantile sexual constitution, and explained as the residues of an 
original phase of polymorphous sexual activity. We should not, however, overlook the 
role Freud attributes to the disavowal of infantile sexual activity in general, and the 
emphasis he places on the barriers and prohibitions erected against these wishes. For it 
is the factor of repudiation and suppression that serves as the primary condition in 
establishing the existence of these infantile wishes. Only subsequently will 
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supplementary information about the development of the sexual impulses be introduced 
to permit a positive characterisation of those wishes. 
III. 
It is important to emphasise the procedure of argument involved here, as it is this 
entire framework that is at stake in the conclusion of this lecture, in the attempt to 
bring these fmdings into relation with the concept of the unconscious already 
elaborated. Freud will now propose using the infantile material derived from dreams to 
provide a positive foundation for the unconscious, extending this concept along a 
developmental axis. 
"Let us now bring together what our researches into child psychology have contributed 
to our understanding of dreams. We have not only found that the material of the 
forgotten experiences of childhood is accessible to dreams. but we have also seen that 
the mental life of children with all its characteristics, its egoism, its incestuous choice 
of love-objects. and so on. still persists in dreams - that is, in the unconscious, and that 
dreams carry us back every night to this infantile level. The fact is thus conflrmed thut 
what is unconscious in mental life is also what is infantile." (210/247) 
The question of the relation between formal and material regression in dreams. which 
appeared to be raised only in passing at the beginning of this lecture. is in fact 
fundamental to this whole account. For it is the formal regression in the mode of 
expression in dreams that provides our flrst access to material from the earliest phases 
of infantile experience. The material derived from the investigation of individual 
development then serves to provide a positive characterisation for the wishes that had 
been identifled as the instigators of dreams. This material will now be brought into 
relation with the concept of the unconscious derived from the initial account of dream 
formation, in an attempt to situate that concept in its full psychoanalytic extension. 
The relationship defmed between these two registers of regression thus opens out a 
space within which the concept of the unconscious can be extended and transformed. 
The plane of formal regression allows us to determine the formal and logical principles 
deftning the conditions of representation in dreams. The plane of material regression 
provides access to the content of infantile impulses and experiences tied up with the 
archaic modes of thought. This infantile material is now ascribed to the unconscious, 
providing a positive determination for that concept as a system with its own 
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mechanisms and content. '''Unconscious'is no longer the name of what is latent at the 
moment; the unconscious is a particular realm of the mind with its own wishful 
impulses, its own mode of expression and its peculiar mental mechanisms which are 
not in force elsewhere. "(2121249) 
This extended concept of the unconscious as a systematic realm founded upon infantile 
determinants now gives rise to a certain tension in relation to the concept of the 
unconscious that has already been elaborated around the status of the latent pole. "But 
the latent dream-thoughts which we have discovered by interpreting dreams do not 
belong to this realm; they are on the contrary thoughts just as we might have thought 
them in waking life. Nevertheless, they are unconscious. How, then, is this 
contradiction to be solved?"(2121249) Freud will at last be forced to bring into foclls 
the distinction between the systematic concept of the unconscious and the descriptive 
use of the term that has served him so well. "(T)he time will soon have come to 
provide another name for the unconscious character of the latent dream-thoughts in 
order to distinguish it from the unconscious which comes from the realm of the 
infantile." (212/249) 
Freud will make use of this distinction to separate off the systematic concept of the 
unconscious from everything that had until now been situated at the latent pole, which 
becomes the site of "the day's residues". The process of dream formation will now be 
attributed to the interaction, or combined influence, of these two distinct components. 
"Something which is derived from our conscious life and shares its characteristics - we 
call it ~he day's residues' - combines with something else coming from the realm of the 
unconscious in order to construct a dream. "(212/249) This once more implies a 
process of dynamic articulation whereby the influence of an unconscious wish is 
distinguished from the contribution of the latent thoughts. It is this process of dynamic 
articulation, along with the inversion of status that it implies, that serves to establish 
the position of the unconscious wish in distinction from that of the latent material. 
It now becomes possible to distinguish the contribution of these two components to 
the process of dream formation as a whole. Dream formation is thus conceived as a 
process of regressive transformation which the material of the latent thoughts 
undergoes under the influence of an unconscious wish. This also provides us with a 
fIrst indication of a possible interaction between the registers of formal and material 
regression in dreams. For the regression of the dream thoughts is now attributed to 
the influence of unconscious mechanisms upon the form of representation of that 
material. "The dream-work is accomplished between these two components. The 
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influence exercised upon the day's residues by the addition of the unconscioLls IS no 
doubt among the determinants of regression."(212/249) 
The relationship between formal and material regression in dreams will thus be placed 
upon a new footing and considered in relation to the question of the conditions of 
wish-fulfIlment in the dream. "We can, of course, raise another question besides: What 
is it that forces psychical activity during sleep to make this regression? Why does it 
not dispose of the mental stimuli that disturb sleep without doing this?"(212/249) The 
answer to this question, "that it is not otherwise dynamically possible to get rid of the 
stimulus to the dream", will allow us to situate the psychoanalytic concept of the 
unconscious in terms of the articulation of the formal and material conditions of wish-




Freud's discussion of the question of wish-fulftlment in dreams constitutes the 
culmination of the argument that has provided the structure for these lectures as a 
whole. We have shown how this argument is elaborated around the initial distinction 
between two different approaches to the problem of dreams. hence between two 
possible models of psychoanalytic investigation. In this lecture Freud will bring these 
two lines of argument into relation with one another and attempt to reconcile them 
around a defence of the thesis that every dream must be understood as the fultilment of 
a wish. 
The question of distortion provides the point of distinction. and hence the site of a 
possible articulation, between the two different lines of argument. For it was the 
suspension of the problem of distortion, in the case of children's dreams, that allowed 
the positive model of investigation to be elaborated around a direct relation between 
the manifest and latent poles of the dream. It was a systematic examination of the 
modalities of distortion which arise to obscure this relation, on the other hand. that 
allowed the notion of the dream-work to be established as the register fundamental to 
the process of dream formation as a whole. 
The problem of distortion is thus attributed a diametrically opposed position in each of 
these two approaches to the dream - in the one case an obstacle to be eliminated or 
reduced to a minimum, in the other the primary object of concern. The respective 
outcomes of these two forms of investigation, the claims and findings upon which the 
different lines of argument depend, are not therefore entirely compatible. "We are 
bound to admit, however, that the things we have discovered by the one path and by 
the other do not entirely correspond. It will be our task to piece the two sets of 
findings together and reconcile them with each other. "(213/250) 
The lack of correspondence between the two models of investigation has been most 
clearly illustrated by the position of the concept "unconscious" in each. The previous 
lecture contained a first attempt to reconcile the different definitions of this concept. 
and to situate a revised and extended concept of the unconscious in the space de tined 
by their relationship. This argument will now provide the framework for the attempt 
to reconcile the two accounts of the procedure of investigation itself. The outcome 
will be a more comprehensive conception of the nature and grounds of validity of the 
technique of psychoanalytic interpretation as a whole. 
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The question of the status and justification of the concept "unconscious" is hardly. 
therefore, an isolated or independent issue. This question is inseparable from oLir 
conception of the grounds of validity of the psychoanalytic technique itself. We have 
seen how this concept is developed around the role played by the wish in the 
instigation of the dream. The question of the status of the wish in the explanation of 
the dream then served as the point of articulation for the distinction between the two 
different models of investigation. The discussion of the conditions of wish-fulfilment in 
the dream will provide the register within which this question can be pursued. 
The notion of wish-fulfIlment was introduced on the basis of the model of children's 
dreams. The absence of distortion in these dreams permits the elaboration of a retlex-
arc model of the dream as the response to a stimulus that disturbs sleep. This empirical 
model of the dream then supplies the foundation for the psychoanalytic account of the 
process of dream formation and the possibility of its explanation. Yet this entire 
model, and the evidence for the central thesis of wish-fulfilment itself, rests upon the 
condition of the absence of distortion. The question now arises as to whether this 
model can be applied with equal validity to distorted dreams as well. "Now that we 
believe we have overcome dream-distortion, we must go on to inquire whether the 
view of dreams as the fulfilment of wishes is also valid of distorted dreams."(213/250) 
Freud will consider possible objections to the thesis that every dream must be 
considered the fulfIlment of a wish. His response to criticisms of the empirical validity 
of this thesis will allow him to extend the grounds of this claim in the light of the more 
comprehensive account of the process of dream formation since elaborated. This 
procedure will at the same time allow him to resituate the position of the wish itself. 
abandoning its status in the latent pole in favour of a source in the systematic, or 
"infantile", unconscious. The process of dynamic articulation by which this 
unconscious wish is distinguished from the latent stimulus entails an inversion in the 
status of that wish and the role it plays in explanation. It is this characteristic 
procedure of derivation that then supports the concept of the unconscious itself. 
The question of the status of the proposition of wish-fulfilment thus becomes the pivot 
of Freud's entire argument. Our understanding of the grounds and justification for this 
thesis will have a determining influence on our conception of the nature and orientation 
of the psychoanalytic technique as a whole. It is thus the very possibility of 
psychoanalytic interpretation, as well as the scope of its validity, that is at stake in 
Freud's defence of this proposition. 
15~ 
II. 
The most obvious objection to the thesis that every dream is the fultilment of a wish is 
the occ.urrence of dreams with a distressing content. Common sense would suggest 
that if every dream was in fact the fulfIlment of a wish then feelings of anxiety and 
unpleasure should be impossible in them. The experience of a dream accompanied by 
distressing affects would then constitute an immediate contradiction of the validity of 
this thesis. Freud's discussion of this objection will allow him to challenge this 
simplistic view of wish-fulfllment and to introduce a more comprehensive view of the 
conditions of wish-fulfllment in dreams. At the same time we will be forced to revise 
our conception of the nature of the wish and the role it plays in the account of dream 
formation as a whole. 
Once again it is a dynamic procedure of argument that serves as the most reliable guide 
to understanding Freud's approach to this question. And again it is the factor of 
distortion that is introduced to provide the initial pivot for this argument. "We have no 
difficulty in replying that in distorted dreams the wish-fulfllment cannot be obviolls hut 
must be looked for, so that it cannot be pointed out until the dream has been 
interpreted. We know too that the wishes in these distorted dreams are forbidden ones 
- rejected by the censorship - whose existence was precisely the cause of the dream's 
distortion, the reason for the intervention of the dream-censorship. "(214/251) 
The factor of distortion, the most intractable obstacle for the initial attempt to 
demonstrate the role of the wish in the process of dream formation, is thus established 
as the pivot of a dynamic argument. This argument then provides the framework for 
Freud's attempt to dissociate the wish from its empirical status in the latent pole and to 
resituate it in the systematic unconscious. It is this procedure that will allow him to 
revise the causal role played by the wish in the explanation of the dream, establishing it 
in the guise of a fmal term of interpretation. The role of the wish in distorted dreams is 
thus established as a necessary postulate required to explain precisely that distortion 
which stands in the way of the attempt to demonstrate the presence of the wish itself. 
This manoeuvre, inverting the relative status of the wish and the factor of distortion 
within a dynamic argument, serves as the foundation for the account that follows. For 
the problem of distressing affects in the dream will now be introduced into this 
dynamic framework in a position analogous to that of the factor of distortion. This 
will allow Freud to deal with the difficulties raised by the question of anxiety by 
examining the defmition of the wish itself and the conditions of its fulfilment in the 
dream. In this way he will make use of the problem of distressing affects in dreams to 
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introduce novel distinctions into the concept of the wish, thus elaborating a dynamic 
account of the conditions of wish-fulfilment within a more comprehensive account of 
the process of dream formation as a whole. 
This argument will be carried out in three stages, m the discussion of three 
"complications" that have to be taken into account when considering the problem of 
affects in dreams. "Firstly, it may be that the dream-work has not completely 
succeeded in creating a wish-fulfilment; so that a portion of the distressing affect in the 
dream-thoughts has been left over in the manifest dream."(214-15/252) This, the 
simplest argument, relies upon the suggestion that the process of dream formation 
might fail to completely satisfy the wish that instigated it. The degree of unpleasure 
experienced in the dream would then be attributed to the residue of the discomfort 
associated with the wishful state itself. 
This line of argument, which relies upon the dream's failure to fulfil its function, 
obviously remains of limited effectiveness as an argument for establishing the nature of 
that function in general. For this approach serves just as well to put in question exactly 
what is meant by the dream's fulfilment of a wish. This argument then merely raises 
more fundamental questions concerning the definition of the wish itself and its role in 
the process of dream formation. Any doubts concerning the dream's ability to satisfy 
the wish thus immediately problematises both our conception of the nature of the wish 
involved and the conditions of its possible satisfaction in the dream. 
It is this notion, however, that allows Freud to introduce a distinction between the 
dream's content and the quota of affect associated with that content. "Such instances 
of failure are no rare event. This is helped by the fact that it is so much harder for the 
dream-work to alter the sense of a dream's affects than of its content; affects are 
sometimes highly resistant. "(215/252) The possibility that these two components of 
the wish might have separate vicissitudes in the dream would then account for the 
distressing affects experienced in the dream despite its attempts at wish- fulfllment. 
"What then happens is that the dream-work transforms the distressing content of the 
dream-thoughts into the fulfllment of a wish, while the distressing affect persists 
unaltered." (215/252) 
The introduction of the distinction between content and affect serves to undermine the 
unitary conception of the wish assumed in the initial account of wish-fulfIlment. The 
problematic occurrence of distressing affects in the dream can now be accounted for in 
terms of the separate, and possibly contradictory, vicissitudes of these two components 
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of the wish. This dynamic reversal culminates in the assertion that in this case it would 
be precisely the experience of distressing affects that would constitute evidence for the 
thesis of wish-fulfilment. For "it is precisely in dreams like this that the wish-fulfilling 
purpose of the dream-work appears most clearly, because in isolation".(21S12S2) 
The import of this argument, however, is not so much its claim to constitute a 
comprehensive response to these objections as to introduce the terms within which a 
solution might be achieved. The distinction between content and affect breaks down 
the unitary defmition of the wish and introduces the possibility of a dynamic 
articulation between these two components. At the same time this distinction 
establishes a preliminary framework that will be elaborated into a dynamic relation 
between two separate wishes in the process of dream formation. This approach will 
then culminate, in the discussion of punishment dreams, in the assertion that the 
experience of unpleasure in the dream may itself be considered the satisfaction of a 
wish. 
The first stage of this argument thus questions the unitary conception of the wish by 
identifying two separate components of that wish and raising the possibility that these 
components might have independent vicissitudes in the process of wish-fulfIlment. The 
dissolution of the unitary conception of the wish itself problematises the previous 
account of wish-fulfllment in a move towards a dynamic account structured around the 
possible relations between these two components of the wish. The next step will take 
the elaboration of this dynamic model of wish-fulfllment a stage further by bringing 
into focus the question of the dreamer's relation to his wish. "No doubt a wish-
fulfilment must bring pleasure; but the question then arises 'To whom?' "(215-16/253) 
The unitary account of wish-fulfIlment had taken for granted that the dreamer and his 
wish are to be identified. It now becomes possible to establish a dynamic relation 
between them, within which the aims of the wish no longer necessarily coincide with 
those of the dreamer. Here it is the factor of censorship that serves as the wedge 
opening up a dynamic relation between dreamer and wish. This notion then provides 
the crucial point of inversion in this relation, allowing the introduction of the possibility 
that the fulfllment of the wish is not necessarily accompanied by the experience of 
pleasure. "But, as we know, a dreamer's relation to his wishes is a quite peculiar one. 
He repudiates them and censors them - he has no liking for them. in short. So that 
their fulfilment will give him no pleasure, but just the opposite."(216/253) 
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The identity of dreamer and wish is thus dissolved into a dynamic relation between two 
separate components which might have independent and even contradictory aims. 
"Thus a dreamer in his relation to his dream-wishes can only be compared to an 
amalgamation of two separate people who are linked by some strong element in 
common."(216/253) The emphasis here, however, is not so much on the element of 
common interest that regulates the relation between these two components, but rather 
on the possibility that their interests might no longer coincide. Freud thus treats us to 
a fairy tale intended precisely to illustrate "the possibility that if two people are not at 
one with each other the fulfilment of a wish of one of them may bring nothing but 
unpleasure to the other".(216/253-54) 
It is within this framework that it becomes possible to elaborate a preliminary 
explanation of the phenomenon of anxiety in dreams. For anxiety will now be 
explained as the product of a dynamic opposition between conflicting tendencies at 
work in the formation of the dream. Observing that in anxiety-dream~ the content is 
often entirely devoid of distortion, Freud suggests that in these dream~ the fulfilment of 
the wish has managed to evade the demands of the censorship, at the cost of the 
generation of anxiety. "An anxiety-dream is often the undisguised fulfilment of a wish 
- not, of course, of an acceptable wish, but of a repudiated one. The generation of 
anxiety has taken the place of the censorship."(216-17/254) 
Freud goes on to point out that anxiety-dreams usually have the effect of waking the 
dreamer. The anxiety serves as a signal that the repressed wish is in danger of 
attaining fulfllment despite the demands of censorship. The anxiety generated in 
response to any particularly disturbing wish would then take over the function of 
censorship, putting an end to that dream by rousing the dreamer from sleep. "Anxiety-
dreams are as a rule also arousal dreams; we usually interrupt our sleep before the 
repressed wish in the dream has put its fulfilment through completely in spite of the 
censorship. In that case the function of the dream has failed, but its essential nature is 
not altered by this."(2171254-55) 
The problem of anxiety in dreams is thus reduced to the question of the dynamic 
conditions under which it becomes possible for a repressed wish to evade the function 
of censorship in the construction of a dream. The answer to this question is to be 
sought in the alteration in the balance of forces between censorship and wish brought 
about by the state of sleep itself. Freud suggests that the function of censorship, which 
is greatly reduced in the state of sleep, tends to become merged with the dominant 
wish to sleep. This creates the conditions for the free expression of repressed wishes 
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under the presupposition that they remain harmless from a practical point of view. as 
the state of sleep bars access to any acti ve implementation. 
It is clear that this account is not intended as a definitive statement on the problem of 
anxiety which, Freud points out, must be approached from a different angle. It should 
rather be considered merely as an introduction to the term"! of the problem within the 
context of the attempt to elaborate a dynamic account of the process of wish-fultilment 
in dreams. This dynamic model of anxiety as the product of a relation of contliet 
between opposing tendencies in the dream then supports the claim that the fulfilment 
of a wish in the dream need not necessarily be experienced as pleasure. "For there is a 
possibility that the fulftlment of a wish may bring about something very far from 
pleasant - namely, a punishment." (2 19/256) 
The reference to the notion of punishment dreams completes the elaboration of this 
dynamic account of wish-fulfilment, introducing the possibility that the unpleasure 
generated may itself be considered the fulfIlment of a wish of the opposing tendency. 
Far from constituting an objection to the thesis of wish-fulfilment, the problem of 
unpleasure in dreams now becomes the grounds for postulating the existence of 
further, punishing tendencies in the dream which are satisfied by that very experience 
of unpleasure. "(T)he punishment is also the fulfilment of a wish - of the wish of the 
other, censoring person."(219/257) 
This passage brings into focus once again the contrasted modes of psychoanalytic and 
empirical argument. If the thesis of wish-fulfilment were to be considered an empirical 
proposition, established by a process of abstraction and generalisation from the given 
evidence, then the experience of anxiety-dreams would seem to constitute a direct 
contradiction to the universal validity of that principle. The particular experience of 
unpleasure in the dream would thus provide grounds for modifying the scope of that 
general principle in order to accommodate the conflicting evidence. 
We have shown, however, that the validity of this principle does not in fact rest upon 
the plane of empirical evidence, but is rather established at the level of the formal 
principles of interpretation. It is the primary position of this postulate as a necessary 
condition of the intelligibility of the dream that serves as the basis for Freud's 
subsequent procedure in relation to the apparently contradictory evidence of 
unpleasure in the dream. The experience of anxiety-dreams thus becomes the occasion 
for the elaboration of certain topographic distinctions designed to account for the 
possibility that the fulfilment of a wish might be accompanied by unpleasure. The 
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discussion of the conditions under which the fulfilment of a wish might give rise to 
unpleasure then establishes that principle on the broader grounds of a dynamic model 
of wish-fulfilment in the dream. 
This procedure of argument at the same time allows us to clarify the nature of the 
relation between dynamic and topographic considerations in psychoanalytic theory. 
Here we have the fundamental proposition of wish-fulfIlment, established on formal 
grounds as a necessary principle of interpretation. The formal status of this principle 
provides the basis for the approach to the problem of unpleasure in dreams, which is 
resolved by an elaboration of the dynamic conditions under which that experience 
might be accounted for. The account of a dynamic relation between conflicting 
tendencies in the dream then serves as the foundation for a topographic account of the 
relation of wishes within the psychic apparatus. The topographic model of a divided 
psychic apparatus, therefore, merely constitutes a structural elaboration of those 
fundamental explanatory principles. 
Criticisms of the empirical validity of the proposition of wish-fulftlment rest upon a 
misunderstanding of the nature of this argument and the relation between principles 
and evidence which it assumes. Hence the importance of the formal derivation of this 
principle, on the one hand, and the critique of the empirical status of the wish, on the 
other. For it is above all the initial critique of the empirical status of the wish in the 
explanation of the dream that prepares the ground for the more fundamental inversion 
in the relation between principle and evidence which this argument makes possible. 
The experience of unpleasure in the dream thus no longer constitutes grounds for a 
modifIcation of the universal validity of the proposition of wish-fulftlment. Rather we 
have a modifIcation in our concept of the wish itself, and the elaboration of a dynamic 
account of the process of wish-fulfllment to allow for the possibility that the fulfJ.lment 
of a wish in the dream might give rise tounpleasure. 
III. 
Freud will go to great lengths here to emphasise the importance of the thesis of wish-
fulftlrnent and the central role it plays in his argument. The entire theory of the dream 
obviously depends to a large extent on the validity of the proposition that the dream is 
in essence the fulfIlment of a wish. Even more important, however, is the question of 
the grounds for this proposition and the argument by which it is established. For the 
justifIcation of this thesis as a necessary principle of interpretation ties this proposition 
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to the very conditions of possibility of the psychoanalytic technique itself. The 
question of the status of the proposition that every dream is to be considered the 
fulfilment of a wish thus becomes fundamental to the validity of psychoanalytic theory 
in general. 
The discussion of these issues is once again set in place by formulating a key objection 
to the plausibility of this thesis. "When someone has accompanied us so far in the 
interpretation of dreams and has accepted everything that has been brought forward up 
to this point, it often happens that he comes to a halt at wish-fultilment and says: 
'Granted that dreams always have a sense, and that this sense can be discovered by the 
technique of psychoanalysis, why must that sense, all evidence to the contrary, be 
invariably pushed into the formula of wish-fulfilment?' "(2211259) 
This passage, and the objection that it raises, may in fact be understood as both a 
summary and a culmination of Freud's argument up to this point. For here we have the 
first explicit suggestion that it is wish-fulfilment that constitutes the sense of the dream. 
The question of the validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment is here brought into direct 
relation with the initial premiss that all dreams have a sense. The juxtapositioning of 
the notion of sense and that of the wish then has immediate and far-reaching 
implications for our understanding of the coherence of Freud's argument as a whole. 
With this conjunction we are thrown back to the very beginning of this argument, to 
the role of the concept of sense in the constitution of the dream as an object of 
interpretation. The proposition that the dream has a sense was situated as a 
fundamental condition of the intelligibility of the dream in general. Yet the problematic 
status of this notion of sense, which appeared to feature as both the premiss and the 
product of interpretation, was never resolved. 
This notion appeared rather to be abandoned in the course of the attempt to establish 
an empirical model for the explanation of the dream as a reaction to a stimulus 
disturbing sleep. The elaboration of this empirical model then came to centre upon the 
concept of the wish and its role in the instigation of the dream. We were, however, 
faced with analogous difficulties concerning the status of that wish and the role it was 
to play in the interpretation of the dream. It is these issues that are at stake in the 
question of the grounds for the proposition that every dream is the fulfilment of a wish. 
It now becomes apparent that, far from being discarded in the course of the argument, 
the concept of sense has in fact continued to provide the most general framework for 
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the discussion of the wish. For in pursuing the question of the wish, and the validity of 
the proposition of wish-fulfilment in general, we have by implication served to clarify 
some of the difficulties associated with the premiss of sense. We have thus suggested 
that the problematic status of both propositions can best be resolved by abandoning the 
attempt to provide an empirical foundation for these concepts in favour of the 
argument for their derivation as conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. 
This procedure would allow us not only to resolve the difficulties associated with the 
status of the two concepts, but also to comprehend the nature of their relation to one 
another. For it is only in terms of their position as conditions of interpretation, and 
thus in terms of their common derivation from the technique of interpretation itself, 
that we can make any sense of the correlation that Freud here establishes between 
them. This relation would allow us to resolve the question of the status of the premiss 
of sense in the light of the grounds for the justification of the thesis of wish-fulfilment. 
The relation with the concept of sense would similarly have profound implications for 
our understanding of the wish and its position in psychoanalytic thought. 
The critique of the empirical and physiological conception of the wish thus clears the 
way for the attempt to situate the wish within a context of signification defined by the 
dream itself. This would imply abandoning any attempt to define the nature of the 
wish in terms of the physiological and functional processes underlying the dream, in 
order to approach the constitution of the wish within a register of sense. This 
approach would allow us to consider the conditions under which the context of 
signification supporting the wish might become assimilated to the register of 
representation defmed by the dream itself. This would then provide us with a far more 
promising framework for determining the conditions under which that wish might be 
fulfilled in the process of dream formation. 
The third term in this correlation between the concept of the wish and that of sense will 
be supplied by the notion of transference. Freud's concluding discussion of the 
transference will focus upon the paradoxical position of this concept as a fundamental 
condition of analytic interpretation and yet as the major obstacle to the success of that 
process. The difficulties associated with the concept of transference will then be 
resolved, by an argument analogous in every respect to the one here, in terms of its 
status as a condition of psychoanalytic interpretation. This argument will take the form 
of a critique of the attempt to ground this concept in the empirical sphere, on the basis 
of its manifestations as an affective relation between patient and analyst, in order to 
situate the transference as a field of signification delimiting the analytic realm itself. 
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The notions of sense, wish, and transference are thus established as three interlocking 
and overlapping concepts whose interrelation serves to define the constitution of the 
psychoanalytic register as a whole. The possibility of this correlation, however, can 
only be understood and justified in terms of the common situation of these three 
concepts as conditions of possibility of the technique of interpretation from which the 
entire theory derives. For it is the technique of interpretation that provides the point of 
articulation in relation to which the correlation between these three terms can be 
elaborated into the field of psychoanalytic knowledge in general. The broad 
epistemological framework defmed by the relation between these terms then provides 
the register within which the status of the other psychoanalytic concepts can be 
determined. 
These are themes that only really come into focus in the course of Freud's final detailed 
discussion of the concept of transference and its role in analytic therapy. It is clear, 
however, that there is no way of understanding the relation between these concepts, 
and hence the scope and coherence of this argument, except in terms of their common 
derivation from the conditions of the technique of interpretation itself. Any attempt to 
ground these terms in the empirical register, and to derive their validity from the nature 
of the object in question, will merely prevent us from making any sense of the relation 
between them. This approach not only gives rise to intractable difficulties in 
determining the status of the individual concepts, but also precludes any grasp of the 
nature of their relation to one another within the coherence of Freud's argument as a 
whole. 
The defmition of each of these central psychoanalytic concepts will thus be supported 
by the same characteristic procedure of argument. This argument requires a critique of 
the positive status of these terms within the empirical register, in order to demonstrate 
the possibility of a fundamental correlation between them at the level of their common 
epistemological grounds as conditions of the technique of interpretation. The 
discussion of these concepts will in each case involve two levels or stages of argument. 
The initial defmition serves to bring to light the difficulties inherent in any attempt to 
establish the validity of the concept on empirical grounds. The critique of the positive, 
substantive, and nuclear status of that concept then provides the foundation for the 
attempt to elaborate a more comprehensive definition of the epistemological conditions 
under which it might legitimately be employed. 
167 
We have already demonstrated how this argument may be brought to bear on the initial 
distinction between meaning and sense in the dream. This distinction turns on the 
contrast between a concept of meaning based on an internal relation of correspondence 
and intention, and the constitution of a closed register of sense defined in terms of its 
external conditions of coherence. The same distinction re-emerges in the account of 
the transference, which is aimed precisely at bringing to light the contradictions 
inherent in the manifestations of this phenomenon as an affective relation unfolding at 
the positive level of meaning and wish. This will allow us to establish a more 
comprehensive defmition of the transference as a register of signification whose 
external limits are identical with those of the analytic realm itself. The correlation 
between the concept of transference and that of sense thus allows us to define the 
constitution of the analytic register in terms of the epistemological conditions under 
which psychoanalytic interpretation may be successfully carried out. 
IV. 
These are somewhat broader considerations which may appear to have no immediate 
relevance to the issue in question here. It is these broader epistemological concerns, 
however, that provide the context for Freud's approach to the thesis of wish-fulftlment 
by bringing it into relation with the basic premiss of interpretation, that every dream 
has a sense. The defence of this thesis then comes to rest upon the introduction of a 
distinction between the latent dream thoughts and the broader register of unconscious 
thought processes as a whole. It is this distinction that establishes the framework for 
the critique of the empirical status of the wish as a latent stimulus, in order to situate 
that wish within the context of signification defined by the dream itself. It is the 
constitution of a closed register of sense in the process of dream formation that then 
creates the context within which latent material of the most varied nature comes to be 
configured as a wish. 
The defence of the principle of wish-fulfilment, introduced here in the form of a 
questioning of the plausibility of that thesis, involves two steps. The first brings the 
validity of this principle into relation with the premiss of sense, the primary condition 
of the intelligibility of the dream in general. This step serves to bring the principle of 
wish-fulfilment into relation with the conditions under which interpretation of the 
dream becomes possible in the first place. It is in the context of this premiss of sense 
that we may then ask under what conditions the range of functions of waking thought· 
become restricted to the single, necessary, and inevitable sense of wish-fultilment in the 
dream. For this is the question posed as the second part of Freud's "objection" to tht! 
validity of this thesis. "Why should not the sense of this nightly thinking be of as many 
kinds as that of daytime thinking?"(22 11259) 
It is clear that any attempt to approach this question in term.~ of the physiological 
foundations of thought can only lead us into immediate difficulties. For we are then 
reduced to seeking to account for this difference in terms of the physiological or 
neurological conditions of thought during sleep. Whatever the nature of these criteria, 
it remains difficult to see how the physiological conditions of thought processes in 
sleep could lead us to the necessary formulation of a wish in the dream. The proximity 
of the problematic of sense, however, allows us to consider this question in term~ of 
the conditions under which the various functions of waking thought become restricted 
to the single formula of wish-fulfIlment in the dream. This question may then be 
answered in terms of the constitution of a closed register of sense, within which those 
thoughts take on the value of representative elements in a process of wish-fulfilment. 
The argument for the thesis of wish-fulfIlment thus turns upon precisely this distinction 
between the various functions or meanings of the latent thoughts and the single all-
embracing sense of the dream. The profIle of that latent material as a wish is then to 
be considered in terms of its position within the register of sense constituted by the 
dream as a whole. It is the context of signification established by the process of dream 
formation itself, then, that provides the conditions under which the range of functions 
of waking thought become assimilated to the single sense of wish-fulfIlment in the 
dream. For the material of those latent thoughts, left over from the waking interests of 
the previous day, fmds a place in the process of dream formation only on the basis of 
its suitability to serve the representation of an unconscious wish. 
This distinction between the content of the latent material and the form of the dream as 
a whole allows us to sketch a basic account of the conditions under which the variety 
of functions of waking thought may become integrated into a process of wish-
fulfilment in the dream. At the same time it will be seen that this account of the 
constitution of a register of sense provides us with a preliminary model of the 
conditions under which certain fundamental analytic phenomena operate. For the 
analytic process itself entails a situation where a wide range of activities and functions 
of waking life come to be focused around, or aligned in terms of, the single theme of 
the transference. The operation of the transference may thus be considered in terms of 
the constitution of a closed register of sense, within which a range of innocllolls 
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functions come to take on a transferential significance In relation to the analyti<.: 
situation. 
The question of the conditions of validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment in dream" 
thus establishes a framework for an entire range of analytic phenomena, and provides 
us with a concrete illustration of how those phenomena come within range of 
psychoanalytic interpretation. For this model would then allow us to consider the 
nature of the symptom as wish-fulftlment in terms of the conditions under which 
certain physiological or somatic functions may become situated within a particular 
context of signification. Any attempt to approach this question in terms of the somatic 
underpinnings of these phenomena, on the other hand, merely reduces us to looking for 
physiological criteria for the distinction between normal and pathological processes 
along the lines of the distinction between waking and sleeping thought. The 
symptomatic qUality of these phenomena, however, is in no way to be sought in their 
physiological foundation,. but derives rather from their position within a register of 
sense that at the same time provides their conditions of intelligibility. 
It becomes clear that the question of the status of the principle of wish-fulfilment does 
indeed bear the importance which Freud here attributes to it within the theory as a 
whole. For our understanding of the grounds of validity of this thesis will have a 
profound influence upon our conception of the scope of validity of psychoanalytic 
interpretation in general. Any attempt to found this principle directly upon the 
evidence derived from an examination of the dream, for example, would merely restrict 
the validity of this thesis to the nature of the particular object concerned. An empirical 
grounding for this thesis would imply a limited conception both of the nature of the 
wish and of the scope and orientation of the technique of interpretation itself. This 
approach would merely serve to cut us off from an appreciation of the full scope of this 
thesis and its validity as a basic principle of interpretation across the range of 
psychoanalytic objects as a whole. 
The defence of the thesis of wish-fulftlment comes to rest upon the distinction between 
the range of meanings of the latent thoughts and the underlying sense of the dream as a 
whole. This distinction allows Freud to fmally clarify the relation between the two 
different models of interpretation and to distinguish their respective orientations, goals, 
and conditions of validity. This account gives rise to two radically different 
conceptions of the nature and status of the wish, one situated in the latent pole and 
derived from the interests of waking thought, and the other associated with the register 
of the dream work and attributed to a source in the infantile unconscious. The 
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distinction between the function of the latent thoughts and the sense of the dream as a 
whole thus not only becomes the occasion for situating the ddinition of the 
psychoanalytic unconscious in its full systematic sense, but also allows us to elaborate 
a novel conception of the nature and conditions of the wish in psychoanalysis. 
V. 
Freud will claim that the criticisms of the validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment are 
based upon "a misunderstanding which confuses the dream with the latent dream-
thoughts, and asserts of the former something that applies solely to the 
latter" .(222/260) He is quite prepared to acknowledge that these latent dream-
thoughts may involve the full range of functions and activities of waking thought, for it 
is from the concerns and interests of waking thought that they are directly derived. 
The latent thoughts, or "day's residues", may thus possess all the characteristics of 
normal thought processes, apart from the fact that they were not conscious to the 
dreamer at the time. The immediate goal of interpretation is then defined as an attempt 
to bring these latent thoughts to light by undoing the process by which they had been 
transformed into the manifest dream. 
We may thus distinguish a strictly limited practical aim of investigation, which is 
concerned solely with removing the effects of the dream-work in order to determine 
the nature of the latent thoughts out of which that dream arose. This interest in the 
content of the latent thoughts is, however, quite explicitly contrasted with the modes 
and mechanisms of the dream-work, which are responsible for giving those latent 
thoughts their characteristic form in the dream. It is the register of the dream-work, 
the array of mechanisms responsible for producing the manifest dream out of the latent 
material, that is here established as the real focus of interpretation and the essential 
component of the process of dream formation itself. "The only essential thing about 
dreams is the dream-work that has influenced the thought-material."(223/261) 
The contrast between the content of the latent thoughts and the form into which that 
material is translated by the mechanisms of the dream-work is then attributed to the 
influence of an unconscious wish. "Analytic observation shows further that the dream-
work never restricts itself to translating these thoughts into the archaic or regressive 
mode of expression that is familiar to you. In addition, it regularly takes possession of 
something else, which is not part of the latent thoughts of the previous day, but which 
is the true motive force for the construction of the dream. This indispensable addition 
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is the equally unconscious wish for the fulfilment of which the content of the dream is 
given its new form."(223-24/261-62) 
Here, then, we finally arrive at the postulation of an unconscious wish. "the true 
motive force" of the dream, introduced to account for the difference between the 
content of the latent thoughts and the form in which they appear in the dream. The 
form of the dream as a whole is now attributed to the influence of this unconscious 
wish, for the fulftlment of which the entire process of dream formation comes about. 
At the same time the role of the latent thoughts is reduced to that of mere instigating 
stimulus. The latent thoughts provide both the occasion and the material for the 
process of dream formation. They could not, however, play this role without the 
"indispensable addition" of the influence of an unconscious wish, which is responsible 
for the form in which that dream then arises. 
The explanation of the process of dream formation thus comes to rest upon the 
postulation of an unconscious wish, which provides the necessary causal force for the 
construction of the dream. And yet it is clear that all the difficulties already associated 
with the form of psychoanalytic explanation now merely become focused upon the 
question of the status of this unconscious wish and its possible grounds of justification. 
The validity of the thesis of wish-fulfilment similarly comes to rest upon the claim that 
the influence of an unconscious wish is to be detected in the formation of every dream. 
Given the difficulties of establishing the empirical validity of this proposition in its 
initial form, however, it is difficult to see how it can now be successfully defended with 
the postulation of a wish whose existence remains even more elusive. 
One should not, then, overlook the difficulties involved in this line of argument. Freud 
has begun by attempting to elaborate an empirical model of the process of dream 
formation which turns upon the role of a latent wish in the instigation of the dream. 
He has attempted to provide evidence for the validity of his central thesis with the 
examples of direct wish-fulfilment in the undistorted dreams of children. The attempt 
to extend this model to account for the more obscure instances of distorted dreams. 
however, meets with certain obstacles that allow us to question the legitimacy of this 
argument as a whole. The difficulties in establishing the general validity of the thesis of 
wish-fulftlment thus cast doubt upon the validity of the entire psychoanalytic model for 
the explanation of dreams. 
In response to criticisms of the validity of this thesis and the evidence upon which it is 
based, Freud now appears to be attempting to modify his argument. He is thus 
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prepared to admit that a latent wish is not in fact an indispensable factor in the 
formation of the dream, and that the latent thoughts do not therefore necessarily take 
the form of a wish. Instead he will claim that the role of those latent thoughts in the 
dream depends upon the influence of a further, more unconscious wish, which has no 
immediate empirical proftle and whose existence cannot therefore be clearly 
demonstrated. It is the influence of this unconscious wish upon the residual material of 
waking thought, however, that is to account for all the characteristic transformations 
that arise in the course of dream formation. 
The latent wish, which has served up to now as the pivot of the empirical model of 
explanation, is thus rendered secondary and reduced to the role of mere instigating 
stimulus in the process of dream formation. Hence even if the latent thoughts should 
happen to take the form of a wish, they would still not in themselves possess sufficient 
motive force to account for this process. The latent wish will only be able to give rise 
to the construction of a dream if it succeeds in gaining reinforcement from an 
unconscious wish, which provides the psychical energy necessary for the process of 
dream formation. The latent thoughts themselves then only playa role in the dream on 
account of their ability to serve the fulfilment of that unconscious wish. 
Freud goes on to invoke the analogy of the relation between capitalist and 
entrepreneur to illustrate the relation between the unconscious wish and the latent 
material. We thus arrive at a conception of the unconscious wish as the product of an 
accumulation of psychical energy from infantile and instinctual sources which supplies 
the quantitative force necessary to motivate the process of dream formation. Due to 
the state of repression this reservoir of libidinal forces cannot itself achieve discharge 
via any of the recognised channels. The conditions of the state of sleep, however, 
allow it to transfer its excitation onto the latent material of thought, achieving a certain 
discharge by proxy in the formation of a dream. 
This quantitative account of the unconscious wish, however, gives rise to certain 
difficulties with the economics of the process of wish-fulfllment in dreams. For we are 
immediately faced with the question of the conditions under which an unconscious 
wish of this nature can be considered to achieve any form of adequate discharge in the 
dream. This question then comes to focus upon the nature of the relation between the 
unconscious wish and the latent thoughts, and the mechanics of the process by which 
this wish transfers its energy onto that latent material in the dream. These questions in 
turn lead us back to more fundamental difficulties with the possible grounds for 
173 
establishing the status of this unconscious wish as the "indispensable addition" in the 
construction of every dream. 
Once again it is the problematic status of the unconscious wish itself that lies at the 
root of the difficulties with the role attributed to it in the explanation of the dream. 
The difficulties of reconciling the questionable empirical status of this wish with the 
universal and necessary role it plays in the explanation of the dream can, however, 
quite easily be resolved by the argument already elaborated. For here it is the process 
of dynamic articulation by which this wish is distinguished from the empirical stimulus 
that provides the key to understanding both the status of the unconscious wish and its 
role in the dream. It is this relation of dynamic articulation, rather than any simple 
quantitative relation of "addition", that then supports the status of that unconscious 
wish in the explanation of the dream. 
The simple expedient of negotiating the problematic relation between the unconscious 
wish and the latent material in the inverse direction thus allows us to clarify the 
difficulties associated both with the status of these terms and the nature of their 
relation to one another. This returns us to the derivation of the unconscious wish as a 
context of signification required to account for the presence of the latent material in 
the dream and its role in a process of wish-fulfIlment. If we maintain this procedure of 
derivation it is clear that there is no need for any further evidence for the independent 
existence of this unconscious wish. For that unconscious wish becomes identified with 
the register of sense itself, the context of signification delimited by the field of 
associations which render that dream intelligible. 
The status of the register of sense which supports the role of the unconscious wish in 
the process of dream formation is itself no longer obscure. We have noted that the 
influence of the unconscious wish is introduced in the first instance to account for the 
difference between the content of the latent material and the form of the dream as a 
whole. And yet the dream-work has already been established as the activity 
responsible for transforming that latent material into the form it assumes in the 
manifest dream. The register of the dream-work is therefore now in place to account 
for the transformations undergone by those latent thoughts in the course of dream 
formation. The modes and mechanisms of the dream-work provide us with a 
systematic account of this register of sense within which the influence of the 
unconscious wish may be identified and detennined. 
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This procedure of derivation provides the key to understanding not only the 
explanatory status of the unconscious wish but the nature of that wish itself. The 
process by which this unconscious wish is distinguished from the latent thoughts shows 
us that it is not merely a question of a difference of magnitude or of levels of 
consciousness. The unconscious wish is not a latent wish that is both more powerful 
and less conscious. The relation of dynamic articulation indicates rather that we must 
conceive the effects of this unconscious wish on a different plane entirely. For this 
unconscious wish is to be identified with the external context of signification within 
which the dream as a whole becomes intelligible. It is this context of signification 
which is then required to account for the role of the latent thoughts in the process of 
dream formation. 
An appreciation of the relation between these two conceptions of the wish is 
fundamental to an understanding of the two different procedures of investigation 
oriented upon them. We must thus distinguish a model of investigation devolving 
upon the role of the latent thoughts in the instigation of the dream and a technique of 
interpretation which attempts to delimit the register of sense supporting them. Any 
attempt to pursue the investigation of the unconscious wish in the same mode as that 
of the latent wish would merely conunit us to the fruitless pursuit of an elusive 
vanishing-point that is in fact no more than the internal reflection of an external 
perimeter of signification. The relation and articulation between these two models of 
investigation, on the other hand, provides us with a coherent account of the conditions 




This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that Freud's entire argument for the validity 
of the technique for the interpretation of dreams comes to devolve upon the 
proposition that every dream is to be understood as the fulftlment of a wish. We have 
suggested that the principle of wish-fulftlment does not stand as merely one fmding 
among others in the psychoanalytic theory of the dream, but rather constitutes the very 
foundation of the technique of interpretation from which that theory derives. Our 
understanding of the status of this principle and the position assigned to it within 
Freud's argument will therefore have a profound influence on our conception of the 
nature of that technique and the grounds for its validity. 
It is noteworthy, then, that we encounter this principle twice in the course of Freud's 
argument - once in the lecture on children's dreams, the apex of the initial empirical 
model of explanation, and then again in the discussion of the process of wish-fulftlment 
itself. It has been suggested that these two approaches to the principle of wish-
fulftlment are associated with two fundamentally different accounts of the orientation 
and grounds of validity of the psychoanalytic technique for the investigation of dreams. 
For it is in fact a critique of the initial empirical argument for the validity of this 
principle that allows us to elaborate a more comprehensive account of the conditions 
of psychoanalytic interpretation in general. 
The initial account develops a reflex-arc model for the explanation of the dream in 
terms of the nature of the latent thoughts that lie behind it. The problem of distortion 
remains the most obvious obstacle to the success of this procedure and the validity of 
the model of explanation elaborated around it. The concern to establish a verifiable 
relation of explanation between the manifest and latent poles of the dream issues in an 
attempt to suppress the register of distortion arising between them. This tendency is 
most apparent in the account of children's dreams, where it is in fact the suspension of 
the problem of distortion that allows the first introduction of the thesis of wish-
fulftlment. For it is only the exclusion of this register that allows Freud to demonstrate 
the nature of the latent stimulus as a wish left over from the experiences of the 
previous day. 
This functional model of the dream as a reaction to the disturbance of a stimulus in 
sleep becomes the basis for the psychoanalytic theory of the dream and the possibility 
of its explanation. The problem of distortion, however, remains an immediate and 
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constant restriction on the validity of this model and the legitimation of the principles 
upon which it depends. These difficulties come to focus upon the status of the wish in 
this model and the possibility of demonstrating its role in distorted dreams as well. We 
were forced to question whether the validity of the principle of wish-fulfilment could in 
fact be defended in these terms. We raised similar doubts about the viability of the 
attempt to arrive at an adequate defmition of the psychoanalytic concept of the 
unconscious by simply extending the scope of the distinction between the manifest and 
latent poles of the dream. 
The difficulties associated with this initial model for the explanation of the dream led 
us to question whether the validity of psychoanalytic procedures could ever be 
adequately established on these grounds. A critique of the empirical status of the wish 
as stimulus then allowed us to develop an alternative argument around the problem of 
distortion itself. Where the initial model attempted to eliminate the register of 
distortion in order to bring the wish to light, the introduction of the notion of 
censorship allowed us to invert the terms of this model and postulate the role of the 
wish precisely in order to account for the very distortion that hides it from view. This 
procedure of derivation becomes the basis for a revised account of the procedure of 
interpretation itself, which takes the register of distortion and representation as the 
foundation for its approach to the wish. 
ThIs approach allowed us to develop a more comprehensive account of the conditions 
of wish-fulfllment in the dream, elaborated around the register of representation which 
provides the basis for the process of dream formation as a whole. The theory of the 
dream-work was established as the true focus of a procedure of interpretation 
operating at a diagonal across the original axis of the relations between manifest and 
latent in an attempt to delimit the register of sense defined by that relation. A 
systematic account of the modalities of distortion arising in the relation between the 
manifest and latent poles of the dream allowed us to determine some of the conditions 
of representation at work in dream formation. The theory of the dream-work becomes 
the basis for a revised account not only of the goals and orientation of the technique of 
interpretation but also of the nature and status of the wish underlying the dream. 
The procedure of argument at the heart of this account at the same time allowed us to 
establish the principle of wish-fulfilment with the appropriate degree of universality 
required to justify the position attributed to it in Freud's argument. For the critique of 
the initial empirical grounds for this principle clears the way for a formal derivation of 
its status as a condition of possibility for the technique for the interpretation of dream". 
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This allowed us to elaborate this principle, in conjunction with the associated concepts 
of sense and transference, into the register of epistemological conditions supporting the 
validity of psychoanalytic knowledge in general. This manoeuvre, however, is only 
made possible by the procedure of argument that allows us to derive these concepts in 
their position as necessary conditions of validity of the technique of interpretation 
itself. 
The most obvious drawback of this procedure is that it has tended to neglect the 
empirical component of psychoanalytic investigation in favour of formal principles of 
interpretation elaborated without any obvious relation to the context from which they 
are derived. This tendency is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the approach taken 
in this thesis, which has used a critique of the empirical argument for the validity of 
psychoanalytic procedures in order to bring to light the further register of conditions 
which that argument is forced to assume. The tendency towards an empty formalism 
of transcendental conditions of interpretation would then be to some extent the direct 
outcome of the simplifications of this approach and its restricted account of the 
possibilities of an empirical argument in general. This approach might. however. be 
considered a necessary counterweight against a simplistic reading of Freud's argument 
in these lectures and the conception of psychoanalytic technique that would follow. 
Yet this approach has at the same time served to bring to light the dynamic procedure 
of argument at the heart of Freud's account and allowed us to follow Freud in 
suggesting that this style of argument be considered characteristic of psychoanalytic 
procedures in general. This dynamic procedure might similarly point the way forward 
to negotiating the simplifications of the distinction between the empirical and the 
transcendental in attempting to define a procedure of argument specific to the position 
of psychoanalysis in modern knowledge. The approach that has allowed us to 
distinguish these two strands of Freud's argument would then also allow us to maintain 
an appropriate articulation between them. We have attempted to emphasise at every 
stage of this account that it is the relation between these two procedures of argument, 
and the models of investigation associated with them, that allows us to arrive at a 
comprehensive account of the conditions of validity of psychoanalytic theory as a 
whole. 
These issues will be pursued in the second volume of these lectures where Freud turns 
to considering the explanation of the symptom. Here it is the question of resistance 
that will serve as the focus of investigation and the point of articulation of a dynamic 
procedure of argument. Where the problem of distortion has allowed us to establish 
the register of sense as the field of conditions supporting the validity of psychoanalytic 
explanation, so too the problem of resistance will now lead us to question the 
conditions of effective therapeutic intervention in the clinic. An examination of the 
paradoxical position of the phenomenon of transference, as both the primary condition 
of intervention and ultimate obstacle to the success of that procedure, will allow us to 
situate the register of transference in an analogous position as the foundation for the 
validity of psychoanalytic interpretation in general. The application of this technique to 
the clinical material will at the same time serve as the most effective test of the validity 
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